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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"He could not, Himself, mal<e a second self 
To be fiis mate - as well have made Himself." 
~ R. Browning, Caliban Upon Setebos 
The somewhat "Hollywoodesque" title of this dissertation can be 
easily misunderstood. It would not be difficult, for example, to miss 
the italics which indicate that the Frankenstein and the Emile 
referred to are not the characters in the respective works but are, in 
fact, the works themselves, Mary Shelley's novel (1818) and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau's histoire (1762). Why this seemingly innocuous 
misunderstanding takes place is one of the central problems with 
which this thesis is concerned, for latent in that initial reading of 
"Frankenstein meets Emile" are the key ideas which formulate the 
question to which this thesis is an answer: "What would it mean for 
modern educational theory if the educational experience were 
understood as a "continuous reconstruction""' of the complementary 
reciprocation^ between the ontology of philosophical hermeneutics 
and the epistemology of Women's Ways of Knowing?"^ And this is 
^ John Dewey defines education as "the continuous reconstrucion of experience." See 
Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 87. We will have more to say about this 
in Chapter 3. 
p 
'"Reciprocation" is intended as an echo of Gadamer's use of the phrase "a texture of 
reciprocal effects" in the context of a discussion of historical consciousness: "The effect 
{Wirl<ung) of a living tradition and the effect of historical study must constitute a unity of 
effect, the analysis of which would reveal only a texture of reciprocal effects." See Truth and 
Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 282-83. 
(All subsequent reference to Gadamer will be from this source unless otherwise stated.) 
®M Belenky, B. Clinchy, N. Goldberger, and J. Tarule, Women's Ways of Knowing (New York: 
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really asking several things: First, "What sort of educational 
experience is contingent upon a philosophy of education that is 
essentially hermeneutical?" Second, "In what ways can philosophical 
hermeneutics be complemented so as to account for gender issues?" 
Third, "How can the critique of gender be complemented by 
philosophical hermeneutics, reciprocally, so that one does not 
supercede the other?" And last, "How plausible is this philosophy of 
education as a counterweight to the monomethodologism of modern 
educational practice?"^ The "key ideas" that are latent in these 
questions form the bases for the next three chapters, 
"Understanding," "Experience," and "Bildung." And why Frankenstein 
Basic Bool<s, 1986). Hereafter in the text as Women's Ways. 
^As I expiain in Chapter 4, modern education has coliapsed practical judgment (what Aristotle 
refers to as phronesis) into technical know-how (or techne). Practical judgment belongs to the 
realm of "tact," of the "extrascientific experiences" that Gadamer associates with the four 
"guiding concepts of humanism": "Bildung," "taste," "sensus communis," and "judgment." 
And this is also where Gadamer connects with Women's Ways, for these are the key concepts 
that best illustrate the impropriety or "abuse of method," not only in the human sciences but 
also in the course of everyday human experience and in the educational experience of 
"constructed knowing" and "connected teaching." What we mean by the impropriety of method is 
that since any given method is supposedly derived from a "universal" principle, the application 
of that method would be invariant regardless of the situation, which is to say, tactless and 
therefore inappropriate. For example, someone who is taught a second language from a series of 
outdated audiotapes and who has had no other contact with that language (as was and still is the 
case in many of the former communist bloc countries and China), the result would be mere 
parroting. I.e. an "uncultivated" use of the language. The language user would have no "sixth 
sense" of how to use the language at the right time in the right place. In other words, the 
parroting would be applied techne without concern for the practical judgment of phronesis. it 
would not require any sense of taste, common sense, or practical judgment for its application, 
which is to say that tact, because it is not a techne, cannot be taught. And as we will see in 
Chapter 2, if we take this example as a "microtext" for the whole of our modern technological 
culture, and specifically for modern educational practices, this is the situation that we must 
come to terms with; for, as we are all aware, "method" in this context can be synonymous with 
an abusive and methodical, negative prejudice. And this leads up to the point that I am trying to 
make in the dissertation itself: knowing how to use techne at the right time in the right place (or 
phronesis) can be understood as the complementarity of Gadamer's "tact" and Women's Ways' 
"constructed knowledge." 
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and Emile are meeting as they are and what ihe\r meeting has to do 
with hermeneutics, feminism, and education will be the explicit topic 
of Chapter 5, which can be thought of as a metaphor or "microtext" 
for the implicit theme of the entire work.5 in Chapter 6, we will 
describe several classroom practices derived from our thesis. 
But in order to meet Frankenstein and Emile in this larger 
context, we will need a working knowledge of hermeneutics in general 
and of philosophical hermeneutics in particular as a kind of 
alternating current which will connect us to the problem of "truth" 
and "method" in education. To that end, the rest of this chapter will 
introduce us to the following: 1) Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
2) hermeneutics, 3) Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and the 
rationale for it in an educational context, 4) the role of hermeneutics 
in education, 5) a brief preview of the chapters to follow, 6) a 
statement of the question (problem) to which this dissertation is an 
a n s w e r ,  a n d  f i n a l l y ,  7 )  a  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  m e e t i n g  o f  F r a n l < e n s t e i n  a n d  
Emile by way of a discussion of the "monstrous imagination." 
Although it might seem more appropriate to begin with a survey 
of what is and what has been meant by the word "hermeneutics" and 
then move on to an introduction to Gadamer and an explanation of 
^Chapter 5 as "microtext" of ttie "tiieme" that is implicit in the entire worl< reflects the 
synecdochical or part-to-whole nature of hermeneutics itself and is at the heart of my thesis. 
Gadamer talks about it in terms of the "dialectic of the word . . . there is another dialectic of the 
word, which accords to every word an inner dimension of multiplication: every word breaks 
forth as if from a center and is related to a whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word 
causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate and the whole worldview that 
underlies it to appear. Thus every word, as the event of the moment, carries with it the unsaid, 
to which it is related by responding and summoning." See Gadamer, 458. 
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Gadamerian hermeneutics, I find that it is almost impossible to talk 
about hermeneutics without referring to Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1900 - ), the contemporary German philosopher or "hermeneutic 
theorist," whose thought dominates much of this work.® 
The son of a professor of chemistry, Gadamer was educated in 
the Classical German tradition of philology,^ the study of which 
developed into an ardent devotion to the dialogue-poetry of Plato 
which culminated in his "habilitation thesis on Plato's dialectical 
ethics, written for Heidegger in 1927 and 1928." But Gadamer's work 
with Heidegger actually began in in 1923. In a revealing passage from 
his autobiographical Philosophical Apprenticeships, he recounts that 
experience: ". . . after an attack of polio and as an immature doctor of 
philosophy and all-too-young husband, I went to Freiburg for a 
semester to study with Heidegger, naturally I also attended the 
lectures and seminars of Husserl."^ 
In 1960, nearly forty years later, at the age of sixty, this former 
student of Heidegger and Husserl, a distinguished university professor 
®The phrase is Allan Megill's. See his Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, 
Derrida (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 20-21. Commenting 
on the development of his thesis that postmodernism developed out of the work of these four 
"prophets of extremity," Megill says that "I was for a time tempted to include a major 
consideration of Gadamer in the present study. . . but decided against dealing with [him] because, 
finally, he rejects the notion of radical crisis. In Gadamer's view, life as it is actually lived has 
its own forms of solidarity, which persist even in the face of the hubris and confusion of the 
intellectuals." This position is, in fact, exactly why I have made Gadamer's work the focus of 
this thesis. It is his "moderate hermeneutics" that makes the complementarity of Dewey, 
Women's Ways, and the educational experience possible. 
^For most of us today, "philology" would be something like a hybridization of rhetoric, 
communication studies, literary theory, linguistics, and Ancient Greek. 
®Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships, trans. Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), x and 35. (Note that Heidegger's Being and Time was 
published in 1927.) 
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and beloved teacher in his own right (the Universities of Marburg, 
Leipzig, Frankfort, and Heidelburg, respectively), published his second 
book and major work, Wahrheit und Methode, a work described as 
"one of the two or three most important works of this century on the 
philosophy of humanistic studies.The first English translation 
(based on a second German edition) was published in 1975 as Truth 
and Method, and a second, revised English edition, based on the 1986 
revised and expanded fifth German edition was published in 1989 and 
is the text to which all reference will be made in this study. 
But this is not to suggest that this is all Gadamer wrote or all 
that he is known for. His lectures, essays, and articles have been 
collected in a number of English translations, and his collected works 
in German are projected for ten volumes, of which seven have 
appeared. However, he is known perhaps more popularly -- at least in 
academic circles ~ as a result of his debates with Jurgen Habermas 
and with Jacques Derrida."'® But Gadamer's influence has spread 
beyond the postmodernist debate. As Joel Weinsheimer, one of the 
translators of Truth and Method puts it, "Gadamer's thought has left 
its mark everywhere among the human sciences ~ in sociology, 
literary theory, history, theology, law - and indeed in philosophy of 
®Joel Weinsheimer, trans., "Introduction to Truth and Method" (New York: Crossroad, 
1989), xi. 
^ "^See Jurgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method" and Gadamer's response 
"On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection" both In Brice R. Wachterhauser, ed., 
Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy (Albany; SUNY Press, 1986). Also see Diane P. 
MIchelfelder and Richard Palmer, eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida 
Encounfer (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989). 
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natural science." To that list I would add the field of education."''' 
Gadamer's long and distinguished career as a teacher, 
philosopher, and cultural historian, notwithstanding, he is first and 
foremost read as a hermeneutic theorist, but it is in this role, 
ironically, that he is least understood -- ironically first because 
hermeneutics has been traditionally associated with the art of 
understanding, and secondly because Truth and Method is, among 
other things, a detailed history of hermeneutics itself. Gadamer 
himself acknowledges that, "Hermeneutics is a word which most 
people do not know and do not need to know. But they are nevertheless 
affected by the hermeneutic experience and not exempted. They too 
try to take something as something and finally to understand 
everything around them and to act accordingly."^ ^  one suspects that 
the main reason for this misunderstanding is due to a certain 
contextual ambiguity (associations with the even more ambiguous 
postmodernism), as well as to the literal strangeness of the word 
"hermeneutics." A recently published text in philosophical 
foundations of education,"'^ for example, makes this comment about 
one of the "persistent problems" presented by hermeneutics and 
phenomenology taken together as a movement: . . the difficulty 
many people have . . . with its reliance on hard-to-translate Germanic 
^^Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), ix. 
^ ^Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson, eds., Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and 
History (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 233. 
^ ^Howard A. Ozmon and Samuel M. Craver, eds.. Philosophical Foundations of Education (New 
York: Macmillan, 1990), 261. 
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terms and its penchant for hyphenated expressions create 
comprehension problems for many readers." So before we close in on 
Gadamer's version of hermeneutics -- what he calls "philosophical 
hermeneutics" ~ and its relevance to the educational experience, we 
need to clarify what we mean by "hermeneutics" in its broadest 
sense. 
Etymologically rooted in the Ancient Greek word hermeios 
"hermeneutics" refers "to the priest at the Delphic oracle, [and] the 
more common verb hermeneuein and noun hermeneia point back to 
the wing-footed messenger-god Hermes from whose name the words 
are apparently derived (or vice versa?). Significantly, Hermes is 
associated with the function of transmuting what is beyond human 
understanding and into a form that human intelligence can grasp.""'^ 
Kurt Mueller-Vollmer takes this image of Hermes-the-translator a 
step further: "In order to deliver the messages of the gods, Hermes 
had to be conversant in their idiom as well as in that of the mortals 
for whom the message was destined. He had to understand and 
interpret for himself what the gods wanted to convey before he could 
proceed to translate, articulate, and explicate their intention to 
mortals.""'® But maybe more to the point of those alleged 
comprehension (interpretation?) problems posed by the concept of 
hermeneutics, we must remember that Hermes, even as an Olympian, 
^ '^See Richard Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, 
Heidegger, and Gac/amer (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 13. (Pages 12-32 
give one of the best introductions to subject.) 
^^Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ed., The Hermeneutics Reader (Hew York: Continuum, 1992), 1. 
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was constantly changing his role, like the quicksilver with which he 
would be later associated by the Romans and by the alchemists (who, 
remember, were the magician-followers of that obscure incarnation 
Hermes Trimegistus). One is tempted to think of Hermes as the god of 
uncertainty, where "uncertainty" carries with it the proverbial 
understanding that nothing is certain save the uncertainty of fate. 
Consequently, whenever anyone attempts to "define" hermeneutics -
especially in the thin air of today's postmodernist atmosphere -- one 
might as well try to see the wind (of which Hermes was also a 
deity)."'® But this is to get ahead of ourselves by anticipating a point 
that will be emphasized later in this chapter and the chapters to 
follow. For now, we can put our feet back on the hermeneutical 
ground, so to speak, by briefly summarizing how hermeneutics has 
been applied in the context of recent intellectual history. 
In spite of the fact that Webster's New World Dictionary: Third 
College Edition defines hermeneutics only as "the art or science of 
the interpretation of literature,"^ ^  Professor Palmer has shown us 
that 
As it has evolved In modern times, the field of hermeneutics has been defined 
in at least six fairly distinct ways. From the beginning the word has denoted 
the science of interpretation, especially the principles of textual exegesis, 
but the field of hermeneutics has been interpreted (in roughly chronological 
order) as: 1) the theory of biblical exegesis; 2) general philological 
methodology; 3) the science of all linguistic understanding; 4) the 
methodological foundation of Gelsteswlssenschafteir, 5) phenomenology of 
^^Note that the illustration at the beginning of Emile's Book III represents Hermes engraving 
the elements of the sciences on columns (Bloom, 38). 
^ ^Victoria Neufeldt, ed., Webster's New World Dictionary, 3rd ed. (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988), 632. 
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existence and of existential understanding; and 6) the systems of 
interpretation, both recollective and iconoclastic, used by nnan to reach the 
meaning behind myths and symbols J ^  
And at the risk of understating what is a long and theoretically 
complex evolution of the concept but also l<nowing the background 
needs of this study, we can paraphrase Palmer's version of the history 
of hermeneutics in a fashion that is somewhat loosely based on 
Richard Rorty's version of the history of philosophy as he tells it in 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.^^ The linchpin in our 
paraphrase will be the concept of "spirit" as a metaphor for that 
which is to be interpreted. But this is "spirit" not in any ahistorical, 
biblical, or metaphysical sense. It is more in line conceptually with 
the "spirit" of the spirit/letter metaphor that the letter kills, but the 
spirit gives life (or that we follow either the "spirit" or the "letter" 
of the law). 
Given this metaphorical frame, then. Palmer's first category, the 
"theory of biblical exegesis" approach to hermeneutics, would be 
described as the rules and methods for interpreting Spirit (with a 
capital "S"), so that the "letter" is a construct of the Spirit, and 
would be analogous to the original "messenger" function of Hermes as 
interpreter of the gods. The main feature of this approach is its 
dogmatic reliance on the part-whole assumption that the New 
^®Palmer, 33. 
^^Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
ig79). 
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Testament is a whole unto itself. Martin Luther (1483-1546) is the 
representative hermeneuticist in this stage. 
The second type of hermeneutics, coinciding with the 
Enlightenment and represented by Friedrich Ast (1778-1841) and 
Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824), "marks the beginning of a general 
hermeneutics" in which "every work of literature is to be interpreted 
in the same way according to the same rules."^® Like biblical 
exegesis, this approach is still deterministic in that it is governed by 
a rigid methodology and a basic underlying assumption that inherent 
in the work itself is a spiritual unity that, under the correct 
conditions, can be revealed. In our terms, it would be the shift from 
the capital "S" Spirit to "spirit" in the lower case, but the letter (the 
pun is unintended) is still the construct of the spirit. To use Myron 
Abrams' turn of phrase, it is a shift from supernaturalism to "natural 
supernaturalism,"^'' where the secularized Spirit turns out to be the 
"spirit of the age." With this approach, the hermeneuticist's role is to 
discover, excavate, and to recreate meaning by thinking "backwards" 
through a historical-critical methodology until the interpreter 
himself is a participant in the unique "spirit" of the time. A 
significant point to remember here is that the general theory of 
philological method marks "the beginning of a general crisis in man's 
relation to his past. The mere fact that a theory of how works of the 
past should be understood is felt to be necessary indicates in itself 
^'^Guttorm Floristad, "Understanding Hermeneutics," Inquiry 16 (1973): 448. 
See M.H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution In Romantic Literature 
(New York: Norton, 1971). 
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that the smooth, unproblematic transmission of the tradition has 
come to an end, and moreover that the present itself has become a 
problem."22 
As we move to the third approach, keep in mind that we have 
been discussing first a "theory," then a "method," and now, with 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), we begin to think in terms of 
a "science." Schleiermacher, in contrast to Ast and Wolf, who limited 
their hermeneutics to works of literature, widened the field of 
interpretation to all linguistic utterance, e.g. biblical, literary, and 
legal. What was unique about his method is that it was 
"psychological." That is, in order to reconstruct the "true" meaning of 
the work, it was not enough to identify oneself with the world of the 
text; one also had to identify with the author of the text, which meant 
to discover "what the author had in mind." Grammatical and 
syntactical considerations were still valid as "objective" measures, 
but now they were also the intersubjective medium of the author's 
"subjective" style. The hermeneuticist would still "divine" meaning, 
but in our terms, the spirit to be divined would be an "inspirit" as in 
an inspiration, a psyche, what Gadamer calls "the nodal point in the 
artist's mind."23 But in spite of Schleiermacher's historical 
consciousness of individual expression, the letter is still the 
construct of the spirit, and a latent dogmatism persists in the 
^^Floristad, 448. Note that it was during this time period that Emile and Frankenstein were 
written. 
^®Gadamer, 166. 
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conviction tfiat it is possible to identify oneself with the author and 
the author's world-view. 
From Schleiermacher we move to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) 
who was Schleiermacher's biographer and the prolific expositor of 
hermeneutics as the methodological foundation of the 
Geisteswissenschaften or the "human sciences." Dilthey extended 
the field of hermeneutics beyond what Schleiermacher had proposed, 
namely literary, biblical, and legal texts, to include "all disciplines 
focused on understanding man's art, actions, and writings. 
Specifically, Dilthey's project was to formulate a science of 
historical understanding that would do for the human sciences what 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason did for the natural sciences. In other 
words, he wanted to find a way to objectify what was non-
objectifiable by proposing that history is made up of individuals and 
their life-experiences, and these life-experiences constitute an 
individual's life history in the same way that history can be said to be 
constituted by the accumulated life-experiences of all individuals. A 
life-experience, therefore, could be construed as something like the 
"molecular unit" of the human sciences from which all of history 
could be understood. Except for this turn, Dilthey's hermeneutics is 
basically Schleiermacher's approach but with the added difference 
that for Dilthey ~ anticipating Heidegger's (and Gadamer's) 
ontological hermeneutics ~ hermeneutics is inescapably bound up 
24palmer, 41. 
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with temporality, and here we have our metaphor of spirit becoming a 
function of time and being, a function that begins the identificatory 
movement towards the fusion of spirit and letter. But even though we 
can see the hand writing on the wall, with Dilthey the letters are still 
from the spiritual hand -- the letter is still the construct of the 
s p i r i t .  
Palmer's fifth classification, which is organized around 
Heidegger's work, includes Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, and 
since we will be looking at that approach in some detail immediately 
after this general survey of hermeneutics, here, for the sake of 
continuity, only a few key points need be mentioned. This 
phenomenological/existential hermeneutics, in Palmer's words,25 
"refers neither to the science or rules of text interpretation nor to a 
methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften but to the 
phenomenological explication of human existing itself." What is 
foundational to this approach is the recognition that hermeneutics is 
ontological. This means that since "understanding" and 
"interpretation" are identified with the hermeneutical experience 
and, reciprocally, identify that experience, they are also existential 
modes of human "being-in-the-world." Gadamer takes this ontological 
direction one step further by arguing that Being is linguistic, and his 
thesis in Truth and Method is, in fact, "Being that can be understood 
is language." {Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache.)^^ In 
^®lbid., 42. 
^®Gadamer, 474. 
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terms of the spirit/letter dichotomy, philosophical hermeneutics 
marks the fusion of the two, that is, spirit has become the construct 
of the letter (where letter is defined as language) and vice versa. 
A final category, according to Palmer, defines hermeneutics as 
the "recollective or iconoclastic" systems for interpreting myths and 
symbols. He cites the work of Paul Ricoeur as representative of this 
mode of thought, and Ricoeur's phrase the "hermeneutics of 
suspicion" is probably the best description of the function of this 
type of hermeneutics, namely the critique of ideology.^7 However, at 
this point, Palmer's 1969 version needs to be modified to take into 
account the work of Habermas and Derrida. To that end, and as a way 
to sum up this entire section, we can defer to the broad categories 
suggested by Shaun Gallagher.^s First, Gallagher combines the 
biblical/Schleiermacher/Dilthey approaches and labels them as 
"conservative hermeneutics," an approach that sees the aim of 
interpretation as "the reproduction of meaning or intention of the 
author by following well-defined hermeneutical canons that guide 
reading." He labels the work of Gadamer and Ricoeur as "moderate 
hermeneutics" and describes that approach as one wherein "no method 
can guarantee an absolutely objective interpretation of an author's 
work because, as readers, we are conditioned by prejudices of our own 
historical existence." He associates Heidegger and Derrida with the 
^^See Gadamer's reply to Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Suspicion," in Hermeneutics, ed. G. 
Shapiro and A. Sica (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 54, where Gadamer 
asl<s: "Is not every form of hermeneutics a form of overcoming an awareness of suspicion?" 
See Gallagher's Hermeneutics and Education (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 9-11. 
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claims of "radical hermeneutics" that "reading is more a case of 
playing or dancing than a puritanical application of method," and that 
"original meaning is unattainable." He groups Habermas, Marx, and 
Freud, among others, in "critical hermeneutics," where hermeneutics 
is "employed as means of penetrating false consciousness, 
discovering the ideological nature of our belief systems, promoting 
distortion-free communication, and thereby accomplishing a 
liberating consensus." For our purposes, we might think of Palmer's 
sixth grouping as a combination of "critical" and "radical" 
hermeneutics. This means that its aim is iconoclastic, but for 
someone like Habermas, that iconoclasm has to result in an 
"emancipatory reflection." This is not the radical hermeneutics of 
deconstructing meaning but a destruction of false consciousness in 
order to bring about a power-free, ideology-free, liberating 
consensus. If we were to see this in spirit/letter terms, we would 
begin to witness an inverse relation, a movement into a kind of 
"negative space." Rather than the letter as construct of the spirit, the 
spirit has now become a construct of the letter, and hermeneutics, in 
Gadamer's phrase, has become "a protection against the abuse of 
method."29 
So given this continuum of hermeneutical theory, what are the 
underlying assumptions for making the connection between 
hermeneutics and education? And what is it about Gadamer's 
^®Misgeld, 70. 
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philosophical hermeneutics (in Gallagher's terms, a "moderate 
hermeneutics") that precludes the other hermeneutic theories as the 
basis for a theory of education? And how, exactly, will "moderate 
hermeneutics" address the problem with which this hermeneutical 
approach to education is concerned? The next three chapters will take 
up all three of these questions in general but will specifically 
attempt to answer the first two by focusing on three traditional 
elements of educational theory, which are, as Georgia Warnke has 
demonstrated,30 also the key elements of Gadamer's hermeneutics: 
1) the role of understanding as a hermeneutical principle and its 
affinities with what we will be calling "tacit hermeneutical 
pedagogies":^! 2) Gadamer's concept of experience, which is 
advanced in the context of Dewey's insistence^^ that a philosophy of 
education must rely on a theory of experience and that "philosophy is 
the theory of education in its most general phases." Our purpose here 
will be to show how Gadamer can supplement Dewey and underwrite 
the compatibility of a continental philosophical hermeneutics with a 
philosophy of education in a liberal democracy: and 3) Bildung, the 
German word for "acculturation," discussed in terms of Women's 
Ways' "constructed knowledge" as the "meeting" of hermeneutical 
'^"Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1987), 167-174. 
31 
' Representative of this educational approach are "the pedagogies of understanding" (Perkins, 
Cohen, Egan), "the pedagogy of care" (Noddings), "connected teaching" (Belenky et al), 
"dialogic teaching" (Reinsmith), "constructivism" (Brooks and Brooks), educational theories and 
practices that are explicitly and/or implicitly derived from Gadamer's hermeneutics, and "the 
pedagogy of the oppressed" (Freire). We will discuss these in more detail in the next chapter. 
®^John Dewey, Democracy of Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 331. 
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understanding and experience The chapter then leads us into what 
can be construed as Part 2 of the thesis: a metaphorical treatment 
(Chapter 5) of the three previous chapters and our thesis as a whole, 
and a practical treatment of the same (Chapter 6). 
Chapter 5 will turn to literary texts, Frankenstein and Emile, 
as a way to further our inquiry.34 As an exemplum or metaphor for 
the complementary reciprocation between philosophical hermeneutics 
and Women's Ways, our task will be to gain a "different voice" for 
taking issue with techne or technical know-how and its signal 
relationship to Gadamer's and Women's Ways' preeminent theme, "the 
abuse of [patriarchal] method" and how it has effected a modern 
philosophy of education that is based upon "the idea that method --
especially scientific method and techne - is the road to truth."^^ 
The aim of the chapter (which is the microtextual theme of the whole) 
qq 
'^•'"Meeting" is an important theme throughout the thesis. For now, we might simply mention 
three ways that Gadamer uses the image. We will have more to say about each in the course of 
our thesis development: 1) "Understanding is always the fusion of these horizons [past and 
present] supposedly existing by themselves" (Gadamer, 306); 2) "Our inquiry has been guided 
by the basic idea that language is a medium where I and world meet or, rather, manifest their 
original belonging together" (Gadamer, 474); and 3) "Hermeneutic work is based on a polarity 
of familiarity and strangeness. . . It is in the play between the traditionary text's strangeness 
and familiarity to us, between being historically intended, distanciated object and belonging to a 
tradition. The true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between" (Gadamer, 295). 
^'^This is similar to the technique used by Maxine Greene, Landscapes of Learning (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 1978); Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); and by Bruce Krajewski, Traveling with Hermes (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1992). 
^^Robert Hollinger, "Toward a Hermeneutical Approach to Education," University of Dayton 
Review 17, no. 2 (Winter 1983), 13. Also in this regard, Gadamer hints at our implicit theme of 
monstrosity: "When a naive faith in scientific method denies the existence of effective history, 
there can be an actual deformation of knowledge. We are familiar with this from the history of 
science, where it appears as the irrefutable proof of something that is obviously false" 
(Gadamer, 301). 
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could very well be "to preserve us from naive surrender to the experts 
of social technology."^® We cannot overstate how important an 
"education for everyone" must play in that preservation, In spite of 
the fact that there is nothing new in a call for protection against the 
"monsters" of technology, even when those monsters begin to 
reproduce in the world of modern educatlon.^^ So one might think of 
Chapter 5 as a reaffirmation of Gadamer's thesis in Truth and 
Method: ". . . the thing which hermeneutics teaches us is to see 
through the dogmatism of asserting an opposition and separation 
between the ongoing, natural 'tradltionV and the reflective 
appropriation of lt."38 
®®Hans-Georg Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutioal Reflection," in 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. and trans. David E. Linge (Berl<eley: University of California 
Press, 1976), 40. 
®^ln this century alone, for example, we think immediately of Aldous Huxley's 1932 novel 
Brave New World; Jacques Ellul's La Technique ou I'enjeu du siecie, which was first published 
in 1954 and translated into English in 1964 as The Technological Society; Heidegger's "The 
Question Concerning Technology" (1954); C.P. Snow's The Two Cultures (1959); Gadamer's 
Wahrheit und Methode (1960); and more recently in more measured terms we thinl< of Albert 
Borgmann's Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (1984), published in the same 
year that Robert Hollinger proposed his "Toward a Hermeneutical Approach to Education" with 
its emphasis on the monomethodological takeover of modern education, and Thomas F. Green, in 
the Dewey Lecture for that same year, addressed "The Formation of Conscience in an Age of 
Technology"; and Donna Haraway's "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and 
Socialist Feminism In the 1980's" (1985). In 1990 Lynn Cheney's NEH report on educational 
practices gone wrong, "Tyrannical Machines," appeared; Neil Postman's Technopoly: The 
Surrender of Culture to Technology (1992) came out, and most recently, Joseph Dunne's (1993) 
indictment of the behavioral objectives model of education was published. 
op 
'^''Gadamer, 28. And as a further clarification of the intentions behind philosophical 
hermeneutics, we can turn to Gadamer's "Foreword to the Second Edition of Truth and Method": 
"] did not intend to produce a manual for guiding understanding in the manner of the earlier 
hermeneutics. I did not wish to elaborate a system of rules to describe, let alone direct, the 
methodical procedure of the human sciences. Nor was it my aim to investigate the theoretical 
foundation of work in these fields in order to put my findings to practical ends. If there is any 
practical consequence of the present investigation, it certainly has nothing to do with an 
unscientific 'commitment'; instead it Is concerned with the scientific integrity of acknowledging 
the commitment involved in all understanding. My real concern was and is philosophic: not what 
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In Chapter 6, we will demonstrate how Gadamer's concept of 
hermeneutical understanding can have application in the classroom 
and how the "meeting" of philosophical hermeneutics and Women's 
Ways can have a further impact on educational theory and 
practice.For at least the past twenty years, supporting evidence, 
both theoretical and practical, has been growing to substantiate the 
claim in favor of the compatibility of Gadamer's hermeneutics and 
education. In the practice of education, for example, we have seen 
the rise and development of collaborative learning, cooperative 
education, global awareness and multiculturalism, whole language, 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science's 
endorsement of a "Liberal Arts Approach to Science" (1991) and its 
offshoot, the "hands-on" approach to science and research, "Project 
Kaleidoscope" (1992), the new problem-solving configurations for the 
teaching of mathematics that were recently proposed by the National 
Council for the Teachers of Mathematics, the practice of "connected 
teaching," the spread of interest in interdisciplinary studies (note 
here the increasing memberships in organizations like the Association 
for Integrative Studies), the growing recognition of qualitative 
we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing" 
(xxviii). 
^^Relative to the universal needs of education, Gadamer identifies the task of philosophical 
hermeneutics as ihe opening up of the hermeneutical dimension in its full scope, showing its 
fundamental significance for our entire understanding of the world and thus for alt the various 
forms in which this understanding manifests itself: from interhuman communication to 
manipulation of society; from personal experience by the individual in society to the way in which 
he encounters society; and from the tradition as it is built of religion, law, art and philosophy, to 
the revolutionary consciousness that unhinges the tradition through emancipatory reflection' 
(Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function," 18). 
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research as a valid procedure, the widespread use of "portfolio 
assessment," and the current interest in understanding as a key 
component in the learning processAs for theory, the two 
principal works on the specific correlation between hermeneutics and 
education in general are Shaun Gallagher's Hermeneutics and 
Education (1992) and Timothy Crusius' A Teacher's Introduction to 
Philosophical Hermeneutics (1991). Gallagher's is a thorough 
treatment of contemporary hermeneutics in the service of his 
argument for Gadamer's "moderate hermeneutics" as a basis for 
rethinking "textualism" as the interpretive paradigm for the 
educational experience. He argues convincingly that the "educational 
experience is always hermeneutical experience.'"^"' Crusius' work 
was sponsored by the National Council of Teachers of English and is 
the second in a series of books dealing with contemporary 
scholarship. Its aim, generally, is to summarize for teachers of 
English and language arts the history and nature of hermeneutics, and 
to describe, specifically, some classroom-tested ways that 
philosophical hermeneutics, in tandem with rhetoric, has been applied 
to the teaching of composition. But the language arts classroom is 
only one area in education where this connection is being explored.'^^ 
^°See the following: Shulman, Messer, et ai., Tannen, Egan, Gardner, Perkins, Brooks and 
Brooks, and Cohen, et al. 
Gallagher, 39. 
Among the many articles which have appeared since 1973 are the following: Deetz (1973, 
1978), Vandenberg (1973, 1979), Hyde & Smith (1979), Rorty (1982, 1989), Brooks (1982), 
Stewart (1983), Hollinger (1983, 1984), Kinneavy (1987), Atkins (1988), Berthoff 
(1990,1991), Saeta (1991), Oshevsky (1992), Richberg, et al (1994), and Sotirou (1993). 
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Thus, on the evidence of twenty-five years of education's 
interest in Gadamer's hermeneutics, and on the strength and cogency 
of Gallagher's and Crusius' arguments, the case for hermeneutics and 
education needs to be given serious consideration by the education 
establishment. This means tal<ing stocl< in some of Gallagher's basic 
conclusions; 1) The educational experience is a dialectical 
"interchange of interpretations rather than an exchange of 
information;" 2) This interpretational interchange is opposed to "the 
narrowly defined epistemological notion of cognition;" 3) "The 
paradigm of learning is one that takes its bearing from the 
interpretational process rather than from the interpretational 
object," 4) The essence of Bildung includes "the dialectical [and 
play-like] movement of transcendence and appropriation;" and 5) 
Practical judgment or phronesis is "the interpretational virtue 
[most compatible with the educational experience] that one can fall 
back on within a hermeneutical situation that is uncertain.Given 
these conclusions, then, it seems that we cannot avoid the larger 
conclusion to which this line of thinking ultimately must lead: If the 
educational experience is, in fact, hermeneutical, and constitutive of 
that hermeneutical experience is an applied ontological understanding 
which is foundationally linguistic and a paradigm for learning, then 
the educational experience, itself, is ontological, and hermeneutical 
These include both theoretical and practical approaches to a variety of educational issues -- from 
the cognitive psychology of understanding, to rhetoric and speech communication, to the art 
class, to whole language instruction, to curriculum theory, to mathematics, to social studies. 
"^^Gallagher, 39, 39, 331, 50, 342 
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understanding (Gallagher's learning) becomes the paradigm for the 
educational experience. Minimally, a cautious acceptance of all or part 
of this conclusion would lead to a reexamination, on the one hand, of 
contemporary education's identification of phronesis with techne, 
and on the other, practice with hegemonic applied theory. At best, we 
could begin to talk about education as essential to our Being as well 
as to our ive//-Being. 
To conclude this chapter, we need to return to its beginning and 
the forewarning of how easily one can misunderstand the title of this 
thesis, for circumscribing that act of misunderstanding lies one of 
the quintessential concerns of Gadamer, hermeneutics, this study, and 
education: prejudice. 
Given the initial misreading of titles within titles, the reader's 
preliminary expectations for what this work is all about would 
probably have been effected by memories of the "Frankenstein 
Meets" subgenre of the horror movie, the "background radiation," if 
you will, of the Karloff-Lugosi Event. And it would take an individual 
reading of the text itself in order to determine where those 
memories and preconceptions would lead the reader. In the case of 
this thesis, sooner or later it would become apparent that that 
projected forethought, i.e., the connection with the monster-movie 
tradition, would not square with the facts as they begin to unfold. 
Hence, this situation would give rise to the question, "What truth 
shows up if my 'prejudices' and yours confront each other on the 
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occasion of this text?"^'^ It is when this "meeting" or confrontation 
shakes loose dialogue that a hermeneutical experience "happens" 
(where "hermeneutics" in its broadest sense means the processes of 
interpretation). The "truth" that "shows up" is what hermeneutics 
identifies with understanding] the "prejudices" are the unavoidable 
forestructures or pre-opinions immanent in the linguistic tradition 
that formulates that "truth"; and the question itself is the 
prerequisite opening without which "truth" as ontological 
understanding would not be able to "unconceal" itself. 
But at this point, our intention is not to spread all of the 
hermeneutical cards on the table. What we ofo want to accomplish 
with this Frankensteinian illustration is to demonstrate what will 
be, for most of this dissertation, an attempt to open up inquiry into 
how hermeneutics, feminism, and education, are interrelated.^® The 
remainder of this subsection, then, will present a brief hermeneutical 
reflection that will, first, locate in those prejudgments associated 
with the title a part that will stand for the whole of the thesis. That 
synecdochical relation will allow us, second, to build on those 
prejudgments, which will, in turn, third, open up the thesis to an 
intersubjective dialogue that will fourth, effect certain "truths" that 
will, in the course of dialogic time, become prejudices themselves, 
^^Roy Howard, Three Faces of Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982), 149. 
'^^Note that the word "demonstrate" derives from the Latin monstrare < monstrum: to show, 
to display (montrer in French), the same etymological source for "monster" and "muster." 
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open to hermeneutic reflection on their own terms. It is when these 
prejudice-induced "truths" that were conceptually (at conception) 
metaphors remain truths,that understanding is suffocated, the 
unnatural is naturalized, and "monsters" are created. 
So in a roundabout way this is an essay about monsters but only 
insofar as monster is circumvented by the concept of monstrosity. 
And it is in this individualized concept of "monstrosity" that we find 
the whole of our project. It is the part that will allow us to continue 
In the dialectical process of "whole-part-whole" which is the 
"hermeneutic circle" of understanding, a circular "inner dynamic, like 
that in a bead of mercury which, even when its original mass is 
shattered, continues in its fractions to manifest the same shape. 
The whole, in other words, effects the part and the part affects the 
whole.The "inner dynamic" of what follows, then, is the back-
and-forth movement of that whole-part-whole process that defines 
hermeneutical theory, a process that begins for us with the concept of 
"monstrosity." 
The notion of "monstrosity," as we will be using it, derives from 
'^^See Paul De Man's "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric" in Harold Bloom's The 
Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), where he analyzes the 
implications of Nietzsche's assertion that "truth is a mobile army of metaphors." De Man argues 
that "Truth is a trope; a trope generates a norm or value; this value (or ideology) is no longer 
true. It is true that tropes are the producers of ideologies that are no longer true' (127). 
'^^Howard, 10. 
48 
^°Put in terms of the scope of this project: my preconception or project -ion of wholeness, 
i.e., my expectation of immanent completedness, was an initial construing of "an original mass" 
(the apparent commonalities of philosophical hermeneutics, Women's Ways, and the education 
experience), which, when conceptually "shattered," continued in its "fractions," 
(Frantienstein, Emile, and their reciprocal wholeness, "monstrosity"), "to manifest the same 
shape" as that of my original foreconception. 
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Monstrous Imagination (1993), Marie-Helene Huet's study of the 
"maternal imagination" and the powerful influence it was believed to 
have had on the embryological development of the fetus.^^ From 
Huet's perspective "The monster was seen as a visible image of the 
mother's hidden passions ... the result of a mother's fevered and 
passionate consideration of images. . . . More specifically, monsters 
were the offspring of an imagination that literally imprinted on 
progeny a deformed, misshapen resemblance to an object that had not 
participated in their creation." A child might be born, for example, 
bearing no resemblance to either parent but bearing the likeness of, 
let's say, a statue that the mother, for whatever reason, was 
enamoured of during the pregnancy. "The monster thus erased 
paternity and proclaimed the dangerous power of the maternal 
imagination." In other words, "If Art must imitate Nature, in cases of 
monstrous procreation Nature imitates Art."®° We might think of it 
this way: In its role as subliminal progenitor, the apperception of an 
image (a work of art) takes over the mother's imagination {image -
ination). Once the takeover is complete, the subverted imagination 
develops into a kind of "imaginary" placenta which then directs the 
"natural" or biological reproductive sequence which results in the 
"monstrous" birth that is a reproduction of the original work of art, 
Marie-Helene Huet, Monstrous Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
Of secondary interest here is that Kant discusses "monstrosity" relative to his theory of the 
Sublime (in his Ciritique of Pure Judgement, which was first published in Berlin in 1790 and 
translated into French in 1796 -- approximately haif-way between the publication dates of Emile 
and Frankenstein, respectively). 
®°lbid, 6, 5, 1. 7. 
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thus Nature imitating Art. A point to remember here: the "monster" 
is monstrous not because of some horrific deformity, but because it 
has an uncanny likeness to something other than the supposed 
biological parents. 
Professor Huet traces this conceit through the Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance and argues that with Romanticism the tables turned: 
The maternal-monstrous imagination shifted from the procreative, 
embryoiogical sphere, to the aesthetic sphere where it was then 
inverted and appropriated as a creative, masculine attribute ~ an 
attribute that helped to create Romanticism's portrait of the (male) 
artist as a lone, solitary, semi-demonic, genius, who ~ like 
Prometheus, Zeus, and Yahweh, (and Caliban's god, Setebos) ~ could 
procreate ex nihilo. The obvious prototype here, of course, is Victor 
Frankenstein, about whom we will have more to say ~ especially as 
"specular companion" to Emile's Jean-Jacques.®"^ What is significant 
to remember now, however, is that with Victor Frankenstein "The 
teratogenic scientist ["teratogeny" is the science of creating 
monsters] had usurped the mother's place, his laboratory had become 
an artificial womb, and the model ~ the images [the statue I 
mentioned earlier] of earlier times hanging in the church or in the 
conjugal bedroom ~ now belonged to a linguistic category: the 
endless taxonomy of 'families' of monstrosities that living embryos 
®^The idea behind the phrase is essentially De Man's (See n. 46): "the homology between 
concept and figure as symmetrical structures and aberrant repressions of differences is 
dramatized in the specular destinies of the artist and the scientist-philosopher" (125). The 
mirror image of the two has obvious implications for the Emiie/Victor Frankenstein analogy. 
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would be made to replicate."®^ jh© "taxonomied" monster had now 
become a work of art, but art in the Aristotelian sense of techne as 
something that can be made {poiesis) via blueprint or recipe.®^ 
The importance of techne and phronesis to the purpose of this 
thesis will become even more evident in the three chapters which 
follow: for now, the point to be underscored is that the ascendancy of 
technical reason (reproduction) over practical reason (interpretation) 
revolved upon the Enlightenment's "prejudice against prejudice,"^^ 
its confidence that the universe, in Locke's phrase, was a "stupendous 
machine," and that Reason as the Natural Law which governs that 
machine, could be discovered, reproduced, and controlled Here is 
^^Huet, 122. 
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^''Again, to underscore the importance of the Aristotelian distinction between techne and 
phronesis to this thesis, I defer to Joseph Dunne's recent study oi phronesis and techne in 
modern philosophy, Bacl< to the Rough Ground (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1993). There he defines techne as . the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker; it 
gives him [sic] a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the how and with-what of the 
making process and enables him, through the capacity to offer a rational account of it, to preside 
over his activity with secure mastery" (9). But, as Dunne goes on to argue, even though it may 
be said of Aristotle that with this concept of techne he "laid down the authoritative framework 
for the whole Western tradition of purposive rationality" (9), "... he nonetheless stopped short 
of according it an unlimited jurisdiction in human affairs. Besides poiesis ... he recognized 
another type of activity, praxis, which is conduct in a public space with others in which a 
person, without ulterior purpose and with a view to no object detachable from himself, acts in 
such a way as to realize excellences that he has come to appreciate in his community as 
constitutive of a worthwhile way of life" (10). Because prax/s required something other than 
the detachment or "uncompromised sovereignty" of poiesis because it "brought one's emotions 
so much more into play and both formed and revealed one's character -- as well as because of its 
bringing one into situations that were very much more heterogeneous and contingent than the 
reliably circumscribed situations of poiesis, praxis required for its regulation a kind of 
knowledge that was more personal and experiential, more supple and less formulabie, than the 
knowledge conferred by techne. This practical knowledge (knowledge fitted to praxis) Aristotle 
called phronesis, and in his analysis of it, in which he distinguished it explicitly from techne, he 
bequeathed to the tradition a way of viewing the regulation of practice as something nontechnical 
but not, however, nonrational" (10). 
^^Gadamer, 270. 
This was not a unique, late eighteenth-century phenomenon. One need only remember that as 
early as 1620, Sir Francis Bacon was describing his "new organon" as the "machine" for 
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where Huet's explication of monstrosity comes in. As we have seen, 
monstrosity is linked to a process of "image resolution," either 
through the maternal imagination's processing of external objects or 
through the paternal (scientistic) imagination's recursiveness. Either 
way requires some sort of preconception which directly shapes the 
progeny, but the criteria by which one labels this progeny a 
"monster," as we have seen, depends upon degrees of identity and 
difference, and it is in this interpretive act that the unnatural gets 
naturalized.®® As Huet observes, the mistaken etymology of the word 
"anomaly" is analogous to this process. Originally from the Greek, 
an-omalos, "not-even" but misconstrued as derived from a-nomos, 
"not-law," and hence related to the Latin norma or "rule," ". . . the 
category of the monstrous is reduced ... to the category of 
norm/normal." When monsters become the classificatory property of 
the biological sciences, which means that the mother is excluded 
from the progenic process, "when we presume to imagine that we can 
provoke them experimentally, then the monster is naturalized."®^ As 
we noted above, the same thing can be said for prejudice: When 
prejudice {'preconception) is mistaken for ideology, and "Truth" or 
"The Correct Meaning" is reproduced or replicated rather than 
putting "piiilosophy and the sciences ... on the solid foundation of experience of every kind" (6). 
To paraphrase his famous aphorism: His "machine" would be the way to control Nature by 
obeying her (29). 
®®For an "unnatural" look at the nature of science, see Lewis Wolpert, The Unnatural Nature 
of Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), especially Chapter Two, "Technology 
is not Science." Note its relevance to our Chapter 3 on Dewey and his conception of scientific 
method. 
®^Huet, 102. 
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questioned as the metaphor it is, then the unnatural (the ideological), 
as was the case for the monstrous (an image of an image), gets 
"normed" or naturalized. The most obvious externalization of this 
phenomenon is the latest reincarnation of Frankenstein, the cyborg 
film -- more monstrous than its progenitor because the new eugenic 
version is a perfect human replication. It looks exactly like everyone 
else.58 
We can conclude this first chapter with what should prove 
to be not only a more concrete example of what we have just 
described, but also a transitional example which will move us 
into a discussion of hermeneutics as a theory of understanding 
and a step closer to the whole, a part of which has been this view 
of monstrosity. 
That first impressions are oftentimes, and ironically, 
/77/simpressions is self-evident. That they continue to be so we 
attribute to irrationality or a kind of "ironied irony." In his Science 
News article entitled "False Impressions,"®^ Bruce Bower reports 
on current research into the "social psychology" of such "judgmental 
mishaps" and tells the following story: 
As the clutch of mourners files out of the cemetery, they pass a neatly attired 
man approaching a grave. He kneels by the headstone, pulls a rubber chicken 
from his overcoat and props it against the burial marker. A strained chuckle 
®®ln "real life" one need only recall the recent controversy over the cloning of human 
embryos. The scientific community was quick to point out that, after all, this was a technique 
quite common to the assembly-line procedures of animal husbandry. One is also reminded of the 
occasional forgery, e.g., the "discovery" of a "new" Rembrandt or of Hitler's Diaries. 
®®Bruce Bower, "False Impressions" Science News 141 (March 28, 1992), 200-203. 
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escapes from the pit of his stomach. 
Puzzled looks cross the mourners' faces. By the time they reach their 
cars, each has an explanation for the bizarre scene. 
"What a disrespectful young man," says one woman. "How would you 
like someone to throw a dead chicken on your grave and then laugh about it?" 
Her husband nods. "He did look a little funny. Could have been gloating 
over the death of a business competitor." 
Another woman shakes her head. "Who knows, the chicken might have 
meant something to the dead person. Still that guy was odd, wasn't he?" 
Meanwhile, the mysterious poultry bearer pays his last respects to his 
departed friend, a comedian whose favorite prop was a rubber chicken."®® 
Citing evidence to support tfie apparently natural human propensity to 
be "drastically overconfident about [our] judgments of others," the 
researchers' remind us that studies over the past twenty-five years 
have emphasized "the tendency of people to assume that another 
person's behavior reflects primarily his or her underlying personality 
traits rather than the influence of the situation in which the behavior 
occurs." But instead of searching for a "dividing line" between 
"disposition and situation," the focus of recent investigation has been 
on "exemplar-mediated prejudice," [italics mine] where an 
"exemplar" is defined as a mental representation of some "other" 
individual, a picture which suggests positive and negative qualities 
that affect our impressions of real people who somehow match up 
with that particular exemplar.®^ 
But like Browning's Caliban, who "sees" an "exemplar" of his God 
Setebos recursively - that is, it endlessly "loops" like a television 
screen that has lost its horizontal hold - if we become so 
®°lbid., 200. 
®1|bid. 
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straitjacketed in our own prevision or forestructure so as not to 
allow for any openness whatsoever, if we have disallowed the 
readiness for interpretive understanding, if we are closed to the 
eductive process of drawing us out of our prejudices in favor of a 
deductive process of drawing us Into them, then we are within an 
experiential continuum that not only is miseducative in Dewey's 
sense, but is also irrational in the political sense of a liberal 
democracy. To live in such circuitry is to live in a technocracy. The 
Enlightenment's solution to this sort of "irrationality," as I 
mentioned earlier, was an insistence, as Gadamer incriminatingly 
puts it, on "a prejudice against prejudice." For Gadamer, prejudice (in 
the sense of preconception or prejudgement as we have been using it) 
is not the problem. The problem, as he sees it, (and as this thesis 
presents it in relation to education) is the identification of truth 
with method. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDERSTANDING 
The Understanding, iil<e the Eye, whilst it makes us see, 
and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of itself; 
And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance and 
make it its own Object. 
- Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
What the object-other yields to us in nonconscious 
response is understanding. - Nel Noddings, Caring 
When John Locke hypostatizes understanding as "the most 
elevated Faculty of the Soul,"®^ he is not talking about "women's 
ways of knowing" nor is he talking about philosophical hermeneutics, 
for as Dilthey remarked, "No real blood runs in the veins of the 
subject that Locke, Hume, and Kant constructed.For Gadamer and 
ior Women's Ways of Knowing^'^ such empirically constructed 
monstrosities, rather than epitomizing what it means to be human, 
actually represent a dehumanization and negation of human 
understanding and, in effect, continue to reinforce Bacon's dictum 
that "Human knowledge and human power meet in one."®® 
"Understanding," for Women's Ways, "involves intimacy and equality 
between self and other"®® and is inviolably embedded in an ethics of 
®^Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 6. 
Gadamer, Truth and Mettiod, 246. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to 
Gadamer will come from this work. 
®'^Mary Belenky, et al.. Women's Ways of Knowing (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Hereafter 
abbreviated as Women's Ways. 
®®Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. F.H. Anderson (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1960), 39. 
®®Belenky, et al., 101. 
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care, in "connected knowing," and in "connected teacliing." This way 
of thinking about understanding shares in the ontological 
understanding as it is described by Gadanner's philosophical 
hermeneutics and in the understanding of which the practitioners of 
"pedagogies of understanding" are implicitly aware. 
Nevertheless, Locke's quasi-psychologistic philosophy of 
understanding, or a loosely fitting Humean derivative of it, is the 
version that most educationists have in mind with Benjamin 
Bloom's®^ behavioral objectives model, when they urge 
understanding to "make it its own object," as if it were something 
that we "have," something intrinsic to human beings -- to turn a 
Rortyan phrase ~ that allows us to "understand" things as "they 
really are." But ironically this essential "cognitive" faculty eludes 
adequate definition. For example, here is the entry for 
"understanding" as it appears in the 1952 Penguin edition of A 
Dictionary of Psychology: "The apprehension of the meaning of 
phenomena, words, or statements: often employed loosely and 
indefinitely, as some sort of agency; general term, covering functions 
which involve apprehension of meaning."®® The point here is not that 
this was the "technical" definition on which the professional 
psychologists at the Boston convention were relying, but as a 
®^Keep in mind that the first worlting group for Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives 
was made up of college examiners attending the 1948 American Psychological Association 
Convention in Boston, and "Handbook I: Cognitive Domain" of the Taxonomy was published in 
1956. 
®®James Drever, A Dictionary of Psychology (Middlesex: Penguin, 1952), 306. 
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pervasive concept, we can assume that it was representative of the 
population's usage in general and of the educational community in 
particular. 
We might imagine that for Locke (and for many of today's 
educational psychologists), understanding is something like a 
cognitive capacitor for the storage of perceptions that also provides 
the potential energy for the association of those perceptions as Truth, 
all of which is effected by the "electricity" of Reason. Understanding 
as this objectifiable and quantitative Truth-to-Reason ratio is, by and 
large, what has stayed with us today in the technical rationality of 
the behavioral objectives approach to education, an approach that 
"requires Art and Pains" to measure the degree to which 
understanding -- that elevated "thing" which we have inside of us --
has been achieved in our students, and this at the expense of a 
philosophy of understanding that recognizes the futility of treating 
education as an applied science. 
As a way to begin to talk about the compatibility of Gadamer's 
understanding as a hermeneutic principle and recent approaches to 
education that might be best summed up as "pedagogies of 
understanding," our task in this chapter will be, first, to define 
understanding in its "elevated status" as "a hermeneutic 
principle":®^ second, to deploy Joseph Dunne's Gadamerian-based 
argument against the empirical model of understanding and its 
offspring, the behavioral objectives model of teaching, as inimical to 
®®Gadamer, 265. 
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the educational experience and as representative of what Gadamer 
attacks as "method"; and third, to suggest that the concept of 
understanding as it is used by Gadamer is compatible with the concept 
of understanding as it is developed by the current practitioners of the 
pedagogies of understanding 7° 
Described by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall in their 
"Translator's Preface to Truth and Method as "the central question of 
Gadamer's investigation,"7"' "understanding" is given its fullest 
treatment in Part Two, Section II, of Gadamer's Truth and Method. 
There we discover -- as Deetz recognized in his seminal articles on 
Gadamer's hermeneutics and communications studies^^ „ that 
Gadamer's "understanding" can be broadly characterized by the 
following: 1) historicity, since it is detached from all dogmatic 
interest in explaining the course of events as the result of ahistorical 
causes; 2) linguisticality, in that language is the fundamental mode 
of our being-in-the-world and therefore the mode of understanding 
itself;^^ and 3) its dialectical structure, or the essential 
^°These "pedagogies of understanding" include "connected teaching" as it is described in 
Chapter 10 of Women's Ways of Knowing-, however, since our Chapter 4 is explicitly concerned 
with that aspect of the thesis, discussion of "connected teaching" throughout this chapter will be 
implicit. 
Gadamer, xvi. 
^^See Stanley Deetz's "An Understanding of Science and a Hermeneutic Science of 
Understanding," The Journal of Communication 23 (June 1973), 139-59, and "Conceptualizing 
Human Understanding: Gadamer's Hermeneutics and American Communication Studies," 
Communication Quarterly 26; 2 (Spring 1978), 12-23. Deetz's work also figures into the 
discussion of care and Women's Ways of Knowing in Chapter Four. 
Gadamer's aphorism which is a microtext for the whole of Truth and Method is "Being that 
can be understood is language" (Gadamer, 474). 
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"openness" of understanding, a predisposition for the "logic of 
question and answer" whicli allows for interaction and integration or 
"fusion of horizons" between interlocutors. 
When we refer to Gadamer's "understanding" as being "elevated 
to the status of a hermeneutic principle," it is really the 
historicity^^ of understanding that is being so elevated. The 
problem with historicity "is how hermeneutics, once freed from the 
ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of objectivity, can 
do justice to the historicity of understanding." To answer this 
question, Gadamer relies on the concept of the hermeneutical circle to 
explain that although "hermeneutics has traditionally understood 
itself as an art or technique," its circular structure, constitutive of 
Being itself, is "not primarily a prescription for the practice of 
understanding, but a description of the way interpretive 
understanding is achieved."^^ 
For Gadamer this means that understanding is not simply 
empathy. It is not "a mysterious communion of souls, but sharing in 
common meaning." Indeed understanding "will always involve more 
than merely reconstructing the past 'world' to which the work 
belongs. Our understanding will always retain the consciousness that 
we too belong to that world, and correlatively, that the work too 
belongs to our world." Because understanding constitutes the 
Palmer defines "historicity" as "the intrinsic temporality of understanding itself in seeing 
the world always in terms of past, present, and future . . (Palmer, 180). 
^^Gadamer, 265-266. 
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movement of Being itself, we can never presume to tliinl< that a 
"correct" meaning or intention is discoverable by some innate faculty 
that allows us to identify with another person or with another time 
period. The most we can hope to achieve is "that we remain open to 
the other meaning of the other person or the text. But this openness 
always includes our situating the other meaning In relation to the 
whole of our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it." In fact, 
"the hermeneutical task becomes itself a questioning of things . . . 
[and] a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him 
[sic] something. That is why a hermeneutically trained consciousness 
must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's alterity. But this kind 
of sensitivity involves neither 'neutrality' with respect to content 
nor to the extinction of one's self, but the foregrounding and 
appropriation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices. The 
important thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text can 
present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth 
against one's own fore-meanings." "It is the tyranny of hidden 
prejudices that makes us deaf to what speaks to us in tradition." 
For our purposes, the historicity of understanding might be best 
summed up with Gadamer's emphasis that, "Understanding is to be 
thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of 
tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are 
constantly mediated. This is what must be validated by hermeneutic 
theory, which is far too dominated by the idea of a procedure, a 
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method." It is this mediation of present and past that Gadamer calls a 
"fusion of horizons" and by which he further defines understanding: 
"Understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly 
existing by themselves."^® 
Contemporaneous with this fusion of horizons is the linguistical 
dimension of Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding. And Gadamer is 
unequivocal about this when he asserts that "Being that can be 
understood is language" or that "understanding and interpretation are 
ultimately the same thing.And this linguisticality, in turn, bears 
directly on the historicity of understanding: "The essential relation 
between language and understanding is seen primarily in the fact that 
the essence of tradition is to exist in the medium of language, so that 
the preferred object of interpretation is a verbal one." This means 
that "the linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of 
historically effected consciousness," a claim that allows for 
understanding and interpretation to "transcend" their specific 
relationship to the verbal tradition "because everything that is 
intelligible must be accessible to understanding and to interpretation. 
What is true of understanding is just as true of language. Neither is to 
be grasped simply as a fact that can be empirically investigated. 
^®lbid., 268-270, 290, 306. 
^^Ibid., 474, 388. As a way to imagine what Gadamer is getting at here, we can call up Joseph 
Dunne's use of the Irish poet Seamus Heaney's analogy of a snowman: "A human being pondering 
the nature of language is not unlike a snowman attempting to comprehend the nature of snow, for 
the snowman's instruments of cognition are no less snowy than the human being's are wordy" 
(Dunne, 413). Dunne goes on to reinforce this image by quoting from Gadamer's essay "Man and 
Language": .. all thinking about language is already once again drawn back into language. We 
can only think in a language and just this residing of our thinking in a language is the profound 
enigma that language presents to thought" (413). 
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Neither is ever simply an object but instead comprehends everything 
that can ever be an object."^® In sum, "the phenomenon of 
understanding shows a universality of human linguisticality as a 
limitless medium that carries everything within it."^® Or to borrow 
a metaphor from Heidegger: "Tradition, then, is not over against us 
but something in which we stand and through which we exist; for the 
most part it is so transparent a medium that it is invisible to us--as 
invisible as water to a fish."®® 
When we speak about the dialectical, the third way of 
distinguishing Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding, we need to 
make the distinction between "dialogic" and "dialectic." Although for 
Gadamer, understanding, almost by definition, interinvolves both of 
these, the dialogical can be thought of as simply an exchange of 
information, as in having an introductory conversation with a new 
acquaintance; whereas, "dialogue proper, which is concerned with the 
common search for meaning ... is the original form of dialectics." 
This is the integrative principle to which we have already been 
introduced as the "fusion of horizons," which is not a closing (in that 
sense of "fusing") of the dialogue but rather an opening up of 
heretofore unknown possibilities. It takes the dialogue beyond what is 
already present while changing the "horizons" of the interlocutors in 
such a way as to "disconceal" what was "dormant" or otherwise 
^®Gadamer, 389, 404. 
^^Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function," 25. 
®°Palmer, 177. 
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hidden in the interactivity of the linguisticality of Being on the one 
hand, and, on the other, the "historically effected consciousness" that 
brings this new Being, so to speak, into being. And Gadamer makes the 
point over and over again that this is indeed an emancipatory 
experience. For example, he claims that, "The hermeneutical 
experience is the corrective by means of which the thinking reason 
escapes the prison of language, and it is itself verbally constituted." 
And elsewhere he says, "All human speaking is finite in such a way 
that there is laid up within it an infinity of meaning to be explicated 
and laid out." But perhaps more specifically, he tells us that, "To 
reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting 
oneself forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, 
but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain 
what we were."®^ 
Nonetheless, granted the emancipatory movement of the 
dialectic, it is the "question" that is the undercarriage of this 
dialectical freedom or openness: ". . . thus the relation of question and 
answer is, in fact, reversed. The voice that speaks to us from the past 
-- whether text, work, trace -- itself poses a question and places our 
meaning in openness. In order to answer the question put to us, we the 
interrogated must ourselves begin to ask questions. We must attempt 
to reconstruct the question to which the traditionary text is an 
answer. But we will be unable to do so without going beyond the 
Gadamer, 188, 402, 458, 379. 
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historical horizon it presents us." In short, a good way to get a feel 
for this dialectical quality of Gadamer's understanding is to consider 
it in terms of the following aphoristic formulation: "To understand a 
question means to ask it. To understand meaning is to understand it as 
an answer to a question."®^ 
To summarize, then, understanding for Gadamer is ontological in 
that we cannot historically objectify it because it is the temporal 
movement of our Being itself. To adapt Ezra Pound's definition of 
poetry, we might think of it as "news that stays news." It is 
ontologically bound up and made manifest by language which is how 
Being can be understood in the first place. And it is ontological in 
that it is dialectical, sharing in that non-methodical give-and-take, 
back-and-forth freedom of movement that characterizes "play" as 
well as the aesthetic experience. In its openness, in its 
questionableness, it is, like a Heraclitean "source," forever renewing 
Itself while forever offering up the refreshing potential for the 
nourishment of life, which, if we want to come full circle, is what 
Being and ontology are all about. 
Before moving on to the problem of how hermeneutical 
understanding can provide us with a possible antidote for the "abuse 
of method" in education, e.g. the behavioral objectives model, let's 
take a look at what Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding might be 
like in practice.®^ However, we need to remember that this is not a 
®2|bid., 374-375. 
®®ln Chapter 6, we will describe some classroom applications for Gadamer's philosophical 
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"technique" for how one goes about interpreting a literary text. It is 
an exemplum, a metaphor for philosophical hermeneutics and thus a 
metaphor for Being itself. 
In one of his fusees or "rockets," (which is how he referred to 
the entries in his personal journals), the nineteenth-century French 
poet, Charles Baudelaire, says that "God is the only being who, in 
order to reign, would not even need to exist." {Dieu est le seul etre 
qui, pour regner, n'ait meme pas besoin d'exister.)^^ As a way of 
sorting out the role of understanding in Gadamer's thought, we can 
appropriate what Baudelaire seems to be saying here about God as 
also true of what Gadamer seems to be saying about the historicity of 
understanding. However, we have to move cautiously, for as we have 
just seen, any claim to know what Baudelaire "really" meant is 
undermined from the outset by the historicity of understanding. At 
best -- and at least for the sake of metaphor -- let's conceive of 
Baudelaire's meaning as having something to do with the fact that 
even if God didn't exist (and the insinuation is that God does not 
exist), people would find a way to create "Him." Now let's give that 
meaning a little temporal and spatial distance. A contemporary 
nineteenth-century bourgeois reader's first interpretive response 
might be to write off this seemingly absurd paradox as one of 
Baudelaire's typically smug wisecracks designed for instant shock 
value, an arrogant smugness similar to the exhibitionist "punkers" of 
hermeneutics complemented by Women's Ways of Knowing (and vice versa.) 
°^David Paul, trans. Poison and Vision, 98. 
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a later generation doing their purple-mohawk, iconoclastic thing to 
make a point about pointlessness and, in an unconscious and ironic 
way, according to Charles Taylor, about authenticity.®^ What this 
hypothetical Parisian reader would be projecting onto the text would 
be his or her own historically situated "prejudices"; These may be 
about the "degenerate" poet Baudelaire, his offensiveness to the 
Catholic tradition, his insensitivity to what were passing for 
accepted manners of human decency, and his brazen disregard for 
decorum or "good taste" in poetry. There would be no attempt on that 
reader's part to cultivate what philosophical hermeneutics values: to 
recognize that all understanding involves some prejudice, and that 
there /s such a thing as a "legitimate" or enabling prejudice that 
allows us to get at where the text (Baudelaire) and the reader are 
"coming from"; to engage in dialogic openness with the Other; to 
question the text and to have it question you; to achieve an awareness 
or anticipatory consciousness that this text might, in fact, have 
something to "unconceal," something to say to an individual reader, 
maybe even be the reader. But from this particular bourgeois reader's 
contextual point of view, he or she would be responding reasonably. 
I.e. objectively, to an inconsequential, highly subjective, and simply 
gratuitous remark made by a notorious poete maudit, a remark the 
meaning of which, in the reader's mind, is patently obvious. In turn, 
®®See Charles Taylor's The Ethics of Authenticity {Cambridge and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1992) and its "companion" volume, Muiticulturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition.' 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.) 
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this exemplar-mediated prejudice would remain subordinated to "the 
tyranny of the hidden prejudice" and would, in its own idiosyncratic 
"gossipy" way, methodically affect future history by effecting a 
historical consciousness that would run together the past, present, 
and future. 
But now let's add even more temporal and spatial distance: Let's 
imagine a twentieth-century small-town lowan (a "he" in this case), 
who has been raised in the tradition of family, community, and Judeo-
Christian values. If he were to approach this sentence "normatively" 
(or maybe a more accurate way to say this would be non-
hermeneutically), without knowing Baudelaire's lurid reputation, he 
might interpret the sentence as a clever albeit profound affirmation 
of faith. The thinking involved would probably go something like this: 
"This statement is very religious indeed. What it says to me is that 
there is no need (in fact there is no way) to prove that God exists as 
an historical, physical Being, because the only way that anyone can 
ever know that God exists is through faith. In other words, that God 
does not exist is all the more proof one needs to know that He, in fact, 
omnipotently and omnisciently rules heaven and earth." 
Now imagine that a friend (a "she" in this case), who is a neo-
Marxist sociologue, sees this person reading the line from 
Baudelaire, recognizes it as one of Baudelaire's fusees, and with 
confident ebullience explicates it something like this: "Presumably 
Baudelaire's suggestion here that God exists by not existing (or vice 
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versa) is that God, in fact, does not exist except as an ideological 
construct, a false consciousness that connes into existence for a 
variety of dominative reasons, the least of which originates in what 
Nietzche called the Will to Power -- and that this absence somehow 
reifies what Derrida calls a 'metaphysics of presence.'" 
If, like the nineteenth-century bourgeois reader, the small-town 
lowan is complacently inexperienced because his horizons are so 
limited, so lacking in the essential "readiness" or "openness" 
necessary for someone to have a "new" experience ~ to, in fact, 
understand ~ he will remain in a "dogmatic slumber," self-
condemned to "sleepwalk through history."®® But if he approaches 
this new disclosure about the meaning of Baudelaire's sentence 
dialectically, the experience would be one of negation, and the 
response might go something like this: "Ironically, much to my 
embarrassment, the opposite of what I took to be the meaning of the 
statement turns out to have a reasonable validity all of its own." And 
it is here, according to Gadamer, that through something like a 
spiraling effect with Erfatirung (the hermeneutical experience which 
will be the subject of the next chapter), understanding finds an 
opening and "happens" [geschehen). This is what he describes as the 
"fusion of horizons" {Horizontverschmelzung). But by this he does not 
mean an assimilation of the two horizons so that Hegelian-like, a new 
and "better" interpretation unfolds itself. What Gadamer is insisting 
The "hidden tyranny" of gender issues would certainly come into play here as well, and this 
is a topic we will deal with directly in Chapter Four. 
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upon here is an essential dialogue between the text and the 
interlocutor, a questioning of the text in order to arrive at an 
understanding of the question to which the text is an answer. 
Now, back to my situation as the writer of these words and the 
contriver of this metaphor. Given my current horizon contoured by 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics -- I find myself fusing my 
"experienced" horizon with Baudelaire's historical horizon by 
maintaining an openness to what it is that both of us are 
understanding. This is to say that I am seeking the question to which 
this fusee might be an answer. But having said this, I must be 
careful, for I could still mistake the originating question for one that 
satisfies my own immediate needs. For example, I might decide that 
the question is, "How can this line from a nineteenth-century poet be 
interpreted as a means of illustrating Gadamerian understanding?" 
Obviously this is a valid question, but it is not a question that has 
been effected by historical consciousness. It is an instrumental or 
methodological question that begs the issue of verification, and 
accordingly we find ourselves back under "the tyrrany of the hidden 
prejudice." But if 1 truly engaged in a dialogue with the text, as 
Gadamer insists that we must, the opening would rightly disconceal 
itself, and the question that I share with Baudelaire might be 
something like, "What relationship exists between Being and 
Nothingness that paradoxically makes Truth possible?" As 
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hermeneutical understanding emerges, as horizons fuse, a tacit truth 
about something that Baudelaire is saying presents itself as an 
answer to that question -- an answer as appropriate to Baudelaire's 
horizon as it is to mine. It is this "reflexive" dimension of 
understanding that Gadamer identifies as his philosophic "real 
concern": ". . . [with] not what we do or ought to do, but what happens 
to us over and beyond our wanting and doing."®^ What emerges is not 
a better horizon, but a different horizon, not a separate and distinct 
horizon of understanding, but a different historically-acted-upon and 
effected perspective that, in//s unhidden turn, conceals and reveals 
that "inner tension or ambiguity" that Gadamer speaks of as "truth." 
So from our encounter with Baudelaire's fusee, a different way 
to think about Gadamer's "new ontology of the event of 
understanding" - of understanding as "the ontological process" --
emerges.®® In one way, Baudelaire's existing-by-not-existing God 
becomes analogous to thinking about Gadamer's understanding as "the 
establishment of a metaphorical relation, it fuses two horizons in 
such a way that they are both the same and different. Without mere 
contradiction, the hermeneutic as joins at one time both is and is 
not, and 'in this as,' Gadamer writes, Mies the whole riddle.'"®® In 
other words, in order to rule, it would not even have to exist. Here, by 
®'^Gadamer, xxviii. 
®®Palmer, 163. 
OQ 
Joel Weinshelmer, "Gadamer's Metaphorical Hermeneutlcs," In Gadamer and 
Hermeneutics, ed. Hugh Silverman (New York: Routledge, 1991), 201. We will refer to 
Gadamer's assertion of the "fundamental metaphoricity of language" In Chapters 4 and 5 where 
we discuss the possibilities of a metaphoristic approach to our thesis. 
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way of transition, Gadamer's point about "infinity" seems to have 
special relevance: 
But the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never 
finished; it is in fact an infinite process. Not only are fresh sources of error 
constantly excluded, so that all kinds of things are filtered out that obscure 
the true meaning; but new sources of understanding are continually 
emerging that reveal unsuspected elements of meaning. The temporal 
distance that performs the filtering process is not fixed, but is itself 
undergoing constant movement and extension. And along with the negative 
side of the filtering process brought about by temporal distance there is also 
the positive side, namely the value it has for understanding. It not only lets 
local and limited prejudices die away, but allows those that bring about 
genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such.^^ 
As was indicated in Chapter 1, this thesis is concerned with the 
problem of counteracting "the naive surrender to the experts of social 
technology" as it applies to the educational community. On this 
account, we can take Hollinger's (1984) and Dunne's (1993) 
observations as being our own. We recall that Hollinger, working from 
Gadamer's treatment of Aristotle's theory of the general conduct of 
life, concludes that modern society's educational ideals and practices 
have been reduced to the needs of a "cost-benefit, utilitarian model 
of rational choice."^^ This is evident in how our ethos, our public 
activity of being-human-in-the-world {praxis) with its 
corresponding principle of practical reason, the judgment necessary 
for the rational deliberation of means to ends {phronesis), has been 
reduced to the activity of producing outcomes (po/es/s) which is 
®°Gadamer, 298. 
Robert Hollinger, "Toward a Hermeneutical Approach to Education," University of Dayton 
Review 17 (Summer 1984), 13. 
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guided by its corresponding principle of technical reason or expert 
knowledge of ends in themselves (techne). In other words, judgment 
has been reduced to method, a reductionism underscored by the irony 
in the title of Gadamer's Truth and Method. He is not offering a 
method for arriving at truth; he is putting truth and method in relief 
as counterintuitive. Moreover, for Gadamer this misguided collapsing 
of truth or judgment into method has resulted in the 
indistinguishability of moral from technical knowledge, and he insists 
that they cannot be thought of as identical: . . moral knowledge," he 
says, "has no merely particular end but pertains to right living in 
general, whereas all technical knowledge is particular and serves 
particular ends . . . Moral knowledge can never be knowable in advance 
like knowledge that can be taught."^^ 
Like Hollinger's argument against education as applied science, 
Dunne's argument against the behavioral objectives model of 
education also is supported by the work of Gadamer and his 
philosophical hermeneutics of understanding.Given this antiseptic 
"objectives" approach to education and given we have already said 
about Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding -- about its historicity, 
liguisticality, and dialectical capacity -- it would seem that if 
someone wanted to produce the exact opposite of a hermeneutical 
approach to education, the behavioral objectives model would fit the 
bill, and this is due primarily to the objectives model's commitment 
^^Gadamer, 320-321. 
Dunne refers to Gadamer as "the hermeneutical philosopher par excellence, who has done 
more than anyone to legitimate the place of conversation in philosophy . . (Dunne, 23). 
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to the priority of "rationality" in teaching which, for Dunne, 
precipitates the larger issue of the nature of any rational practice. 
Alluding to the title of his book. Back to the Rough Ground - and to 
the inspiration for it from a passage out of Wittgenstein, Dunne 
states clearly his position on the objectives model: "one might teach 
by this model on ice but hardly in the rough ground of the 
classroom. 
In terms of Gadamer's ontological understanding, then, we can 
call into question the objectives model's vacuum-like mode of being-
in-the-world, which is its minimalizing of historicity, 
linguisticality, and "dialecticality," if you will. As Dunne argues, the 
difficulty is not so much with the the emphasis on behavior as it is 
with the concept of "objective" itself: "Written into the concept of 
objective was the requirement that the [objective's] achievement 
should be verifiable -- that unequivocal evidence should be available 
to establish it; and confining objectives to observable behavior 
ensured that this requirement could be met." Presumably, the act of 
verification -- contrary to any sense of historicity ~ would be the 
responsibility of some detached observer who would have no 
connectedness, no familiarity with the teacher or with any sense of a 
local hermeneutics.®^ Furthermore the required precision of the 
language in which the objective must be stated would preclude any 
®^Dunne, 3, 5. 
we will see In Chapter 4, this Is what Women's Ways calls "procedural knowledge" and 
its attendant epistemology, "separate knowing." 
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misunderstanding whatsoever. Interpretation, in otiier words, would 
be gratuitous because transmission of meaning would approximate 
something like a scientistio telepathy. The teacher would be in 
communication with "an indeterminate community of observers or of 
other teachers who, solely by reference to her stated objectives --
and without need to establish through discussion [read dialogue] any 
shared contextual understanding -- ought to be able, in the one case, 
to assess her teaching performance and, in the other, to replicate 
everything essential in it (since what is essential was taken to reside 
simply in a specified outcome)."®® 
This is the technicist methodology of verification and 
replication, and its underlying assumption is that there exists "out 
there," external to language, something that can be discovered and 
then reproduced in such a way that it can be verified by a third party. 
Teaching in this model has been reduced to a kind of neutral 
"transplant operation" whereby teaching as a form of action "is no 
longer seen as embedded in particular contexts or within cultural, 
linguistic, religious, or political traditions which may be at work in 
all kinds of tacit and nuanced ways in teachers and pupils as persons." 
In effect, teaching is nothing more than the instrumentality which 
occurs between the preparation of the objectives on the one hand, and 
their subsequent evaluation on the other. It is the "neutral" means for 
efficiently effecting ends, while in the course of that operation, 
®®Dunne, 3. As we enter the "age of virtual reality," I am reminded here of the "virtual 
reality" of "virtual education" 
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intimacy, dialogue, tradition, and individual experience -- those 
human interests which define our being as understanding -- have been 
denied entry because of their unpredictability, their uncontrollability. 
But this is not to say that they have been denied entry altogether: . . 
rather than entering into the pedagogic relationship and determining 
what can transpire within it . . . emotions are allowed to exist only as 
the content of certain affective objectives which the teacher, with 
full explicitness and foresight, can plan and control."®^ 
Just as the means are considered value-neutral, so then must be 
the ends and the whole model itself: . . the model was seen as 
carrying no substantive commitments with respect to educational 
values but as being equally hospitable to educators of any and every 
persuasion [and] as a framework for organizing teaching, could be 
presented as neutral; for it made no prescriptions about what should 
be taught but, rather, offered an instrument to all who had such 
prescriptions." But, in fact, the only grounding for this presumption of 
neutrality is the prejudgment that a plan of rational action based on 
the empirical sciences would be perfectly applicable to and much 
needed in the fuzzy and "unscientific" practice of education. And it is 
this very presupposition, i.e, that the empirical sciences can provide a 
universal norm for all thinking and acting, which is the target of 
Gadamer's argument for an ontological understanding and his 
Aristotelian notion of phronesis as "the best available model for 
®^Dunn0, 5. 
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illuminating the kind of understanding that is [Gadamer's] own special 
concern."9® Confronted with the noticeable absence of phronesis or 
practical judgment in the objectives model, we begin to realize that 
in this neutralized environment, whatever it is that makes ends 
valuable in the first place is unaccounted for. Dunne's point in this 
regard is that, "Atomistic objectives may seem worthwhile, however, 
only if they aggregate over time into qualities of mind and character, 
such as an ability for independent thought and reflection, a habit of 
truthfulness, a sense of justice, a care for clarity and expressiveness 
in writing and speech"; yet the "model cannot offer grounds for 
supposing that qualities such as these -- which I [Dunne] took to be 
the really significant achievements of education - even exist."®® To 
conclude this section we might do well to recall Gadamer's thoughts 
on moral knowledge: "It is obvious that man [sic] is not at his own 
disposal in the same way that the craftsman's material is at his 
disposal. Clearly he cannot make himself in the same way that he can 
make something else. Thus it will have to be another kind of 
knowledge that he has of himself in his moral being, a knowledge that 
is distinct from the knowledge that guides the making of something." 
And finally, he tells us that, "We learn a techne and can also forget it. 
Qp 
""Dunne, 7, 15. In terms of modern educational theory, techne has superceded practical 
judgment or phronesis. This means that there is no room for the extrascientific experiences of 
Bildung, taste, common sense, judgment, tact, or "connected knowing" -- not only because 
they cannot be measured or otherwise quantified, but because they cannot be taught. The failure 
of current educational thinking is the conviction that phronesis can be reduced to techne, when, 
in fact, they are as different as "truth" and "method." 
®®Dunne, 6-7. 
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But we do not learn moral knowledge, nor can we forget 11.""'®° 
Counter to the "applied sciences" or "engineering approach" to 
education are certain teaching practices that are similar enough to 
each other that they can be called "hermeneutical," but hermeneutical 
in the sense of the larger thesis of this dissertation -- that the 
educational experience itself is hermeneutical, where hermeneutics 
is defined by Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. These approaches 
to teaching can be grouped into three areas: 1) "connected teaching" 
as it is described in Chapter 10 of Women's Ways of Knowing, 2) 
teaching practices that are identified explicitly as "hermeneutical," 
and 3) teaching practices that can be described as tacitly 
hermeneutical, which includes "pedagogies of understanding" and 
those strategies that are currently being referred to as 
"constructivist."^ 
"Connected Teaching" is the approach advocated by the authors 
of Women's Ways of Knowing. For them connected teaching is the 
antithesis of what Paulo Freire derisively calls the "banking concept 
of education," a view of pedagogy that caricatures the teacher as a 
banker whose sole purpose in teaching is to make "deposits," to fill 
up the students with information."'By contrast, according to 
^®®Gadamer, 316-317. 
These alternatives to the behavioral objectives mentality will be highlighted in more detail in 
Chapter 6 where I will outline actual classroom applications. What follows here will be more like 
a "line up" of these approaches with brief explanations as to what affinities they share with 
Gadamer's ontological understanding. 
^ °2see Freire's The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos. (New York: 
Continuum, 1992). Freire's work parallels many of the ideas presented in this thesis and has 
influenced many of the "pedagogies of understanding" that will be mentioned in this chapter. 
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Women's Ways, the connected teacher is more like a "midwife" and 
the educational experience is analogous to that of birth. The role of 
the midwife-teacher is to "assist in the emergence of consciousness" 
and her "first concern is to preserve the student's fragile newborn 
thoughts." With the emphasis on process rather than product, and 
again citing Freire's problem-posing method, the authors portray "the 
object of knowledge" as an engagement between teacher and student 
wherein "they talk out what they are thinking in public dialogue. As 
they think and talk together their roles merge." This process, in turn, 
creates the "connected class," a community of learners in which 
"members can nurture each other's thoughts to maturity" and where 
"no one apologizes for uncertainty" because, unlike a hierarchy, "it is 
assumed that evolving thought will be tentative.""' 
Another distinct characteristic of the connected class is its 
adherence to the authors' conception of "connected epistemology." By 
this they mean that "the connected class recognizes the core truth in 
the subjectivist view that each of us has a unique perspective that is 
in some sense irrefutably 'right' by virtue of its existence. But the 
connected class transforms these private truths into 'objects,' 
publicly available to the members of the class who, through 
'stretching and sharing,' add to themselves as knowers by absorbing in 
their own fashion their classmates' ideas. The connected class 
constructs truth not through conflict but through 'consensus.'" And 
^'^^Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, Tarule, 218-219, 221. 
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further reinforcing this view of consensus is the connected teacher's 
welcoming of a diversity of opinion in the classroom, "seeing the 
other, the student, in the student's own terms." On this point the 
authors rely on the work of Nel Noddings, who contrasts separate 
education with a pedagogy of caring: "In traditional separate 
education," according to Noddings, "the student tries to lool< at the 
material through the teacher's eyes. In contrast, the caring teacher 
'receives and accepts the student's feeling toward the subject 
matter: she looks at it and listens to it through his eyes and ears.""" 
With these main points in mind, then, we can summarize the 
connected teacher's pedagogy as one that favors "connection over 
separation, understanding and acceptance over assessment, and 
collaboration over debate." We might also add that a decisive interest 
in personal history and experience, a reliance on the linguisticality of 
experience -- especially through the medium of conversation -- and 
the recognition of question posing as being "at the heart of connected 
knowing" are qualities of connected knowing that suggest a strong 
affinity with Gadamer's "understanding."^ 
The second group of hermeneutical approaches to education are 
those that have been duly introduced by their practitioners as 
explicitly hermeneutical (Gadamerian) in their own right. In Chapter 
1, we briefly alluded to the fact that philosophical hermeneutics has 
found its way into many areas of knowledge, so as a way of shoring up 
222-224. 
^°®lbid, 229, 189. 
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the case for a similar pervasiveness in the pedagogical content areas, 
we need to highlight those larger content areas that have made a case 
for philosophical hermeneutics in their future: 
1) Maria-Barbara Watson-Franke and Lawrence C. Watson (1975) 
suggest that since the task of anthropology is to reach an 
understanding of cultures through interpretation, some of Gadamer's 
principles, "such as understanding in context as opposed to 
preunderstanding and the dialectical relationship between the 
interpreter and the object of interpretation, may be helpful in 
defining the essential problems [of anthropological interpretation]." 
2) Stanley Deetz (1978), arguing for a rethinking of communications 
studies, singles out Gadamer's position against the idea that a perfect 
understanding can be found, and calls for a new mode of historical 
consciousness (Gadamer's) to accommodate "a concept of human 
understanding which is rich enough to account for everyday 
experiences as well as provide direction for studying how 
understanding can be increased in communication." And in a later 
article (1990) he expands this argument to include "Gadamer's 
ontology of understanding as a developmental foundation for 
interpersonal system ethics." Noteworthy here also is Michael Hyde's 
work (1980) on a hermeneutical application to oral history and John 
Stewart's (1983) "interpretive listening" as a hermeneutical 
alternative to empathy. 
3) Susan J. Hekman (1986) gives over a third of her book on the 
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sociology of knowledge to establish her argument "that Gadamer's 
hermeneutics is relevant to the current problems of the social 
sciences and that it is instrumental to the definition of an anti-
foundational social science." Elsewhere (1993) she gives us a glimpse 
at how Gadamer's hermeneutics could have some "relevance for the 
formulation of a postmodern feminism." 
4) Matthew Robert Foster, in a dissertation for the University of 
Chicago Divinity School (1987), makes "connections between 
[Gadamer's] hermeneutics and moral practice in the political context." 
5) Roberto Alejandro (1993) makes a strong appeal for Gadamer's 
hermeneutics in political theory as a new way to think about 
"citizens as interpreters of traditions, laws and social practices." 
6) And one final example that will provide us with the bridge into 
educational disciplines is the groundbreaking work by Shaun Gallagher 
(1993) that fully develops the thesis that the educational experience 
is, indeed, hermeneutical and there are "essential connections 
between interpretation and education within the contemporary 
framework of hermeneutics.""' 
Because in Chapter 6 we will be taking a much closer look at 
actual classroom applications of Gadamer's hermeneutics, these last 
two sections ~ pedagogical content areas that explicitly have used 
Gadamer's philosophy, and areas in education that have been tacitly 
hermeneutical - will set that stage by briefly identifying the 
^®®See the following: Watson-Franke, 247; Deetz (1978), 15 and (1990), 226; Hekman (1986), 
91 and (1993), 17; Foster, 2; Alejandro, 69; Gallagher, 2. 
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subject areas and the idea behind the practice. Explicitly, connposition 
theory and rhetoric (Kinneavy, Berlin, Crusius, Sotirou) have been 
working with Gadamer's Ideas more extensively than nnost other 
fields. The reasons for this can be found in the close ties with the 
historic, linguistic, and dialectical dimensions of understanding. 
Similarly, foreign language instruction (Peck) with its obvious need 
for theories of translation, culturality, and dialogue are relying on 
Gadamer's advocacy of openness, the turning to advantage of 
individual prejudgments, and the game-like interplay of the dialectic. 
In addition, there is work on a hermeneutical approach for the 
teaching of academic listening skills in the second language 
classroom (Stewart). A third approach, in the mathematics classroom 
(Brown), has taken up the challenge of providing students with an 
opportunity to avoid positivistic descriptions of content and process 
by encouraging students to discuss the part-to-whole relationship of 
"correct answer" and theorem. Art education (Brooks) is another area 
where Gadamer's ideas have found application. The key idea here 
begins with the historicity of understanding. Working from this 
perspective, the art teacher can gain a more experienced 
understanding of how to relate to individual student needs by fusing 
the historical horizons of her own work as a child with that of her 
work as an adult. A fifth example is found in the American literature 
classroom (Saeta). Here, the dialectical movement of hermeneutical 
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interpretation can provide a way to cross-examine the process of how 
the American myth has been created and sustained through the 
process of canonization. A final model takes us outside of the 
classroom and into the world of curriculum theory (Atkins). Relying on 
Gadamer's position that values are applied to concrete and specific 
situations and that judgment plays a key role in that application, 
Atkins reasons that if educational experiences are placed within an 
interpretive framework, then hermeneutics can offer a way to 
reframe curriculum theory across the board. 
In addition to the explicit uses of Gadamer's ideas in the 
classroom situation, there are extant what can be referred to as 
tacitly hermeneutical practices. These include what David Perkins, in 
his book Smart Schools, refers to as the "pedagogy of understanding" 
which urges students, across the disciplines, "to go beyond the 
given." He details seven "understanding performances" that can 
facilitate this form of higher order thinking, a line of thought that 
can be associated with the work of his colleague at Harvard's Project 
Zero, Howard Gardner. Another example of this movement under the 
banner of "understanding," if you will, is evidenced by the essays in 
the recent Jossey-Bass collection. Teaching for Understanding. The 
thread that runs through these essays, like that in Perkins and 
Women's Ways, is concerned with breaking away from the orthodox 
models of "received knowledge" and "procedural knowledge"""®^ in 
favor of dialogic engagement and questioning. Another recent 
^ terms are from Women's Ways. 
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collection of essays, Education for Judgment, promotes "discussion 
teaching" as a way to actively participate in the construction of 
knowledge which, as the authors tell us, is accomplished through a 
process of inquiry, critical discourse, and problem-solving. This 
predisposition toward undemtanding as a pedagogical principle can 
also be found in William Reinsmith's portrait of the teacher as 
dialogist who, among other things, creates mutuality and 
cooperativeness as well as strives to get students to see dialogue as 
sharing communal knowledge. And in another work, Kieran Egan's 
Primary Understanding, we get the first installment of a proposed 
four-volume theory of education that is grounded in a 
conceptualization of understanding that is based on the "fusing" of 
Plato's and Rousseau's "horizons" and in this particular volume, 
aimed at the educational process during the primary school years. One 
final example, what is being referred to as "constructivism," 
encompasses many educational practices, e.g., discovery learning, 
interdisciplinary studies, cooperative and collaborative learning, 
whole language, the National Science Foundation's "Project 
Kaleidoscope," and the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics 
revision of problem-solving so as to more clearly reflect the dialogic 
process. In their In Search of Understanding: The Case for 
Constructivist Classrooms, Brooks and Brooks point to the goal of 
the constructivist classroom as "a learning environment where 
students search for meaning, appreciate uncertainty, and inquire 
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responsibly." And this, they argue, will remove the current 
impediments to student understanding."'0® By laying out these 
approaches to education, we hope to bring into view the possibility 
that there is something inherent about the shared interest in all of 
them, and that the underlying consensus can be understood as the 
emerging realization that the educational experience is indeed 
hermeneutical. 
To conclude this chapter, we can turn to a second exemplum, a 
brief discussion of Coleridge's "Rime of the Ancient Mariner." As 
Baudelaire's fusee gave us an opening to talk about the nature of 
Gadamerian understanding, the "Rime" will enable us to see more 
clearly the nature of hermeneutical understanding in the educational 
experience. 
About fifteen years ago I heard the late Archibald MacLeish 
lecture on what it is, exactly, about Coleridge's Ancient Mariner that 
overpoweringly keeps the young Wedding guest from attending the 
marriage celebration of no less than his own next of kin, Macleish 
wondered about the didactic eccentricity of the teller and the 
seeming incongruity between the Mariner and the explicit 
improbability of what seems to be the innocuous, moral tale that he 
tells -- a tale, Macleish observed, that not only effectively creates 
the intimate sense of power necessary to hold the Wedding Guest's 
1 OR 
"°See Christensen's Education for Judgment, xii; Reinsmith's Archetypal Forms in Teaching, 
96; and Brooks and Brooks' In Search of Understanding, v. 
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will, but to hold it to such a degree that the Guest could not, as 
Coleridge says, "choose but hear." I don't remember that MacLeish 
gave any specific answers, but over and over during the years 
following that lecture, I have been held by what Alfred North 
Whitehead would probably call the "beauty of the idea," more 
specifically, the beauty of the idea of MacLeish's question. This, as I 
understand it, is also what Gadamer enjoins us to do in the process of 
understanding: Ask, "To what question is this an answer?" 
For our current purposes, however, a more helpful way to say 
this might be by way of Gadamer's "horizon of the question," the 
attainment of which allows for meaningful understanding. Overcoming 
the self-alienation of "writtenness" is what understanding does, and 
the way by which this understanding wins out is through dialogue. 
Gadamer makes the point that between a reader and a text a dialogue 
does, in fact, take place. The dialogue is what allows the subject 
matter to "unconceal" itself to the reader. But just as in dialogue 
between two people, understanding cannot occur if one of the 
participants has come to the conversation with his or her mind made 
up about the subject matter to be discussed. Gadamer's dialogue 
requires an openness, and this accessibility holds true for the subject 
matter of a text. Dialogue, for Gadamer, has a mind of its own: "Thus a 
person who wants to understand must question what lies behind what 
is said. He must understand it as an answer to a question. If we go 
back behind what is said, then we inevitably ask questions beyond 
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what is said. We understand the sense of the text only by acquiring 
the horizon of the question -- a horizon that, as such, necessarily 
includes other possible answers."^ 
But what does all of this have to do with "The Rime," the 
educational experience, and philosophical hermeneutics? What 
Coleridge is up to, it seems to me, is a canny statement about what 
Robert Scholes has called "textual power.""'Every time we read the 
"Rime" or, for that matter, any text (especially those that we can't 
put down) each of us becomes that Wedding Guest, and the textual 
power of the tradition (the Mariner), to paraphrase Coleridge, can 
"have our will." In Gadamer's jargon this is "what happens to us over 
and above our wanting and doing" because, as Gadamer would have it, 
that which is being communicated in the text has a will of its own, 
the "will" of "historically effected consciousness." So although we 
must be aware that a text has the power to hold our will, we must 
also know when to back off from the "Mariner's eye" and his "skinny 
hand." That is to say, we must know when (and how) to question the 
dialogue. This ability to adjudicate rival truth-claims Gadamer 
identifies with phronesis, that "practical reasonableness" which is 
the ability to make the right decision at the right time in the right 
place. We must know that the reality of the text is not, necessarily, 
the empirical reality of day-to-day life, that it does not correspond 
^ ®®Gadamer, 370. 
^ ^ °See Robert Scholes' Textual Power: Literary Theory and the Teaching of English (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 18-21. 
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to some objective, external and eternal verity. We must know with 
Gadamer's aphorism that "Being that can be understood is language" 
that linguisticality has the power to shape an individual's 
understanding, the ability to think about his or her own thinking; and 
for this reason, an awareness of hermeneutical understanding can 
develop that individual's ability to decide for herself or himself 
whether "the story" is more important than "the wedding," or the 
wedding more important than the story, or, at the very least, to know 
when the story is more important than the wedding and vice versa. 
It is the Mariner that we can personify as Gadamer's timeless 
and overpowering tradition - who is the text that holds the power 
of language, the power of Being that can be understood. Only at the 
point when the Mariner-As-Tradition (or teacher) fuses horizons with 
the Wedding Guest-As-lnterlocutor (or student) can the discourse 
become hermeneutically understood and fuse with the "historically 
effected consciousness" that is understanding. In terms, then, of the 
educational experience, when a teacher, because of her capacity for 
"emancipatory reflection," is able to "connect" with her students and 
effect an openness to tradition -- as the Mariner does with the 
Wedding Guest ~ the power of understanding can find its fullest 
working expression. Only at that point in the hermeneutical 
experience is there no pretense of superiority, and only at that point 
will learning occur so that the student, like the Wedding Guest "the 
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morrow morn," will go "like one who has been stunned" into self-
understanding, "of sense forlorn . . . sadder and wiser." 
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CHAPTERS 
EXPERIENCE 
This suggests very well what I would have in the place of 
"foundation." I would call it "participation," because that 
is what happens in human life. . . . Participation is indeed a 
better formulation of what is going on in our life experience 
than is the foundationalist account of the apodictic evidence 
of self-consciousness. -- Gadamer, "The Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion" 
If the living, experiencing being is an intimate participant in 
the activities of the world to which it belongs, then 
knowledge is a mode of participation, valuable in the degree 
i n  w h i c h  i t  i s  e f f e c t i v e .  - -  D e w e y ,  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  
Education 
It should be fairly obvious by now that there is a lot of 
"meeting" going on in this dissertation. Whether It is the meeting of 
Frankenstein and Emile, Gadamer's ontological understanding 
meeting the pedagogy of understanding and connected teaching or, as 
we shall see in this chapter, the meeting of Dewey's "experiential 
continuum" and Gadamer's hermeneutical experience, "meeting" is a 
necessary condition of philosophical hermeneutics and, by extension, 
of the educational experience. But with Gadamer (and in my opinion 
with Dewey) we need to remember that given hermeneutics' 
"intermediate position" between "familiarity and strangeness," this 
is not to suggest a procedure for understanding why or how these 
entities are meeting as they are but rather to clarify the 
"experiential" conditions in which the meeting itself takes place. In 
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this regard we recall what Gadamer calls a "fusion of horizons" 
which, as we saw in the previous chapter, actually defines 
understanding itself. This fusion, according to Gadamer, is marked by 
dialectical interplay, linguisticality, and historicity insofar as "the 
horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past," and as we 
shall see in this chapter, this fusion of horizons also characterizes 
what Gadamer calls "historically effected consciousness," which, in 
turn, "has the structure of experience (Erfahrung)" Similarly, as 
John Dewey tells us in Democracy and Education, he thinks of 
"meeting" in terms of democracy -- as "primarily a mode of 
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience," which is 
dependent on what he refers to in Experience and Education as the 
past of "the living present," or the past as a "potent agent" for 
acquainting "the young" with "the living present,""'^ For "meeting" 
in both Gadamer and Dewey, we can read "experience" and still 
maintain the coherence of their individual philosophies. 
What we are leading up to with this initial juxtaposition of 
Gadamer and Dewey is that they do seem to share a common interest 
in meeting, and as the above epigraphs suggest, this affinity can be 
considered from the perspective of their views of the concept of 
"participation," which is also another way of saying "experience." If 
^ ^ ^ H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306, 346. (Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent 
references to Gadamer will be from this worl<.) Erfahrung will be a key point in our discussion 
of Women's Ways in the Chapters 4 and 5. 
^^^John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1916), 87 (hereafter 
abbreviated in notation as DE); and Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan, 
1938), 23 (hereafter abbreviated as EE), 
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we pause for a moment to have a look at the word "participation" 
etymologically, the propriety becomes even more striking. 
"Participation" derives from an Indo-European root that had 
something to do with "selling" or "making equal." In Latin this 
becomes the root "par" from "parare," "to equate," as in our current 
use of the word "par" on the golf course. But perhaps the most 
relevant usage can be found in the grammatical term "participle," 
which is a "fusion" or "equalization" of adjective and verb, a 
hybridization that requires its own category as a "verbal,"'*''^ which, 
as we are understanding him, is analogous to what Gadamer means by 
a "fusion of horizons." And because of this metaphorical relationship 
to his philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer gives us a brief 
commentary on the significance of the word "participation": 
Participation Is a strange word. Its dialectic consists of the fact that 
participation is not taking parts, but in a way taking the whole. Everybody 
who participates in something does not take sonnething away, so that the 
others cannot have it. The opposite is true: by sharing, by our participating 
In the things in which we are participating, we enrich them; they do not 
become smaller, but larger. The whole life of tradition consists exactly In 
this enrichment so that life is our culture and our past: the whole inner 
store of our lives is always extending by participating.^ 
In this passage we can almost hear Dewey saying that "no point in the 
philosophy of progressive education is sounder than its emphasis upon 
the participation of the learner in the formation of the purposes 
which direct his activities in the learning process" and that "present 
experience . . . can expand into the future only as it is enlarged to take 
example: In the sentence "Shooting stars fell all night," the word "shooting" is the 
participle as adjective, but "shooting" in another context can also be a verb. 
^Gadamer, "Hermeneutics of Suspicion," 64. 
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in the past.""'''^ Rorty argues for this common element in Gadamer's 
and Dewey's thought as enabling them to defend themselves against 
charges of "vulgar relativism." He argues "that what both men put in 
place of Reason -- the Platonic organ for detecting truth -- is a sense 
of tradition, of community, of human solidarity . . . [and] this sense is 
a sufficient defense against vulgar relativism.""'''® The 
persuasiveness of Rorty's angle here on relativistic thinking has been 
seriously called into question and, for our purposes, is a separate 
issue from that at hand. What is significant for us about Rorty's 
version of Dewey is that Rorty has recognized and argued for some 
strong connections between the work of Gadamer and Dewey. And as 
we shall see at the close of the chapter, this argument for 
connectedness is also an argument for their having similar views on 
the nature of the scientific method. 
However, an explication of respective philosophies of 
participation will not be the task of this chapter; instead, the primary 
task will be to agree with Rorty on the plausibility of a Dewey-
Gadamer anti-foundationalist view but to suggest further that this 
shared interest in "participation" implies a shared sense of 
"experience" and that this shared sense of "experience" indicates 
that a compatibility exists between what Gadamer is saying about the 
hermeneutical experience and what Dewey is calling for when he says 
^ ^ ^Dewey, EE, 67, 77. This, of course, presupposes a free and open conversation among all 
people, regardless of gender or race. The next chapter tal<es up this issue. 
^^®Rorty, "Hermeneutics, General Studies, and Teaching," 2-3. 
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that a philosophy of education requires a theory of experience. Our 
position is that Dewey's argument for progressive education -- as he 
spells it out in Democracy and Education and Education and 
Experience — can be thought of as his own treatment of "truth and 
method" with all of the attendant ambiguities of those two terms 
taken as one."'"'^ Dewey's unrelenting antagonism toward the abuse of 
method or what he calls "straight-jacket and chain gang procedures in 
education . . . that create only 'sharps' in learning . . . egoistic 
specialists" puts into relief his philosophy of education as "a 
constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience" in which "the 
aim must always represent a freeing of activities" and "the object 
and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth.""'''® Our 
contention is that this line of thought is very similar to Gadamer's. 
The apparent contradiction between the two, however, lies in their 
respective opinions on the nature of the scientific method, but on this 
account it seems there is a misunderstanding of both views, for what 
Dewey is promoting as "scientific method" in education and what 
Gadamer is challenging as "the abuse of method" in the human 
sciences are not the same thing. Had Dewey been thinking about the 
social engineering variety of method that Gadamer attacks, Dewey's 
detractors most likely would not have accused him so readily of 
the next chapter, I follow a similar tactic with Women's Ways of Knowing. There I draw 
the following analogy: Gadamer's "truth" is to "constructed knowledge" what "method" is to 
the perspectives of "received," "subjective," and "procedural knowledge." 
^^®Dewey, D E ,  61, 9, 76, 105, 100. 
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educational capriciousness and "non-directive nonsense," accusations 
that eventually outflanked the progressive education movement. 
Therefore, as a secondary task, we will argue that Gadamer's 
hermeneutics - defined as"'^^ "the art of employing methods where 
they belong, not where they don't belong". . . [and] "a protection 
against the abuse of method" ~ can be a supplement to Dewey's 
problematic conception of scientific method, a conception that caught 
Dewey up in an educational double bind: For the traditionalists, his 
scientific method was not scientifically methodical enough, and for 
the progressives, it was too methodically scientific."'in our way of 
thinking, if we take up this supplementary position, then the 
compatibility between the educational dimension of Gadamer's 
hermeneutical experience, on the one hand, and Dewey's theory of 
experience as requisite for a philosophy of education, on the other, 
becomes plausible. 
We will attempt to make the case for a Gadamer-Dewey 
connection by way of a three-part strategy: first, to define what 
Gadamer and Dewey each mean by "experience": secondly, to describe 
what we might guardedly call Dewey's "tacit hermeneutics"; and 
^^®Misgeld, 70. 
1 ^ Osecause Dewey was familiar witli Hegel and the work of Schleiermacher, his use of the term 
"science" may have been a gloss on the German word "Wissenschaft," which, according to the 
translators of Truth and Method, "suggests thorough, comprehensive, and systematic 
knowledge of something on a self-consciously rational basis" (xviii). This would set it apart from 
our understanding of the words "science" and "scientific" which we associate more with the 
German term, Naturwissenschaften or "natural sciences." 
1 P1 
"^'To use Gadamer's language, "the hermeneutical experience is the corrective by means of 
which the thinking reason escapes the prison of language, and it is itself verbally constituted" 
(Gadamer, 402). 
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then, by way of conclusion, to compare Gadamer's and Dewey's 
respective ideas of what constitutes scientific method and its 
relationship to experience as a way of arguing for Gadamer's 
hermeneutical experience as the philosophy of experience that Dewey 
spent most of his life trying to clarify as the basis for his philosophy 
of education. 
Any attempt to define "experience" in either Gadamer's or 
Dewey's usage of the term would require a book-length explication in 
and of itself. (In fact, both men have written book-length 
explications on the subject; Gadamer's imposing sections in Truth 
and Method and Dewey's Experience and Nature.) But in working with 
Gadamer, the most obvious difficulty is that we are dealing with a 
second language. For example, as the translators of Truth and Method 
tell us, there are "two separate words for 'experience' in German: 
Eriebnis and Erfahrung... Erlebnis is something that you have, and 
thus is connected with a subject and with the subjectivization of 
aesthetics. Erfahrung is something that you undergo, so that 
subjectivity is overcome and drawn into an event {Geschehen) of 
meaning."'•22 ip our current English usage, Erlebnis \s what we would 
refer to as a "lived-experience," something that has immediacy but is 
not the usual day-in-and-day-out routine of living. Rather, as Gadamer 
explains it,''^^ Erlebnis is something that "achieves permanence, 
weight, and significance from out of the transience of experiencing." 
1 99 
•^'^Gadamer, xiii-xiv. 
•"^aibid., 61. 
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For instance, in the course of our everyday experiences, if we had the 
unexpected opportunity to meet someone who is unusually fun to be 
with, we might remark to someone else later that meeting that person 
was a "real experience." This kind of experience "makes a special 
impression that gives it lasting importance""'24 and is also evident 
when we talk about "experiencing" works of art or of unusual scenery 
in nature. Of oblique significance for us here is that it was the 
nineteenth-century hermeneutic philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey, who, in 
his 1905 Das Eriebnis und die Dichtung {Experience and Poetry), 
succinctly formulated this concept of Eriebnis. That Dilthey's 
thought in this regard might have had some bearing on Dewey's use of 
"experience" is an inviting prospect, especially given Dilthey's 
concept of Eriebnis as occupying an "intermediate position between 
speculation and empiricism,""'^5 or between the experience and its 
result. We also know that Dewey was familiar with the work of that 
other key figure in the development of modern hermeneutics, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher,''26 the first biography of whom was written by 
Dilthey. 
But it is the second German word for "experience," Erfahrung, 
that is most closely allied with the hermeneutical experience as 
Gadamer addresses it, specifically in Part II, section II. 3 of Truth 
and Method, the same section where he works through the 
^24|bid. 
^25|bid., 65. 
^^®See Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, 307. 
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implications of "understanding" for the hermeneutical experience. 
Etymologically rooted in the German word for "journey" or "travel," 
Fahre (the same root for our words "fare" and "ferry"), Erfahrung 
"provides the basis in our actual lives for the specifically hermeneutic way 
we are related to other persons and to our cultural past, namely dialogue and 
especially the dialogue of question and answer. This kind of "experience" is 
not the residue of isolated moments, but an ongoing integrative process in 
which what we encounter widens our horizon, but only by overturning an 
existing perspective, which we can then perceive was erroneous or at least 
narrow. Its effect, therefore, is not simply to make us "knowing," to add to 
our stock of information, but to give us that implicit sense of broad 
perspectives, of the range of human life and culture, and of our own limits 
that constitutes a non-dogmatic wisdom.^ 
This is the experience that we have in mind when we speak of an 
"experienced person" or when we encounter an advertisement that 
stakes a company's reputation on so many "years of experience." It 
characterizes the experienced person as someone "who, because of 
the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from 
them, is particularly well-equipped to have new experiences and to 
learn from them."''28 And in this sense it /s a journey, a life's 
journey. 
But as we have seen with Gadamer's concept of understanding, a 
simple definition is impossible when describing the nature of 
philosophical hermeneutics. When we find ourselves trying to focus on 
one condition as we are doing here with "experience," we soon 
discover that we must deal with certain other conditions, which are 
those things that make an experienced person "experienced,"''^9 in a 
^^^Gadamer, xiii. 
"•^Slbid., 355. 
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fashion that suggests a seemingly endless array of Chinese boxes. So 
rather than open more boxes than we need, we will attempt to fill in 
between the lines of Erfahrung when we discuss Dewey's tacit 
hermeneutics. 
If being semi-obscure were a criterion for hermeneutical status, 
then Dewey's theory of experience would rank with Gadamer's. The 
reason for our inability to hold Dewey and Gadamer to one definition 
seems to lie in one of the conditions necessary to both theories: a 
kind of "freeing activity" that Dewey calls "growth" and that 
Gadamer refers to as "openness" or "the awareness of one's own 
historicity." We cannot fingerprint what Dewey means by 
"experience" because if we could, we would be, in effect, establishing 
hard evidence for "a moving force," a "liberating power" that can be 
thought of as freedom itself. More to the point, experience for Dewey 
is more like an "experiential continuum," wherein "the function of 
knowledge is to make one experience freely available in other 
experiences." And the process that allows this to happen is the 
consequence of "the two principles of continuity and interaction . . . 
the longitudinal and lateral aspects of experience."^In Democracy 
and Education he gives what seems to me to be the clearest 
"definition" of this continuum; 
^^®For Gadamer this is the "contemporaneousness" of the "fusion of horizons," "historicaiiy 
effected consciousness," "tradition," "language," "openness," "the structure of the 
question," "phronesis," and "application." 
^®°See Dewey, EE, 38; Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 93; EE, 28; DE, 339; and EE, 
44. 
7 7  
The nature of experience can be understood only by noting that it includes an 
active and a passive element peculiarly combined. On the one hand, 
experience is trying - a meaning which is made explicit in the connected 
term experiment. On the passive, it is undergoing. When we experience 
something we act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo 
the consequences. We do something to the thing and then it does something to 
us in return ... The connection of these two phases of experience measures 
the fruitfulness or value of the experience. IVIere activity does not constitute 
experience. It is dispersive, centrifugal, dissipating. Experience as trying 
involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is 
consciously connected with the return wave of consequences which flow from 
it. When an activity is continued into the undergoing of consequences, when 
the change made by action is reflected back into a change made in us, the 
mere flux is loaded with significance. We learn something.^ 
This has the ring of what Gadamer is saying about historicity, 
"historically effected consciousness," and "the negation of 
experience" that sets Erfahrung apart as something that somebody 
"undergoes." Later we will have more to say about these echoes, but 
at this point, we need to establish some basic groundwork for our 
hypothesis that there does in fact exist at least a tacit hermeneutical 
awareness on Dewey's part. 
When in his Hermeneutics and Education (1992) Shaun Gallagher 
appeals to the authority of Dewey's Democracy and Education, 
specifically to Dewey's poetical image of "luminous familiar spots 
from which helpful suggestions may spring," Gallagher is building his 
case for reasserting "the essential connections between 
interpretation and education within the contemporary frameworl< of 
hermeneutics." For Dewey, the image occurs as he is building his 
case for the connection between experience and effective thinking: "A 
large part of the art of instruction lies in making the difficulty of 
Dewey, DE, 139. 
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new problems large enough to challenge thought, and small enough so 
that, in addition to the confusion naturally attending the novel 
elements, there shall be 'luminous familiar spots from which helpful 
suggestions may spring." As for Dewey's being in "the loop" of the 
hermeneutical circle, implicit in those "luminous familiar spots," 
Gallagher says, is the concept of "a forestructure which conditions 
one's initial approach [to a given problem] and is refined or revised in 
the process of learning." This "initial approach," as the argument 
goes, is that workhorse of Deweyan education, the hypothesis. And 
since the hypothesis "will always be an interpretation and will 
always depend on fore-conceptions" (in this case the "luminous 
spots"), then it follows for Gallagher that "if we consider the 
procedure of hypothesis formation as one model of learning, then 
learning is clearly defined by the hermeneutical circle." And we can 
follow that circle still further by assuming that Dewey's own 
thinking here belies an antecedent foreconception of the 
hermeneutical tradition i t s e l f . ^  ^ 2  
That that forestructure was the crystallization of what William 
James called the "nitrous oxide intoxication of absolute idealism," 
(which really meant Hegel's theory of the constitutive power of 
Thought), we know from Dewey himself. In 1945, Dewey, with an 
analogously circular image, remarked that "I jumped through Hegel, I 
should say, not just out of him. I took some of the hoop . . . with me, 
••^^Gallagher, 71, 2, 157, 71, 72. 
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and also carried away considerable of the paper the hoop was filled 
with."•'33 Earlier (1930), in his brief and only autobiographical 
account of his own Bildung, his own intellectual development ("From 
Absolutism to Experimentalism"), he says it this way:''^^ "| drifted 
away from Hegelianism in the next fifteen years [after completion of 
Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins in 1884]; the word 'drifting' expresses the slow 
and, for a long time, the imperceptible character of the movement, 
though it does not convey the impression that there was an adequate 
cause for change/Nevertheless I should never think of ignoring, much 
less denying, what an astute critic occasionally refers to as a novel 
discovery - that acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent 
deposit in my thinking . . . Were it possible for me to be a devotee of 
any system, I still should believe that there is greater richness and 
greater variety of insight in Hegel than in any other single systematic 
philosopher -- though when I say this I exclude Plato, who still 
I 
provides my favourite [sic] philosophic reading." 
What Gallagher is after, however, is to argue neither for Dewey 
as a closet hermeneuticist nor as a repressed Hegelian, but rather to 
argue that in Dewey and Gadamer - because of their shared Hegelian 
influence -- significant evidence exists to support the claim that the 
educational experience itself is hermeneutical and that since 
education is, in fact, interpretational, then learning, rather than the 
standard hermeneutical reading of a text, is the more appropriate 
^^^Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 14. 
^^^John McDermott, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, 8. 
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"paradigm" for the educational process. We can take his key point 
here to be that "the paradigm of learning is one that takes its bearing 
from the interpretational process rather than from the 
interpretational object."'^^^ But our intention is not to argue in 
support of Gallagher's thesis directly, but inversely, to appropriate 
his Gadamer-based assertion that "the educational experience is 
always interpretational" in order to set up our contention that the 
philosophy of experience needed for the "new" Deweyan education can 
be understood via Gadamer's understanding of Erfahrung. What we 
are trying to make of Dewey's hermeneutical tendency, then, is to 
emphasize that Gallagher discusses it within the foundational context 
of his thesis, within what he calls a "moderate hermeneutics" - one 
specifically based on Gadamer's "philosophical hermeneutics." 
Gallagher's discussion of Dewey, Gadamer, hermeneutics, and 
education is not an isolated case. As we have seen, ten years before 
Gallagher's placing Dewey within the hermeneutical tradition, Richard 
Rorty was writing explicitly about Dewey and the "hermeneutical 
stance." Pointing out that hermeneutics, in a "loose but useful sense," 
has "a primarily negative meaning. . ."something which is not 
scientific inquiry, as such inquiry has been traditionally understood," 
he then goes on to "discuss the question of how education might be 
conceived if one starts from Nietzschean rather than Platonic 
assumptions ... to identify the hermeneutic stance with something 
^^Gallagher, 331. 
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which may seem tamer and more familiar and more manageable ~ 
namely Deweyan pragmatism." In order to make his point about Dewey 
and hermeneutics, Rorty enlists the help of Gadamer who, in Rorty's 
estimation, is the "principal example of a hermeneutic philosopher," 
through whom the hermeneutical stance can be understood as "an 
alternative to the notion of an 'objective truth.'" "On Dewey's 
alternative account, as on Gadamer's," Rorty argues, "we need to 
think of the goal of inquiry and of life not as getting in touch with 
something that exists independently of ourselves, but as Bildung, 
self-formation, what Dewey liked simply to call 'growth.' In 
particular, we need to see education not as helping to get us in touch 
with something non-human called Truth or Reality, but rather in touch 
with our own potentialities.""'^® 
It seems that this hermeneutical stance is a very helpful way to 
think about Dewey's philosophy of education because it can help us to 
understand one of Dewey's prerequisites for that education ~ a 
philosophy of experience. In Experience and Education he puts it this 
way: "The lesson for progressive education is that it requires in an 
urgent degree, a degree more pressing than was incumbent upon 
former innovators, a philosophy of education based upon a philosophy 
of experience." And twenty-two years earlier in Democracy and 
Education, he is arguing for "a new philosophy of experience and 
"'"Rorty, "Hermeneutics, General Studies, and Teaching," 1-3. In her recent discussion of 
creative democracy and education. Nancy Wareheime has noted that "the similarities between 
Dewey and Gadamer are apparent, Rorty claims, in their commonly held understanding that 
experience is essentially linguistic and historical" (74). 
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knowledge, a philosophy which no longer puts experience in opposition 
to rational knowledge and explanation."^^7 gyt ^jg attempt at 
actually formulating such a philosophy -- which he termed either 
"empirical naturalism" or "naturalistic empiricism" or "naturalistic 
humanism" ~ appeared in 1925, first as a series of lectures, then 
published that same year as Experience and Nature.^^^ However, the 
reviews were mixed, and in the long run, even for Dewey himself, the 
project was disappointing. Rorty attributes this to Dewey's wanting 
"to be as naturalistic as Locke and as historicist as Hegel.""' 
Implicit in what Gallagher and Rorty are up to in their 
approaches to education from a Dewey-Gadamerian hermeneutics, and 
explicit in what we hope to get at in this chapter is what Dewey 
himself would have called the "working capital" of further inquiry. 
Our "working capital" is invested in the hunch that Dewey was right 
about the need for "a new philosophy of experience" to underwrite a 
new philosophy of education, but that he did not completely succeed in 
clarifying"'40 the relationship of that theory to the practice of 
education. However, in the bearings Rorty has taken from Gadamer's 
"I^^Dewey, EE, 29; and DE, 273. 
^ ®®This was two years before Heidegger's revolutionary Sein und Zeit and ten years before 
Gadamer began the notes which were to become -- not until 1960 - Truth and Method. 
^®®Rorty, "Consequences of Pragmatism," 1982, 82. 
reminded here of Dewey's own self-criticism in "From Absolutism" where he says ". . . 
I am dubious of my own ability to reach inclusive systematic unity. . . " (McDermott, 9). it is a 
"dubiousness" that R.W. Sleeper reads as a despair Dewey had toward the end of his life of 
"making himself clear. He still wanted what he had wanted all along, to communicate the 
connections of things in experience with things in existence" (Sleeper, The Necessity of 
Pragmatism, 116). One might also recall B.F. Skinner's qualified praise of Dewey for throwing 
out "aversive educational practices" but having "too little to put in its place" (Skinner, The 
Technoiogy of Teaching, 58). 
8 3  
philosophical hermeneutics relative to Dewey and in what Gallagher 
has appropriated for his own working capital in arguing for a 
fundamental interrelationship between hermeneutics and education, 
the basic groundwork for that philosophy of experience has been laid 
out. 
But before "cashing in" on that working capital by putting our 
own hypothesis up for collateral, our own Deweyan "incursion into the 
novel," a biographical digression here might help to clarify Dewey's 
persistent worry and concern over the nature and legitimacy of 
experience as a philosophical concept. In "From Absolutism," he says 
that experience "should not be treated even by a philosopher as the 
germ of a disease to which he needs to develop resistance." And 
Rorty, in his "Dewey's Metaphysics," tells us that "very near the end 
of his life, Dewey hoped to write a new edition of Experience and 
Nature, 'changing the title as well as the subject matter from 
Nature and Experience [sic] to Nature and Culture." RorXy goes on to 
say that "In a letter to Bentley he [Dewey] says 'I was dumb not to 
have seen the need for such a shift when the old text was written. I 
was still hopeful that the philosophic word 'Experience' could be 
redeemed by being returned to its idiomatic usages." 
Rorty goes on to emphasize that Dewey "was always to insist 
that his opponents were those who erected dualisms because they 
'abandoned the acknowledgement of the primacy and ultimacy of gross 
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experience -- primary as it is given in an uncontrolled form, ultimate 
as it is given in a more regulated and significant form -- a form made 
possible by the methods and results of reflective experience.*" Then 
Rorty gets to the point of his essay: "Dewey's mistake ~ and it was 
a trivial and unimportant mistake, even though I have devoted most of 
this essay to it - was the notion that criticism of culture had to 
take the form of a redescription of 'nature' or 'experience' or both. 
Had Dewey written the book called Nature and Culture, which was to 
replace Experience and Nature, he might have felt able to forget the 
Aristotelian and Kantian models [categories or distinctions] and 
simply have been Hegelian all the way, as he was in much of his other 
(and best) work."^^"" We can take this to mean that had Dewey, as a 
"reconstructed" Hegelian, readdressed his thinking about 
"experience-and-nature-and-culture" hermeneutically and, 
ultimately, in its interrelationship with education, he would have 
appropriated an understanding of hermeneutical experience that might 
have been akin to Gallagher's appropriation of Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics for that same purpose. This claim is not so farfetched 
as it might first appear. We can take our cues from Gallagher, 
Gadamer, and Rorty in this regard but take heart from Robert Hollinger 
who, in his Hermeneutics and Praxis (1985),^'^2 ^33 recognized the 
comparative hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer, the Rortyan 
pragmatism of Dewey, and the "possible synthesis of compatible lines 
McDermott, 9; Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 72, 80, 85. 
^^^Hollinger, Hermeneutics and Praxis, ix. (We remember, too, that Gadamer was one of 
Heidegger's students.) 
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of development." Which is to say that by extension, we can connect 
Gadamer to Dewey through Rorty. 
But it seems that Dewey did, in fact, thirteen years later, have 
at least a preliminary vision of Nature and Culture -- a 
"recontextualized" version that he called Experience and Education. 
In that book Dewey doesn't waste any time getting to the point. In the 
first sentence of the "Preface," we are told that "all social 
movements involve conflicts which are reflected intellectually in 
controversies.""'vvith this seemingly commonsensical observation, 
however, he is setting us up for a major policy statement about 
education. He goes on to remind us that, yes, education should also be 
included in this "arena of social struggles, practical and theoretical," 
but "as for theory, at least as far as educational theory is concerned, 
the practical conflicts and the controversies that are conducted upon 
the level of these conflicts, only set a problem." Now it becomes "the 
business of an "intelligent theory of education to ascertain the 
causes for the conflicts," then to come up with a "plan of 
operations," which will have as its source "a level deeper and more 
inclusive than is represented by the practices and ideas of the 
contending parties" [italics mine]."''^'^ This circular or spiraling 
movement of social movement-fo-conflict-fo-controversy-fo-
problem-fo-cause-fo-plan-of-operation takes us right back to the 
^'^^Dewey, EE, 5. 
^44|bjd. 
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social milieu but now a reconstructed social setting or culture ~ 
probably what Dewey belatedly thought of as the Culture of the ill-
fated title of his work on metaphysics. Interesting to note here in 
regards to the continuity of Dewey's thinking is that twenty-two 
years earlier in Democracy and Education, he makes the comment 
that a new conception of experience (his) made possible by such 
things as psychology, industrial methods, and the experimental 
method in science "reinstates the idea of the ancients that experience 
is primarily practical, not cognitive ~ a matter of doing and 
undergoing the consequences of doing. But the ancient theory is 
transformed by realizing that doing may be directed so as to take up 
into its own content all which thought suggests [italics mine] and so 
as to result in securely tested knowledge. 'Experience' then ceases to 
be empirical and becomes experimental.""''^^ 
Dewey's definition of education as a "continuous reconstruction 
of experience" begins to sound like Heidegger's description of the 
hermeneutical circle cited by Gadamer in Truth and Method: "It is not 
to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle that 
is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of 
the most primordial kind of knowing, and we genuinely grasp this 
possibility only when we have understood that our first, last, and 
constant task in interpreting is never to allow our fore-having, fore­
sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and 
popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure 
"•"^^Dewey, DE, 276. 
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by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things 
themselves." Gadamer comments that, "What Heidegger is working out 
here is not primarily a prescription for the practice of understanding, 
but a description of the way interpretive understanding is 
achieved.""'^® The point of Heidegger's "hermeneutical reflection" is 
not to prove that such a circle exists but to show that this circle 
possesses "an ontologically powerful significance" in terms of 
tradition. A propos here is one of those points that Rorty always 
seems to have so much fun in making: "... if the only choice is 
between Platonism and pragmatism, Heidegger would wryly and 
ironically opt for pragmatism. . . . This qualified sympathy for 
pragmatism is clearest in Being and Time, \he book which Dewey 
described as 'sounding like a description of 'the situation' in 
transcendental German.'""'The "situation" to which Dewey is 
referring here is what we might term the "experiential unit" for his 
criteria of experience and is, as we saw above, defined by the 
interaction and continuity "going on between an individual and 
objects and other persons." Interaction and situation are, as Dewey 
says, "inseparable from each other": "Continuity and interaction in 
their active union with each other provide the measure of the 
educative significance and value of an experience. The immediate and 
direct concern of an educator is then with the situations in which 
^^®Gadamer, 266. 
^^^Rorty, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, 32. 
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interaction takes place.""' 
For Gadamer, this concept of "tradition" has a special 
significance, for the working-out-of-tradition or historically 
effected consciousness "has the structure of experience." It is 
experience (Erfahrung) "which provides the basis in our actual lives 
for the specifically hermeneutic way we are related to other persons 
and to our cultural past, namely, dialogue and especially the dialogue 
of question and answer. This process of historically effected 
consciousness {wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) is ". . . the 
consciousness effected in the course of history and determined by 
history and the consciousness of being thus effected and determined." 
And it is this "openness to tradition which is characteristic of 
historically effected consciousness that constitutes the highest type 
of hermeneutical experience," a concept of experience, we must 
remember, that distinguishes historically effected consciousness by 
what Gadamer terms "readiness": "The hermeneutical consciousness 
culminates not in methodological sureness of itself, but in the same 
readiness for experience [italics mine] that distinguishes the 
experienced man [sic] from the man captivated by dogma." And finally 
in this regard: "A person who believes he is free of prejudices, relying 
on the objectivity of his procedures and denying that he is himself 
conditioned by historical circumstances, experiences the power of the 
prejudices that unconsciously dominate him as a vis a tergo." 
148 
^°Dewey, EE, 43-45. Put in Heideggerian terms, we might say that the immediate and direct 
concern of an educator is with Dasein or "being-in-the-world", forestructure, and with the 
consciousness that tradition always already is. 
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With this admittedly circumscribed attempt at describing 
Gadamer's theory of the hermeneutical experience, We have been 
trying to move toward a clarification of Gadamer's claim that history, 
tradition, experience, understanding, and language (or taken as a 
whole the "historically effected consciousness") are all bound up 
together in the hermeneutical act of interpretation ("Understanding is 
always interpretation, and hence interpretation is the explicit form 
of understanding")."'^® It would follow then -- as Gallagher maintains 
-- that if the educational experience is indeed always hermeneutical, 
then the educational experience is, itself, forestructured by that 
same historically effected consciousness. 
Another way to come at this is to emphasize one other very 
important Deweyan idea in Gadamer: Gadamer's concept of the 
"horizon." Gadamer defines horizon as "the range of vision that 
includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point." 
He goes on to say that the concept of horizon is essential to the 
concept of "situation," which, by definition, is "a standpoint that 
limits the possibility of vision." Applied to the thinking mind, 
"horizon" is characterized by "the way in which thought is tied to its 
finite determinacy and the way one's vision is gradually expanded." 
According to Gadamer, a person who "has an horizon" knows "the 
relative significance of everything in that horizon, whether it is near 
or far, great or small," Similarly, "working out of the hermeneutical 
^^^Gadamer, 346, xxxiv, 361, 362, 360, 307. 
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situation means acquiring tlie right horizon of inquiry for the 
questions evoked by the encounter with tradition." And finally; "The 
historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is 
never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never 
have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into 
which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person 
who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out of which all human 
life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in 
motion. The surrounding horizon is not set in motion by historical 
consciousness, but in it the motion becomes aware of itself." For 
Gadamer the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. 
"Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons 
supposedly existing by themselves."^ 
Immediately apparent here, perhaps more so than anywhere else 
in the conversation between the Gadamer-Dewey "text-horizons," is 
Dewey's question, "How shall the young become acquainted with the 
past in such a way that the acquaintance is a potent agent in 
appreciation of the living present?" This "past of the living present" 
is a good shorthand way of describing Gadamer's "fusion of horizons," 
which, we must remember, is also Gadamer's definition of 
understanding, hence the link between experience and understanding 
on the one hand and, from a Deweyan perspective, education on the 
other. But even more relevant to Gadamer's description of the ever-
^50|bid.. 302, 304, 306. 
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movingness of one's historical horizon is Dewey's "principle of 
continuity of experience" by which he means "that every experience 
both takes up something from those which have gone before and 
modifies in some way the quality of those which come after." He then 
quotes the appropriate lines from Tennyson's "Ulysses": . . all 
experience is an arch wherethro'/ Gleams that untraveled world, 
whose margin fades/ For ever and for ever when I move." Gadamer 
might have just as appropriately quoted the same lines to illustrate 
his evermoving horizon of historically effected consciousness."^ 
To read Dewey hermeneutically, then, is to enact the 
hermeneutical experience of the fusion"'of horizons in and of itself. 
(Are we reading Dewey through Gadamer or Gadamer through Dewey?) 
Like the wordplay in "fusion" and in Gadamer's historically effected 
consciousness, in reading Dewey hermeneutically we find ourselves in 
that in-between-ness upon which, Gadamer believes, the work of 
hermeneutics is based. It is a "polarity of familiarity and strangeness 
.... The true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between." But here 
too, as we said at the outset, we must remember Gadamer's further 
insistence that, "Given the intermediate position in which 
hermeneutics operates, it follows that its work is not to develop a 
procedure of understanding, but to clarify the conditions in which 
understanding takes place." 
Dewey, EE, 23, 35. 
am always reminded of llie propriety of the nuclear physicist's definition of "fusion" as a 
kind of "continuous reconstruction" of energy. 
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So, at the familiar end anyway, what we are proposing here as an 
approach to Dewey's philosophy of education based upon the 
hermeneutic experience is not a prescription or procedure for a new 
educational methodology. Indeed, one of Gadamer's strongest points 
about the nature of hermeneutics is that it "is the art of employing 
methods where they belong, not where they don't belong." Instead, 
what we have been attempting to do is to clarify some of the 
conditions in which understanding can take place, specifically, a 
recognition of the following: 1) Dewey's "social movement circle" as 
a variant of the hermeneutic circle and that that structure is the 
structure of experience; 2) The hermeneutical implications of 
historicity and interdisciplinarity in Dewey's observation that 
because "the objectives of learning are in the future and its 
immediate materials are in present experience, they can be carried 
into effect only in the degree that present experience is stretched, as 
it were, backward," expanding into the future only as it is also 
enlarged to take in the past; 3) This historical dialectic as suggestive 
of Dewey's sense of a Gadamerian "fusion of horizons" and its direct 
relationship to understanding: 4) Dewey's prescription for the 
situation as dependent upon the two inseparable principles of 
"interaction" and "continuity," the "longitudinal and lateral aspects 
of experience" as another way of getting at Gadamerian dialectic and 
historicity: 5) Dewey's use of the word "reconstruction" in his 
lifelong insistence on education as the "continuous reconstruction of 
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experience" as not synonymous witfi repeatability, e.g., in the 
positivist's sense of a capacity to repeat an experiment for 
verifiability.''53 Rather, as Rorty has spent a professional lifetime 
a r g u i n g ,  i t  c a n  b e  b e s t  u n d e r s t o o d  t o  m e a n  r e d e s c r i p t i o n ,  w h a t  
Gadamer characterizes as "an ongoing reacquisition that proceeds 
into infinity."''®'^ 
By way of conclusion, we need to tal<e a magnified look at what 
appears to be a formidable obstacle to any attempt at claiming a 
compatibility between Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and 
Dewey's theory of experience as a basis for a philosophy of education, 
namely, their views on scientific method. Gadamer's hermeneutics --
as representative of the current reputation of hermeneutics in general 
-- "has a primarily negative meaning: it is something which is not 
scientific inquiry, as such inquiry has been traditionally 
understood."^®® At the other extreme is Dewey's reputation as the 
personification of that tradition. However, these interpretations do 
not follow from what each man actually says. 
Throughout his work, Gadamer neither disparages science nor the 
science of inquiry, which for him we can think of as his version of the 
dialectic or "the structure of the question [that] is implicit in all 
experience." For example, Gadamer, writing in the "Foreword" to the 
Second Edition of Truth and Method says in no uncertain terms that 
"•S^Dewey, EE, 77, 44. 
^ ^'^Gadamer, "The Problem of the Historical Consciousness," 60. 
^^^Rorty, "Hermeneutics, General Studies, and Teacfiing," 1. 
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"If there is any practical consequence of the present investigation, it 
certainly has nothing to do with an 'unscientific commitment'; 
instead, it is concerned with the 'scientific' integrity of 
acknowledging the commitment in all understanding." A few 
paragraphs later he adds, "This does not in the slightest prevent the 
methods of modern natural science from being applicable to the social 
world .... I did not remotely intend to deny the necessity of 
methodical work within the human sciences .... The difference that 
confronts us is not in the method but in the objectives of knowledge." 
And in his "Afterword" he takes this a step further by criticizing 
those who are so caught up in "the methodologism of theory of 
science that all they can think about is rules and their application. 
They fail to recognize that reflection about practice is not 
methodology .... Despite all the differences between the natural 
sciences and [human sciences] there is really no disagreement 
between them about the immanent validity of critical methodology in 
the sciences." And finally, Gadamer makes it clear what the real 
problem is: 
The final confusion that dominates methodology of the sciences is, I think, 
the degeneration of the concept of practice. This concept lost its legitimacy 
in the age of science with its ideal of certainty. For since science views its 
purpose as isolating the causes of events - natural and historical -- it is 
acquainted with practice only as the application of science. But that is a 
'practice' that requires no special account. Thus the concept of technology 
displaced that of practice; in other words, the competence of experts has 
marginalized political reason.^®® 
Dewey, on the other side of this coin, neither promotes a hard-
^®®Gadamer, 362, xxviii, xxix, 556. 
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line objectivist's approach to scientific method nor does he give any 
evidence that he is sympathetic with the social engineers of his day. 
For instance, in The Quest for Certainty Dewey includes a chapter on 
"The Supremacy of Method," but instead of a mini-treatise on 
methodologism, we find that Dewey is reminding us that, "When 
action lacks means for control of external conditions, it takes the 
form of acts which are prototypes of rite and cult. Intelligence 
signifies that direct action has become indirect. It continues to be 
overt, but it is directed into channels of examination of conditions 
and doings that are tentative and preparatory." And in his next 
chapter, Dewey gives us a good idea of what "significant change . . . 
would issue from carrying over experimental method from physics to 
man [in regard to] the import of standards, principles, rules." He tells 
us that "these and all tenets and creeds about good and goods, would 
be recognized hypotheses. Instead of being rigidly fixed, they would be 
treated as intellectual instruments to be tested and confirmed ~ and 
altered -- through consequences acting upon them. They would lose all 
pretence of finality -- the ulterior source of dogmatism." In our 
reading of Dewey's experimental method, the "hypothesis" is, as we 
said earlier, the "workhorse" of his approach to method, and based on 
what he says about its role in the experiential continuum, when it is 
taken seriously, it will allow philosophy to make good on its claim to 
universality but only when philosophy "connects this universality 
with the formation of directive hypotheses instead of with a 
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sweeping pretension to knowledge of universal Being.""'^7 
This sounds very much like Gadamer's appeal for a consciousness 
of the "tyranny of the hidden prejudice," his detail of the structure of 
the question, and his explication of a hermeneutical understanding 
that "always involves applying the meaning understood." Finally, on 
the role of reflection (or lack thereof) and the "absoluteness of the 
ideal of 'science,* Gadamer's words could be easily those of Dewey: 
Gadamer says, "A philosophy of the sciences that understands itself 
as a theory of scientific method and dismisses any inquiry that cannot 
be meaningfully characterized as a process of trial and error does not 
recognize that by this very criterion it is outside science." And Dewey 
puts it this way: "Thought or reflection ... is the discernment of the 
relation between what we try to do and what happens in consequence. 
No experience having a meaning is possible without some element of 
thought .... In discovery of the detailed connections of our activities 
and what happens in consequence, the thought implied in cut and try 
experience is made explicit." For Gadamer as for Dewey, scientific 
method does not lead to things like behaviorism or behavioral 
objectives in education, and Dewey would be in complete agreement 
with Gadamer when the latter says that, "The paradigm of 'posing and 
testing hypotheses' pertains to all research, in the historical 
sciences too . . . and it always presents the danger that the rationality 
of procedure will be taken for a sufficient legitimation of the 
^^^Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 223, 277, 310. 
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significance of wiiat is 'known' througii it."^®® 
In closing, we will follow up this last citation with an argument 
that Rorty develops in his essay "Method, Social Science, and Social 
Hope," an argument that lends further support to the idea that Dewey 
is not at odds with Gadamer (and the "hermeneutical stance") about 
scientific method. Rorty's main point is that contrary to the 
positivists' thinking about the "nature" of science and scientific 
success, that is, "that discovery of this nature will give us a 
'method,' and that following that method will enable us to penetrate 
beneath the appearances and see nature 'in its own terms,'" Nature 
does not "speak" or favor any one "true" language, so that any 
attempt to "read," "decode," or otherwise discover "Nature's Own 
Language" is misguided from the start. However, according to Rorty, 
historically this has not been the case. These same positivists "have 
spent the last hundred years trying to use notions like 'objectivity,' 
'rigor,' and 'method' to isolate science from nonscience . . . [and this 
has been in spite of the fact that] "neither realism nor idealism could 
explain just what the imagined 'correspondence' between nature's 
language and current scientific jargon could consist in." Rorty calls 
for reinforcements from the work of Thomas Kuhn, whose thinking has 
significantly influenced our understanding of "scientific structures." 
Rorty sums it up this way: . . scientific breakthroughs are not so 
much a matter of deciding which of various alternative hypotheses 
••^^Gadamer, 333, 554, 145, 560. 
are true, but of finding the riglit jargon in which to frame hypotheses 
in the first place." And, elsewhere, "If 'scientific method' means 
merely being rational in some given area of inquiry, then it has a 
perfectly reasonable 'Kuhnian' sense -- it means obeying the normal 
conventions of your discipline, not fudging the data too much, not 
letting your hopes and fears influence your conclusions unless those 
hopes and fears are shared by all those who are in the same line of 
work, being open to refutation by experience, not blocking the road to 
inquiry." Having thus established his position regarding scientific 
method, Rorty states the aim of his essay as recommending "a 
Deweyan approach to both social science and morality, one which 
emphasizes the utility of narratives and vocabularies rather than the 
objectivity of laws and theories," and that "it would do no harm to 
adopt the term 'hermeneutics' for the sort of by-guess-and-by-God 
hunt for new terminology which characterizes the initial stages of 
any new line of inquiry." And lastly, ". . . Dewey emphasizes that this 
move 'beyond method' gives mankind an opportunity to grow up, to be 
free to make itself, rather than seeking direction from some imagined 
outside source."^ If we too can move beyond method, then it might 
be helpful to say that we have begun to clarify some of the conditions 
necessary for the understanding of a Deweyan philosophy of education 
based upon a hermeneutical philosophy of experience -- in all of its 
familiarity and strangeness. 
^®®Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 192-195, 199-200, 204. We might note here in 
passing that Gadamer, too, is sympathetic to Kuhn's thought. (See Gadamer, 283n, and Gadamer 
(1985), 179.) 
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CHAPTER4 
BILDUNG 
"God ain't a he or a she, but a It." 
-- Shug to Celie in Aiice Wail^er's The Color Purpla 
Here iies the greatest danger under which our civilization 
stands: the elevation of adaptive qualities to privileged 
status. 
" Gadamer, "What Is Practice?" 
It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, 
if we understand at ail. 
- Gadamer, Truth and Method 
I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess. 
-- Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" 
In the previous two chapters we took a close look at Gadamer's 
"understanding" (Verstehen) and "experience" {Erfahrung), 
respectively, as two of the three conditions which give unity and 
coherence to philosophical hermeneutics as well as to the educational 
experience. In this chapter we turn to Bildung -- the German word in 
Gadamer's hermeneutics that is roughly synonymous with the process 
of educative acculturation -- as the third and final condition for the 
completion of that unity. Our approach will be the same as it was for 
the other two chapters, where we attempted to demonstrate the 
compatibility of philosophical hermeneutics to the theory and 
practice of education. In the case of "understanding," we tried to 
show that philosophical hermeneutics is compatible with what we 
might refer to collectively"'as the "pedagogies of tacit 
1 Rn 
'°"As we pointed out in Chapter 2, this includes "pedagogies of understanding," 
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hermeneutics." For "experience," we set out to compare John Dewey's 
theory of experience and Gadamer's hermeneutical experience as a 
means of claiming a place for philosophical hermeneutics in the 
American liberal democratic tradition of Dewey's progressive 
education. Now, with Bildung, we turn to the work of Mary Belenky et 
al and their study, Women's Ways of Knowing (1986)."'®'' Because this 
work builds on the earlier studies of Carol Gilligan's In a Different 
Voice (1982) and Nel Noddings' Caring (1984), we will develop our 
argument indirectly on the basis of these interrelated works as a way 
of understanding in a different way if we are to understand women's 
and men's "ways of knowing" at all.'^®^ But our intention is neither to 
get pulled into the ongoing debate over what constitutes specific 
feminist theories nor to argue for or against the validity of 
Gilligan's/l/Vomen's Ways research as an epistemology of 
empowerment."'Our task is to generate a conception of Bildung 
that mediates "understanding" and "experience" hermeneutically, that 
"constructivist" pedagogies, and educational practices tiiat have incorporated philosophical 
hermeneutics (either explicitly or implicitly). 
Belenky, B. Clinchy, N. Goldberger, J. Tarule, Women's Ways of Knowing (New York: 
Basic Books, 1986). 
^ ®^Rather than having to rely on the problematic category of "cultural feminism," at one point I 
thought my argument might be better served if 1 had come up with my own term for the kind of 
feminist epistemology that "women's ways" represents, e.g., "hermeneutical feminism," or 
"participatory feminism," or "difference feminism," or something like what Charlotte Bunch 
calls "nonaligned feminism." But I thought isetter of doing so mainly because I found myself 
stepping into the trap that Carol Tavris calls the "mismeasure of woman"; that is to say, I began 
to realize that I was measuring "women's ways" against my male conception of a male's theory 
of understanding, i.e., Gadamer's. In the end, I decided that what I wanted to say about feminism 
in this regard could best be said by Women's Ways, especially given its understanding of 
"constructed knowledge," and "connected teaching." 
°"^One can turn to a variety of sources to follow up on theory classification, e.g., Rosemarie 
Tong's Feminist Thouglit, and to a growing body of commentary on the Gilligan issue, e.g., 
Kerber et al (1986), Benhabib (1986), Crysdale (1994). 
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is, in a non-hegemonic way. But we will not be setting out to do this 
by reinventing the postmodernist critiques of these power/knowledge 
structures. We have "crossed the postmodern divide," and critical 
theory has been unrelenting in rooting out these power structures, yet 
the jury is still out the extent to which theory has been successful at 
effecting change, especially in terms of education and the process of 
Bildung. Thus we hear from postmodernists like Linda Nicholson and 
Susan Hekman who are busy piecing together "elements of a 
postmodern feminism" and someone like Patti Lather who locates 
herself in the "liberatory education" movement and is working toward 
the same goal for "feminist research and pedagogy with/in the 
postmodern" by focusing on "oppositional discourses of criticism 
resistance.""'®'^ 
What we are proposing in this chapter is similar to these 
projects, but our emphasis is not on the postmodern as such, nor is it 
on a postmodern critical feminism, but this is not to dismiss these 
deconstructive efforts out of hand. Rather, I see what follows as 
"building"''®^ on the terrain cleared off by the critical theorists so 
that our approach is more pragmatically directed in the sense that 
Women's Ways can be understood as complementing philosophical 
hermeneutics (and vice versa) in much the same way that we argued in 
the last chapter for philosophical hermeneutics as supplementing 
'•S'^See Nicholson's Feminism/Postmodernism-, Hekman's Gender and Knowledge; and Lather's 
Getting Smart, xvii. 
^ ®®The Bildung/buMmg near-homophone will be a thematic metaphor for the chapter. 
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Dewey's theory of experience. To put this another way, what follows 
is an attempt to bring the critical theorists, the moderate 
hermeneuticists, and the pragmatists into the same conversation, and, 
as a variation on how Women's Ways conceptualizes "connected 
teaching," this complementarity can have a practical application in 
the classroom. What must be kept in mind here, though, is that this is 
not a one-sided operation. Philosophical hermeneutics, for example, 
will not be telling Women's Ways (or vice versa) what to do in order 
to effect change within the dominant power structure. What we will 
see emerge in the course of this chapter is a kind of reciprocating 
complementarity or a "fusion of horizons" by which philosophical 
hermeneutics meets certain needs of Women's 1/Vays and Women's 
Ways reciprocates. The subsequent widening of horizons that results 
from this "fusion" is what we will be calling Bildung, which, in this 
context, we might define as the acculturative predisposition to 
learning, where "learning," as we saw in the previous chapter, is the 
hermeneutical paradigm. In the educational or classroom context, this 
"fusion" becomes a practical matter of recognizing the 
complementarity between Women's M/ays'advocacy of "connected 
teaching" and the necessary roles that hermeneutical "understanding" 
and "experience," for example, play in the development of that 
pedagogical, ontological, and epistemological mode. The question, 
then, to which our proposed reciprocation will be an answer is, "How 
can philosophical hermeneutics, complemented by Women's Ways, 
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account for the gender inequities and 'trait genderizations' that are 
the direct concerns of feminism and educational theory,"'®® and how 
can this be done without slipping into a feminist essentialism?" 
Gender is an issue that Gadamer does not confront directly in Truth 
and Method nor does he speak specifically to gender issues 
elsewhere: however, implicit in philosophical hermeneutics and 
essential to it is a profound concern for the "Other," for the "l-Thou 
relationship," and it is here that we will make our case for 
complementarity. 
The direction that we will take in sorting through all of this will 
be first, to define what philosophical hermeneutics means by 
Bildung', secondly, to clarify the main points of Women's Ways and 
to show how philosophical hermeneutics' Erfahrung can complement 
Women's Ways' ambiguous position on cognitive stages of 
development which, in turn, complements philosophical hermeneutics' 
apparent silence on educational theory; and third, to show how 
Women's Ways' critique of patriarchal hegemony complements that 
omission in Truth and Method which, in turn, complements 
contemporary feminism's need for a persuasive rhetoric. (Here the 
stress will be on what Gadamer holds to be "the fundamental 
metaphoricity of language.") In other words, we will be striving to 
166what is on the line here, as Marjorie Grene has indicated (Wachterhauser, 168) is the 
problem of how historicity as a defining principle of human being can be within nature. Also see 
Robin Schott's reply to Weinsheimer, "Whose Home Is It Anyway? A Feminist Response to 
Gadamer's Hermeneutics" (Silverman, 202). 
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attain what John Rawls refers to as a "reflective equilibrium" in 
which Gadamer is complemented in the light of Women's Ways and, 
reciprocally, in which Women's Ways is complemented in the light of 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, and we must do so without one 
superceding the other. 
What is Bildung? Georgia Warnke, who has written extensively 
on Gadamer, defines it as "the process through which individuals and 
cultures enter a more and more widely defined community." Similarly, 
Richard Rorty builds on Dewey's pragmatism to make his point about 
the fundamental nature of Bildung: "we need to think of the goal of 
inquiry and of life not as getting in touch with something which 
exists independently of ourselves, but as Bildung, self-formation, 
what Dewey liked simply to call 'growth.'" And Gadamer calls it "the 
greatest idea of the eighteenth century." But more specifically, 
according to the translators of Truth and Method, "Bildung is 
translated by 'culture' and related forms such as 'cultivation' and 
'cultivated' .... Gadamer defines Bildung as 'the properly human way 
of developing one's natural talents and capacities.'""'®^ But as 
Gadamer makes clear in his other writings, this association with 
culture is not blind. He is very much aware that the concept of culture 
has been and still is used simply as an instrument of domination. 
However, what remains important for him -- despite the criticism 
against him of espousing a "universal optimism" -- is "the concept 
"•^^See Warnke's Gadamer, 173; Rorty's "Hermeneutics, General Studies, and Teaching," 3; 
and Gadamer's Truth and Method, 9 and xii. 
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that a self can be formed without breaking with or repudiating one's 
past and that this fornnation cannot be achieved by any merely 
technical or methodical means." 
In terms of education (Victor Frankenstein and B. F. Skinner 
notwithstanding), we cannot simply "build" a human being as a 
craftsperson would make some specific thing. As we saw in Chapter 2 
with Joseph Dunne's argument against the behavioral objectives 
model of education, we cannot be taught phronesis because we cannot 
separate ourselves from it as if it were some technique that can be 
observed, rehearsed, and replicated. In Gadamer's terms, it happens to 
us "over and above our wanting and doing." The real question, Gadamer 
reminds us, is, "However much it is the nature of tradition to exist 
only through being appropriated, it still is part of the nature of man 
[sic] to break with tradition, to criticize and dissolve it, and is not 
what takes place in remaking the real into an instrument of human 
purpose something far more basic in our relationship to being?" 
Gadamer also notes that within Bildung is the root word Bild, 
•form,' 'image,' and more particularly, 'picture,'" and the implication 
here is that "cultivation" is the "figuring out" or "constructing of" a 
self that conforms with an ideal image of the human.But this is 
not to suggest a Platonic elitism over a democratic view of culture. 
1 RR 
' °°See H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Weinsheimer and Marshall (New York; 
Crossroad, 1992). Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to Gadamer will be from 
this work. Also note here the etymological link between "cultivation" as it is used here and 
"tilling" the earth as it is used in agriculture. Also the Latin root "cultus" or "care" reinforces 
the cultural feminist connection. Compare Dewey's "growth" and, as we will see in Chapter 
Five, Rousseau's plant metaphors. 
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As Gadamer surveys the history of the concept, he tells us that, not 
surprisingly, this "eductive" conception of selfhood is found in 
medieval mystical thinking, where the image to be drawn out was the 
Image of God in man (literally "male"). In other words, with dogma 
comes the elitist conception of a perfection of form, which is, in this 
case, "God's Image."^®^ Historically, this becomes more evident with 
the word's obvious connection to pictures and images, as 
aestheticism begins to play a very important role in the development 
of Bildung, and the perfection of the human image to be "drawn" is as 
a work of art, something like the "portrait" of Oscar Wilde's Dorian 
Gray. In this regard we can "hear" that history as it is expressed in 
the modulated expressions of the root word itself. As Joel 
Weinsheimer says, "Gadamer structures the first third of Truth and 
Method around Bildung and its linguistic cognates: Bild (form, 
image, picture), Nachbild (reproduction), Vorbild (exemplar), 
Gebilde (structure), Urbild (original), Abbild (copy), and 
Einbildungskraft (imagination),"^About as close as we can get to 
this sort of wordplay in English is with "image" in "imaglnaWon," 
"form" in "formation" or, by extension, with the near homophone, 
"building." 
Unlike the elitist's agenda or "narrow snobbery" of an aesthetics 
^®®The analogue in hermeneutics, as we saw in Cliapter 1, is the hermeneutics of biblical 
exegesis. There are also parallels in the New Science of the seventeenth century with Bacon 
"reading" the bool< of nature in order to discover "the footsteps of the Creator imprinted on his 
creatures" (Anderson, 29), and in the aesthetics of typological symbolism, especially as 
described by Erich Auerbach in his Mimesis. We are also reminded here of our discussion in 
Chapter 1 of the "monstrous imagination" and the "exemplar-mediated prejudice." 
^^°Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 68. 
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of Bildung,^'^'^ the primary reason for Gadamer's emphasis on the 
concept lies in his attempt to introduce the ontoiogical tradition, to 
explain its role in the working out of everyday experience, and to 
relate this project to the "human sciences.""'jq illustrate this we 
can turn to how Gadamer begins Truth and Method. Part One is 
entitled "The question of truth as it emerges in the experience of 
art." The first subsection deals with "transcending the aesthetic 
dimension" and describes the "significance of the humanist tradition 
for the human sciences." After a brief treatment of the "problem of 
method," Gadamer turns to four "guiding concepts of humanism": 
"Bildung" "Sensus communis," "Judgment," and "Taste." What 
these four concepts have in common and what makes them unique to 
the human sciences, Gadamer tells us, is "tact" {Tactgefuhl).'^^^ He 
says that, "By 'tact' we understand a special sensitivity and 
sensitiveness to situations and how to behave in them, for which 
knowledge from general principles does not suffice. Hence an 
essential part of tact is that it is tacit and unformulable . . . . For the 
tact which functions in the human sciences is not simply a feeling and 
^^^This is Dewey's phrase, and for his strong comments on the "dualism" of educational values, 
of which "that between culture and utility is probably the most fundamental," see Democracy 
and Education, 229-30, 260-61, 288. 
17P 
'"^To avoid confusion with this terminology, we need to remember that for Gadamer the "human 
sciences" are \he Geisteswissenschaften, an "untranslatable" German term, that originated, 
ironically, as a translation of J. S. Mill's English term "moral sciences." The point for us is that 
we should not confuse Gadamer's "human sciences" with the American conception of the "social 
sciences." 
1 
'"'As Robert Hollinger pointed out to me, this is Wittgenstein's "knowing our way about." We 
can also think of it in terms of Michael Polanyi's "tacit knowing." 
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unconscious, but is at the same time a mode of knowing and a mode of 
being." Weinslieimer glosses tliis passage by pointing out that 
"Against those who maintain that tact is mere feeling without 
cognitive import, Gadamer argues that tact acquired through Bildung 
is a way of knowing: and against those who contend that tact is 
merely a means of knowledge (and therefore reducible to a procedure 
or method), Gadamer asserts that it is also a way of being." This 
"tact," we learn, "includes Bildung," and the nature of Bildung 
itself is characterized as "a universal and common sense" that keeps 
"oneself open to what is other -- to other, more universal points of 
view. It embraces a sense of proportion and distance in relation to 
itself, and hence consists in rising above itself to universality. To 
distance oneself from oneself and from one's private purposes means 
to look at these in the way that others see them." But this is not to 
say that the "universality" to which Gadamer alludes is a fixed 
concept or general rule to be applied to a particular situation. It Is 
more like "a social or communal sense of the viewpoints of the 
possible others." Remember that "tact is not a natural capacity for 
feeling. It must be acquired and thus presupposes BUdung."'^^^ 
It is in this context that we will approach the topic of Bildung 
in the light of Women's Ways as a mode of knowing and a mode of 
being. This, then, is at the heart of our earlier formulation that the 
educational experience {Bildung) is, in Dewey's phrase, "the 
continuous reconstruction" of the complementary reciprocation 
^^^See Gadamer, 16-17; Weinsheimer's Gadamer, 72; Gadamer, 17; Weinsheimer, 72. 
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between the ontology of philosophical hermeneutics 
(tact/understanding) and the epistemology of Women's Ways 
("constructed knowledge'Vexperience). And here again we come up on 
the theme of "meeting," for in the etymological sense of "contact," 
we begin to hear and to get a common sense of the connected knowing 
and the belongingness that both Women's Ways and philosophical 
hermeneutics share with one another. The last third of this chapter 
will attempt to further clarify this. For now we need to turn briefly 
to the problem of how philosophical hermeneutics can be a 
complement to Women's Ways. 
As was noted earlier, our understanding of Women's Ways of 
Knowing does not presuppose that a "counter culture" based upon the 
superiority of women supercede the dominant male culture."'^® Our 
position focuses on the complementarity of what Women's Ways 
calls "constructed knowledge" and what Gadamer refers to as "tact," 
the umbrella term that includes Bildung. Briefly, "constructed 
knowledge" is characterized by "passionate knowing . . . the 
elaborated form connected knowing takes after women use the self as 
an instrument of understanding." This means that this perspective 
begins "as an effort to reclaim the self by attempting to integrate 
knowledge that [women feel] intuitively [is] personally important 
with knowledge they had learned from others.""'^® The self becomes 
^^^Alice Echols, "The Taming of tha Id," in Pleasure and Danger, ed. Carole Vance (Boston: 
Routledge, 1984), 50. This essay provides a clear survey of the history of "cultural feminism." 
^^®Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, Tarule, 141, 134. 
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the mediator of understanding because it beconnes one with the object 
of knowing, unlike the objective distancing involved when, for 
example, in "procedural knowledge" knowing is directed away from 
the the self and towards the object the knower seeks to understand, 
which is the process of rational analysis. Again, this is not to 
advocate a position that Carol Tavris seems to think is the primary 
concern of the cultural feminists, namely, that of "dethroning the 
universal male" in order to reverse the polarities of "us-them 
(women as the problem) thinking" to "them-us (men as the problem) 
thinking" based upon some idealized glorification of women's natural 
ways of being.This is an oversimplification on her part and does 
not follow from what the authors of Women's Ways actually say 
about their research into women's epistemology. Our task in what 
follows is to point out areas of compatibility, not to argue an 
"either/or" case for an ethics of responsibility versus an ethics of 
rights grounded in some misguided belief in innate characteristics of 
gender. Gilligan herself cannot be read as explicitly taking this 
position, especially when, in her "Preface" to In a Different Voice 
she says, "The different voice I describe is characterized not by 
gender but by theme," a point that she further clarifies elsewhere. 
To begin, we need to put Belenky et al into context. Women's 
Ways of Knowing was published in 1986 and was the end result of a 
^^^Carol Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 60, 
^^®Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 2; and 
Linda Kerber et ai., "On In a Different Voice,' Signs 11 (1986): 324. 
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five-year project begun in the late 1970's. The authors of the study, 
all cognitive psychologists, include the following: Mary F. Belenky (U 
of Vermont), BIythe M. Clinchy (Wellesley), Nancy R. Goldberger 
(Fielding Institute, Santa Barbara), and Jill M. Tarule (Lesley College). 
The study is based on interviews with 135 women. Each interview 
session lasted approximately two to five hours and focused on 
relationships in families and schools rather than the workplace. There 
were 90 interviewees from 6 colleges and universities and 45 from 
family agencies. The project was conceived of as a continuation of the 
work begun by Harvard's William Perry in his all-male study. Forms 
of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years (1970) 
and by Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice (1982), which is her 
response to Lawrence Kohlberg's study of moral reasoning in boys and 
men, The Philosophy of Moral Development (1981), which derived 
from his 1958 University of Chicago dissertation, "The Development 
of Modes of Thinking and Choices in Years 10 to 16.""'^® 
With its collective 135 voices taken as the "different voice" of 
Woman, we might think of Women's Ways of Knowing as the cognitive 
psychologist's version of the Bildungsroman. As in that literary 
genre, Belenky et al, by retelling the life-change stories of women, 
1 comparing the titles of these works, one can begin to get a sense of what Gilllgan means 
by a "different" voice. Note the formal, analytic character of the two male works and the less 
constrained approach taken by the women. But there is a curious twist to this observation that is 
even more revealing of the "voice" thesis: In conversation, BIythe Clinchy pointed out that 
Women's Ways of Knowing was not their choice for a title; rather, it was the editor's decision. 
The implication was that the Women's Ways "angle" would be a better marketing strategy. In 
this regard, one wonders if Gilligan's title is her own. This insight was brought to my attention 
by Professor Jane Kvetko. 
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describe the process of Bildung or "cognitive development" as 
reflected through "five different perspectives on knowledge that 
women seem to hold," but they "leave it to future work to determine 
whether these perspectives have any stagelike qualities.""'The 
following is their summary of these positions: 
Building on Perry's scheme, we grouped women's perspectives on knowing 
into five major epistemological categories: silence, a position in which 
women experience themselves as mindless and voiceless and subject to the 
whims of external authority; received knowledge, a perspective from which 
women conceive of themselves as capable of receiving, even reproducing, 
knowledge from the ail-knowing external authorities but not capable of 
creating knowledge on their own; subjective knowledge, a perspective from 
which truth and knowledge are conceived of as personal, private, and 
subjectively known or intuited; procedural knowledge, a position in which 
women are invested in learning and applying objective procedures for 
obtaining and communicating knowledge; and constructed knowledge, a 
position in which women view all knowledge as contextual, experience 
themselves as creators of knowledge, and value both subjective and objective 
strategies for knowing.^ 
We need to note that two ways of "knowing" - "separate 
knowing" and "connected knowing" -- coexist in the fourth position of 
"procedural knowledge," with connected knowing bridging procedural 
and constructed knowledge. Briefly, separate knowing is the dominant 
mode in modern society. It involves the search for and use of 
impersonal rules, techniques, and methods, and the knower is 
separated from the known. Its mode of discourse is argumentation, 
and, as an epistemology, Belenky/Clinchy/Goldberger/Tarule tell us 
that separate knowing can be compared to what Jerome Bruner calls 
the "paradigmatic mode," Peter Elbow refers to as the "doubting 
^®®Blythe Clinchy, "On Critical Thinking and Connected Knowing" Liberal Education 75 
(Nov/Dec 1989): 14. 
^®^Belenky et al., 15. 
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game," and Wilhelm Dilthey categorizes as the 
Naturwissenschaften.^^^ Connected knowing, on the other hand, 
requires a knower to "get behind the other person's eyes and look at 
things from that person's point of view. . . . The connected knower 
believes that in order to understand what a person is saying one must 
adopt the person's own terms and refrain from judgment."''®^ The 
authors compare this kind of knowing to Bruner's "narrative mode," 
Elbow's "believing game," and Dilthey's Geisteswissenschaften. And 
in contrast to the argumentation of separate knowing, the "voice" of 
connected knowing is narration. Instead of a voice that "evaluates," 
we are told, the connected knower "understands." But this is not to 
say that women in this regard are incapable of rational evaluation. 
Clinchy explains that "many women would rather think with someone 
rather than against someone. I [Clinchy] am arguing against an 
unnecessarily constricted view of thinking as analytic, detached, 
divorced from feeling.""' 
In terms of Gadamer's Truth and Method, if we visualize the five 
perspectives of Women's Ways as on a divided line,"!®® the first three 
'"'Ibid., 113. Tlie reference in Women's Ways is to Bruner's essay "Narrative and 
Paradigmatic Modes of Thought" in Learning and Teaching the Ways of Knowing (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985); and to Elbow's Writing Without Teachers (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973). We have met Dilthey's writing in Chapter 1. 
^®3ciinchy, 18. 
^^'^Ibid. For Hegel this is the opposition between reason {vernunft) and understanding 
{verstehen). 
^®®Plato's image of the Divided Line (Book VI, 509c-511d in Allan Bloom's translation of The 
Republic) makes for a thought-provoking analogy. Note that in both examples the lines are 
divided into unequal segments. But the analogy should not suggest identity. In contradistinction to 
our thesis, for Plato, when someone learned a techne, it was understood that knowing techne 
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positions and part of the fourth ("separate knowing") would belong to 
a segment that we might call "method" or techne in Gadamer's sense 
of the "abuse of method" or "the use of method where it does not 
belong," i.e., the methods of social engineering imposed on humanistic 
concerns. We can also take Gadamer's critique of method to include 
the "White Male Club's"^®® abuse of power over others, specifically 
Its racist and sexist requirements for "membership" which are based 
on a perverse rationalization of what constitutes a human being (or a 
subhuman being as the case may be)."*®^ The other side of the dividing 
line -- the remainder of position four ("connected knowing") and all 
of position five -- we might then call "truth" or phronesis or what 
Gadamer describes as "the 'scientific' integrity of acknowledging the 
commitment involved in all understanding ... not what we do or what 
we ought to do, but what happens over and above our wanting and 
doing.""'®® 
This is the realm of "tact," of the "extrascientific experiences" 
also meant knowing the appropriate phronesis. 
^®®Robert Terry, in his inquisitional and apparently timeless article, "The White Male Club: 
Biology and Power," Civil Rights Digest (1974), 13-21, takes a critical view of the way people 
of color and white women are dominated by the power of white males in our society. He attempts 
to explain why there continues to be an inequitable distribution of power among the people in the 
United States and what needs to be done to remedy the situation. Likening the country to a "white 
male club" committed to technical superiority and dominance of the world scene, he shows how 
the practice of the club arbitrarily gives privileges to club members (white males) exclusively, 
preventing those "others" who want to become members from doing so ~ unless they conform 
to the white male model. Despite the fact that attacks on the club keep recurring, Terry maintains 
that the club has resisted change, leaving people of color and white women in subordinate 
positions. We will have more to say about the White Male Club later in the chapter. 
®^See Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," The Yale Review 81:4 
(October 1993), 1-20. 
^®®Gadamer, xxviii. 
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that Gadamer associates with the four "guiding concepts of 
humanism": "Bildung," "taste," "sensus communis," and "judgment." 
And this is also where Gadamer connects with Women's Ways, for 
these are the key concepts that best illustrate the impropriety of 
method, not only in the human sciences but also in the course of 
everyday human experience and interaction, as well as in the activity 
of "constructed knowing" (and "connected teaching"). What we mean 
by the impropriety of method is that since any given method is 
supposedly derived from a "universal" principle, the application of 
that method would be invariant regardless of the situation, which is 
to say, "tactless" and therefore inappropriate. For example, someone 
who is taught a second language from a series of outdated audiotapes 
and who has had no other contact with that language (as was and still 
is the case in many of the former communist bloc countries and 
China), the result would be mere parroting or an "uncultivated" use of 
the language. The language user would have no "sixth sense" of how 
to use the language at the right time in the right place. In other 
words, the parroting would be applied fec/7ne without concern for the 
practical judgment of phronesis. \t would not require any sense of 
taste, common sense, or practical judgment for its application, which 
is to say that tact, because it is not a techne, cannot be taught. And 
as we saw in Chapter 2, if we take this example as a "microtext" for 
the whole of our modern technological culture, and specifically for 
modern educational practices, this is the situation that we must come 
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to terms with, for as we are all aware, "method" in this context can 
be synonymous with an abusive and methodical, negative prejudice. 
And this leads up to the point that we are trying to make in this 
chapter and in the dissertation itself: knowing how to use techne at 
the right time in the right place (or phronesis) can be understood as 
the complementarity of Gadamer's "tact" and Women's Ways' 
"constructed knowledge." Understood in this way, we arrive at our 
aim for education as the inculcation of tact through Bildung (through 
the hermeneutical forms of "connected teaching" and the "pedagogies 
of understanding and care") and a variation on our thesis: The 
educational experience is the continuous reconstruction of the 
complementary reciprocation of Gadamer's "tact" and the 
"constructed knowledge" of Women's Ways of Knowing. 
To map out how Women's Ways' perspectives might be 
actualized, we can turn to Alice Walker's "womanist" 
BUdungsroman, The Color Purple, where the five "ways of knowing" 
seemingly unfold in what can be interpreted as sequential phases of 
development. We have to be careful, though, for, as we saw above. 
Women's M/ays makes no claims for such stages of growth. The 
authors remind us that for some of the women that were interviewed, 
memories of having been in one or more of these positions were 
evident, but the authors do not press for any one position as 
presupposing or anticipating another. So why offer up a reading that 
suggests the existence of a dialectic from one perspective to the 
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next, culminating in "constructed knowing"? There are two reasons. 
First, this reading of The Color Purple is somewhat contrived so as 
to simply illustrate the full continuum of the five perspectives as 
well as their potential for "stagelike qualities." Another reading 
could very easily refute that Celie is, in fact, in any one of the stages 
that we propose for her throughout the novel. For example, at the end 
of the novel, one might argue that she is not constructing her own 
understanding at all but obviously is still working within a 
"procedural knowledge" perspective. The second reason for including 
this particular reading involves it as an illustration of the way in 
which Women's Ways is complemented by philosophical 
hermeneutics, specifically by the role of hermeneutical experience 
{Erfahrung) in the "unfolding" of these perspectives. 
When we first meet Celie, she has been effectively silenced by 
the dominating and cruel males who control her life. She is illiterate, 
and when she speaks, it is a base and vulgar language. Mindless and 
voiceless, she is, by the measure of man, less than human. However, 
as she learns language, learns how to read, Celie begins her entry into 
human understanding in the form of "received knowledge," accepting 
what she is told as truth but at least more knowledgeable as to what 
she is accepting. But after she meets Shug, all of this changes. As we 
saw in one of the epigraphs to this chapter, through love and caring, 
Shug gets Celie to recognize the value of personal or "subjective 
knowledge." God, for example, "ain't a he or a she, but a It," an 
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indefinite pronoun that opens itself interpretively to Celie and allows 
her to search out and to intuit her own truths. Once Celie has done 
this and has taken responsibility for her own life, she begins to 
realize the necessity of "procedural knowledge," which results in her 
creating her own business as a seamstress and clothing designer. 
Finally, with the unraveling of the novel's plot, i.e., the revelation of 
true identities and the return of Celie's children, we have the sense of 
Celie now capable of constructing her own truths and of valuing "both 
subjective and objective strategies for knowing," The thematic sense 
at the novel's end is one of "homecoming," a metaphor for the return 
to a selfhood that has remained the same but has also become 
different. It has become, in effect, a home away from home. We will 
return to this aspect of our topic, to what Gadamer calls "the 
fundamental metaphoricity of language" and its implications for 
Women's Ways as a a complement to philosophical hermeneutics, but 
first we must take a look at how Gadamer's philosophy of experience 
can be a complement to Women's Ways. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, Erfahrung, the hermeneutical 
experience, is a fundamental aspect of philosophical hermeneutics."'®^ 
It is "the experience of negation" and is quintessentially linked to the 
Chapter 3 we learned that Erfahrung "provides the basis in our actual lives for the 
specifically hermeneutic way we are related to other persons and to our cultural past, namely, 
dialogue and especially the dialogue of question and answer. This kind of 'experience' is not the 
residue of isolated moments, but an ongoing integrative process in which what we encounter 
widens our horizon, but only by overturning an existing perspective, which we can then perceive 
was erroneous or at least narrow. Its effect, therefore, is not simply to make us 'knowing,' to 
add to our stock of information, but to give us that implicit sense of broad perspectives, of the 
range of human life and culture, and of our own limits that constitutes a non-dogmatic wisdom. 
("Translators Preface" to TM, xiii). 
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educational experience. Gadamer says that, "Only through negative 
instances do we acquire new experiences, as Bacon saw. Every 
experience worthy of the name thwarts an expectation. Thus the 
historical nature of man [sic] essentially implies a fundamental 
negativity that emerges in the relation between experience and 
insight." He goes on to make the connection between hermeneutical 
experience and the Aeschylean experience of "learning through 
suffering," explaining why this must be so: "What a man [sic] has to 
learn through suffering is not this or that particular thing, but insight 
into the limitations of humanity, into the absoluteness of the barrier 
that separates man from the divine .... Thus experience is experience 
of human finitude . . . . If it is characteristic of every phase of the 
process of experience that the experienced person acquires a new 
openness to new experiences, this is certainly true of being perfectly 
experienced. It does not mean that experience has ceased and a higher 
form of knowledge is reached (Hegel), but that for the first time 
experience fully and truly is. In it all dogmatism, which proceeds 
from the soaring desires of the human heart, reaches an absolute 
barrier.In this light, our Women's Ways' reading of The Color 
Purple is also a reading of the novel as a formulation of the 
hermeneutical experience, the experience of negation. We might even 
say that the novel is one long string of negations for Celie. For 
example, Celie's learning to read and write is a negation of her 
"•^^Gadamer, 365, 356-357. 
1 2 0  
"silence": she realizes the suffering that she causes Sophie after 
Harpo, on Celie's advice, beats Sophie in order to keep her in her 
place; she discovers through Shug that being a woman can be more 
than she had ever imagined: Shug shows Celie how to "negate" God: 
Celie discovers that her sister had, in fact, been writing to her all 
along: and in the end, she discovers that the identities of parents and 
children were not what they appeared to be. Read in this way, we are 
not so much concerned with how one attains some "higher form of 
knowledge" or "constructed knowledge" as we are with the 
historicity of Being, what Dewey calls the "continuous 
reconstruction of experience," and Charles Taylor calls "situated 
freedom." It is this ontological framework that complements 
Women's Ways. 
But in what specific ways are Gadamer and Women's Ways 
similar? Gadamer tells us that the hermeneutical experience requires 
the priority of hearing over sight, and in the previous two chapters we 
learned that Gadamer's philosophy is indeed founded on an ontological 
conception of understanding marked by its linguisticality and 
dialectical nature, i.e., speaking, listening, application, and the 
historical effecting of that interaction. In this regard we need only 
recall Gadamer's definition of hermeneutics as "the art of bringing 
what is said or written to speech again." To underscore the point, 
however, we can turn to Gadamer's metaphorical use of key words. In 
this case we find recurring in Truth and Method important variations 
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on the German verb horen or "listen to," from which our English word 
"hear" is derived, and one of the most significant variations is with 
the word for "belonging" (gehoren). As we are told by the translators 
of Truth and Method, "In many languages, 'to hear' and 'to obey' are 
the same word. When we genuinely listen to another's insight into 
whatever we are seriously discussing, Gadamer suggests, we discover 
some validity in it, something about the thing itself that would not 
h a v e  s h o w n  i t s e l f  s i m p l y  w i t h i n  o u r  o w n  l i m i t e d  h o r i z o n  . . . .  
Participants in a conversation 'belong' to and with each other, 'belong' 
to and with the subject of their discussion, and mutually participate 
in the process which brings out the nature of that subject." (in 
American slang, we have the expression "I hear you" as an all-purpose 
way of saying "I agree with you" or "I understand what you have said 
and I will respect or obey your wishes.") This "bringing out" process, 
as we have seen, is the event of hermeneutical understanding itself, 
and as we begin to realize early in our reading of Truth and Method, 
the embeddedness of "hearing" and "voice" and "belongingness" (or 
community) is not simply an etymological phenomenon but a 
metaphorical experience that reveals the ontological implications of 
the dialectic implied in "hearing" (horen) and the inseparability of 
hearing the voice of the Other or "belongingness" {Zugehorigkeit).^^'^ 
On this point we can also turn to Rorty, who, like Gadamer and 
Women's Ways, has made his case for metaphor as a source of our 
Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, 119; Gadamer, xvi, 463. 
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beliefs. Explaining that traditional philosophy has downgraded 
metaphor because it "endangered the conception of philosophy as a 
process culminating in vision," Rorty tells us that "such visual 
metaphors contrast with the auditory metaphors which Heidegger 
preferred .... The latter are better metaphors for metaphor, because 
they suggest that cognition is not always recognition, that the 
acquisition of truth is not always a matter of fitting data into a 
preestablished scheme. A metaphor is, so to speak, a voice from 
outside logical space, rather than an empirical filling-up of a portion 
of that space, or a logical-philosophical clarification of the structure 
of that space."^92 
Similarly, in Women's Ways we are told that "the tendency for 
women to ground their epistemological premises in metaphors 
suggesting speaking and listening is at odds with the visual 
metaphors (such as equating knowledge with illumination, knowing 
with seeing, and truth with light) that scientists and philosophers 
most often use to express their sense of mind." Further, we learn that 
Belenky et al "adopted the metaphor of voice and silence as our own. 
It has become the unifying theme that links the chapters in our story 
of women's ways of knowing and of the long journey they must make 
if they are to put the knower back into the known and claim the power 
of their own minds and voices." We also learn of the importance of 
"understanding" as "something akin to the German word kennen, 
1 QP 
""^•Rorty, Philosophical Papers vol. 2, 12-13. Here again we return to the thematic continuity 
of the Bildung/building trope. 
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implying personal acquaintance with an object [usually a person]" and 
that understanding is more prominent in "connected knowing" than in 
"separate knowing." "Understanding," we are told, "involves intimacy 
and equality between self and object, while knowledge . . . implies 
separation from the object and mastery over it."''^^ Furthermore, this 
priority of understanding over knowledge -- as we have seen it unfold 
in both Gadamer and Women's Ways -- is further described by their 
respective applications of the "i-Thou" metaphor. 
But what of the objection to the comparison of these two views 
of understanding on the grounds that "understanding" is more like a 
psychological state of empathy for Women's Ways? It would be 
difficult to overlook Women's Ways' differentiation between 
"reception" and "projection" on this point. Drawing from the work of 
Nel Noddings, Belenky et al assert that unlike the traditional "phallic 
image" of empathy as projecting oneself into another in order to 
better understand, the image of "receiving the other" or of "feeling 
w i t h  t h e  o t h e r "  i s  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  w o m e n . I n  
our view, this is precisely what Gadamer has in mind when he tells us 
that "understanding begins when something addresses us."^^® And it 
is this mutual concern for the "thing-in-itself" {Sache) that guides 
the dialogue that allows the fusion of the "I" and "Thou" to take 
"•S^Belenky, et al., 18, 19, 101. 
^®^Gadamer, 358; Clinchy, 18. 
I^^Beienky, et al., 122. 
^®®Gadamer, 229. 
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place, which is to say that this reciprocal concern for the Sache 
generates the all-important dialogue, which, in turn, generates 
ontological understanding, the complementarity that philosophical 
hermeneutics gives to Women's Ways. This way of responding to the 
Other leads us to a final area of comparison, for what seems to 
further reciprocate these views of understanding is some fundamental 
acknowledgement of "care." 
Unlike Gilligan, Noddings, and Women's Ways, Gadamer does not 
speak explicitly about "care."''^^ However, as we have seen, his 
philosophical hermeneutics comes out of the work of Heidegger, who 
maintained that constitutive of Being is what he called Sorge. 
Translated as "care" or "concern," Sorge characterizes that 
ceaseless interaction of Being with everything that it comes into 
contact with and is something like the structure of the way Being 
inhabits the world. And there is a strong sense of this concern for 
Being in Gadamer's emphasis on the Other, "openness," and 
"belongingness." For instance, Gadamer sounds very much like an 
advocate of an ethics of care when he says that, "It is truly a 
tremendous task which faces every human every moment. His [sic] 
prejudices ~ his being saturated with wishes, drives, hopes, and 
interests -- must be held under control to such an extent that the 
other is not made invisible or does not remain invisible. It is not easy 
to acknowledge that the other could be right, that oneself and one's 
a very difficult passage, Gadamer defends Heidegger's "existential of care" against 
"another specific ideal of existence" {Gadamer, 263). 
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own interests could be wrong .... We must learn to respect others 
and otherness.""'®® 
These implicit similarities between Gadamer's hermeneutical 
view of "care as concern for the Other" and Women's Ways view of 
"care as relational ethics" have, in fact, been found to be compatible 
in terms of interpersonal communication theory."'^9 Recognizing that 
their work is coming out of the work of Gilligan and Gadamer (among 
others), Deetz and Stevenson bring to the surface an underlying 
affinity between these two views of care, a comparison that lends 
itself very well to our discussion. Briefly, their approach to 
understanding and care echoes one of our themes in the previous 
chapter, "participation." Here, the authors refer to a "participatory 
attitude," which "is based on the central interpersonal decision to 
engage wth the other [and] this is not principally a decision as to 
whether or not you will interact, but whether you will talk with o r 
af others." And sounding very much like Gadamer and the cultural 
feminists, Deetz and Stevenson point out that one of the essential 
traits of this attitude is "care," which denotes a "quality of 
appreciating things for what they are and being committed to their 
preservation and self-development .... To care is to have our senses 
open to experience, rather than to have them foreclosed by bias, 
prejudice, careless thinking and feeling, and a desire to have our own 
'""Misgeld, 233. Note the connection here to the experience of negation (Erfahrung). 
199see Stanley Deetz and Sheryl Stevenson, Managing Interpersonal Communication (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1986). 
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way. Carefulness involves being both tentative and committed ~ a 
desire to delay judgments and a commitment to understand." Finally, 
to redouble what we have been saying all along, this "participatory 
attitude" is another example of the fusion of horizons. The Women's 
Ways' echo in Deetz and Stevenson that "being careful is working to 
stretch one's self to understand that which is other" can be 
understood in Gadamerian, ontologicai terms as an appeal to the 
"fundamental metaphoricity of language."2°° The implication is that 
if understanding is linguistic, if language is fundamentally 
metaphorical, and if "Being that can be understood is language," then 
Being is fundamentally metaphorical. This means that "Being" 
carefully open to the Other is to understanding what metaphor is to 
language, and this leads us to how Women's Ways complements 
philosophical hermeneutics and, again, how that complementarity 
reciprocates with a hermeneutical approach to feminist discourse. 
In her essay, "Rhetoric in Postmodern Feminism: Put-Offs, Put-
Ons, and Political Plays," Eloise Buker makes the point that "feminist 
postmodern writers offer some surprising metaphors for us to try on 
in order to construct political understandings." She is quick to point 
out, however, that before such construction can happen, 
deconstruction - in the form of subverting "domination politics" or 
what Kathleen Jones calls "the hegemony of patriarchal gender 
relations" and Fox-Genovese refers to as "the stranglehold that . . . 
SOOoeetz and Stevenson, 22, 26. Gadamer asserts that "transference from one sphere to 
another has not only a logical function; rather, corresponding to it is the fundamental 
metaphoricity of language" (Silverman, 181). 
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men have maintained on human possibilities and prestige" -- must 
take place first.201 But is philosophical hermeneutics up to the task 
of providing feminist social theory with an "empowering dialectic"? 
In and of itself, as the argument goes, probably not.^®^ But the point 
of this chapter is that the radical or feminist hermeneutics required 
of Gadamer for subverting that stranglehold can be found in the 
complementary fusion of horizons that we have posited for Women's 
Ways with philosophical hermeneutics. If we think of this thesis as 
one of the "surprising metaphors for us to try on in order to construct 
political understandings," that is, if we think of Women's Ways as 
the tenor and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics as the vehicle of 
a metaphor itself, then in this fusing we can indeed say that 
Women's Ways' epistemology is Gadamer's ontology, which is not to 
favor one of the subjects over the other. We must remember that in 
the metaphorical process of interaction not only does the vehicle 
filter the tenor, but the tenor modifies the vehicle as well,203 and 
this is what we mean by the complementary reciprocation of Gadamer 
and Women's Ways. Not exactly the image of a cyborg, but when read 
2°^Buker, 230; Jones, 20; Fox-Genovese, 45. 
2®^The "dialectic of empowerment" is from Eioise Suiter's thougiit-provoking essay, "Feminist 
Theory and Hermeneutics: An Empowering Dialectic?" which in some important ways anticipates 
our thesis. Her thesis is "that feminism can become even more effective to the degree that it 
takes the insights of philosophical hermeneutics into consideration in organizing and articulating 
its account of social reality and its prospects for embodying a life that feminists can call Good." 
See Buker, "Feminist Theory and Hermeneutics," Social Epistemology 4, no.1 (1990): 23. 
^®®The theories of metaphoricity get abstruse; however, the essays in the following provide a 
good overview: Sheldon Sacks' On Metaphor {Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) and 
Andrew Ortony's Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
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as a metaphor for Being -- and since for Gadamer, Being is language 
and language is fundamentally metaphoric, then it is also a metaphor 
for metaphor itself ~ it can be as "surprising" as its counterparts. 
Although any one of the metaphors Buker cites would thematize 
the aim of this chapter, one in particular is especially "off-putting" 
and, thereby, particularly appropriate for the "border pedagogy" 
implicit in this discussion. Buker spotlights Donna Haraway who, 
writing in a "Manifesto for Cyborgs; Science, Technology, and 
Socialist Feminism in the 1980s" confesses that she would "rather be 
a cyborg than a goddess." By using the science fiction image of the 
being who is half-human/half-machine, Haraway claims that such 
imagery "can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we 
have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is not of a 
common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia. It is an 
Imagination of a feminist speaking in tongues to strike fear into the 
circuits of the super savers of the New Right." According to Buker, 
"These passages go beyond reminding us that our identities are a 
result of the social construction of a political order. They point out 
that the language and cultural practices of our societies constrain the 
choices that serve as the basis for that construction to work; they 
move toward deconstructing the distinctions that undergird those 
constraints. 
As a plausible counter to the lament that "contemporary 
^°^Buker, "Rhetoric in Postmodern Feminism," in The Interpretive Turn, eds. D.R. Hiley, et al. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 230-231. Haraway's essay is included in Nicholson, 
Feminism/Postmodernism. 
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feminism has failed to develop a persuasive rhetoric," Buker's sketch 
of what such a rhetoric might be like (which is further developed by 
the essays included in Linda Nicholson's Feminism/Postmodernism) 
also provides ancillary backup for the hopes and insights of education 
advocates like Elaine Atkins, who believes that the hermeneutic 
tradition "can provide curriculum theorists with a powerful tool for 
reshaping education thought and practice," for Shaun Gallagher whose 
"hypothesis" in Hermeneutics and Education is that "educational 
experience is always hermeneutical experience," for Susan Hekman 
who observes that "Gilligan has accomplished in moral theory what 
Gadamer accomplished in epistemology," and for Karen Warren who, 
working within a model developed by Wellesley's Peggy Mcintosh, 
hopes for a "rewriting of the future of curricula" that will challenge 
"the Malestream Curriculum" and ultimately jump the "phase gap" to 
create a "redefined" curriculum that "includes us all."205 Our hope in 
this chapter is to follow up on these and other leads that support the 
hunch that feminist theory can find a different voice in philosophical 
hermeneutics and that Gadamer's hermeneutics can find what Derrida 
refers to as a home-away-from-home^o® jn cultural feminism. 
If we return to the Divided line that we proposed earlier, the 
latter area of the Women's Ways model can be viewed as analogous to 
Gadamer's concept of "tact" as a "microtext" for the 
^®®Fox-Genovese, 53; Atkins, 437; Hekman, Gender and Knowledge, 57; and Warren, 49. 
^®®The idea is from Derrida's "White Mythology" where he says that the figure of the borrowed 
home signifies metaphor itself. See Weinsheimer {1991, 185) for a discussion of this in relation 
to Gadamer. 
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interrelationship of hermeneutical understanding and experience 
{Erfahrung). Tact, as we have seen, presupposes Bildung (a kind of 
forestructure that as we saw earlier is the precondition for 
hermeneutical understanding) and which is, to roughly paraphrase 
Heidegger (and by implication Gadamer), the primordial knowledge 
that is Being itself. (We might paraphrase Shug here and say that 
"Being a\n't a He or a She, but a It.")^^^ And as we know from 
Gadamer, this Being that can be understood is language. 
Understanding, in other words, is the mode of Being, and since 
understanding is possible only through language, and tact presupposes 
language. Being presupposes tact, which, in turn, presupposes Bildung 
and the hermeneutical experience of negation. Thus, the question for 
Bildung becomes, "What are the necessary conditions for 
understanding to take place?" or "How do we remove the blockages, 
obstructions, and resistance from Being's way?" Gadamer and 
Women's Ways respond with nearly the same answer: "voice." Both 
figuratively and literally, "voice" becomes the necessary vehicle for 
the shaping of understanding, which, in turn, becomes the mediator of 
a community bonded by what Women's Ways and the Heideggerian 
tradition refer to as "care." We might even go so far as to say that 
what Bildung is to tact in Gadamer's philosophy, voice is to 
understanding in the epistemology of Women's Ways. And again, we 
pn7 
^"'However, there is a problem in this regard because, as Derrida has demonstrated in his 
critique of Heidegger, the reduction of Being to a unity (an "It") nullifies the possibility of gender 
critique. Perhaps a better example here is Haraway's androgenous cyborg metaphor. 
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arrive at our formulation tliat the educational experience is the 
complementary reciprocation between the ontology of philosophical 
hermeneutics and the epistemology of Women's Ways. 
To illustrate this connection between the metaphoricity of 
ontology and care, we can begin with a "building"208 as a near 
homophone of Bildung, and this building will be the structure that 
will house Robert Terry's "White Male Club." Think of it as the White 
Male Club house. Let us further imagine that, like Bildung, this 
structure is differentiated by its style, and that its style is 
eighteenth-century neoclassical, similar to the majority of federal 
buildings and monuments in Washington, D.C., e.g., the White House, the 
Supreme Court, and the National Archives. (Or on a parallel track, we 
can imagine the building as the archetype of the typical twentieth-
century American school building, with its internal and external, 
regimented, rectangular shapes.) Given this rectangular, "closed" 
shape of the community, the "tactfulness" (judgment, taste, common 
sense) of the Club's members will be contingent upon their being able 
to apply "the right angle" to situations they encounter in their day-
to-day praxis. For students it will be how well they can seek out "the 
right answer" and mechanically reproduce it for the teacher.^OQ 
Similarly, as we have seen with Gadamer, tact presupposes Bildung. 
If Bildung is restrictive, tact will recapitulate that understanding. 
OAO 
"^""See Heidegger's "Building Dwelling Thinking" in David F. Krell ed., Martin Heidegger: Basic 
Writings. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 323-339. 
Women's Ways describes this as "received knowledge." 
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Thus the problem that confronts us is how to construct, in Women's 
Ways' jargon, not only the building but how to get the Club to 
understand itself in what Gadamer calls^io the "thoughtful mediation 
with contemporary life." 
Our next step, then, for the building of our White Male Club 
house is to come up with what Ricoeur calls the "architecture of 
themes and purposes-''^"* V We can do this by turning to Gadamer's 
assertion of the fundamental metaphoricity of language. As 
Weinsheimer puts it, "If it is the case that the metaphoricity of 
language makes understanding itself possible, the resultant 
interpretation will be metaphorical whether it contains any 
metaphors or not."^^^ jhese metaphorical correspondences begin to 
"unconceal" themselves, for example, when we consider the propriety 
here of Heidegger's description of language as the "house Being," 
that "linguistic turn" which holds that language is not a mere form of 
expression but an appearance of Being itself. Similarly we are 
reminded of the relevance, indeed the importance of language and 
voice to feminist theory - from the critiques of "the virtue of 
silence," to Gilligan's "different voice," to Lakoff's Language and 
^Gadamer, 169. 
quote is from Ricoeur's essay "Metaphor and the Problem of Hermeneutics," in J. 
Thompson, ed., Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 175. The context in which he makes this remark is relevant to what we are after in 
terms of metaphoricity and "shape": "As a totality, the literary work cannot be reduced to a 
sequence of sentences which are individually intelligible; rather, it is an architecture of themes 
and purposes which can be constructed in several ways. The relation of part to whole is 
ineluctably circular." 
^Weinsheimer, "Gadamer's Metaphorical Hermeneutics," 191. 
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Woman's Place, to the argument made by Women's Ways in favor of 
an aural metaphor over the traditional male-oriented visual tropes -
as more relevant to the experience of women. A propos here is 
Timothy Crusius' comment that "philosophical hermeneutics tends to 
think of truth more as something we 'listen for' rather than 'look at.'" 
His allusion is to Gadamer's definition of philosophical hermeneutics 
as "the art of bringing what is said or written to speech again." We 
are reminded as well of the point made earlier by Donna Haraway's 
cyborg example of the need for a feminist rhetoric, for a "voice of 
authority" that will allow women to "become insiders and acquire an 
insider's voice of authority while questioning insider values."^''^ The 
point to be made here takes the White Male Club house as a house 
made out of language, and if that house is to be reconstructed then the 
means by which reconstruction will succeed must be through the 
cooperative efforts of a language community or "community of 
conversation." It would be an answer to Toni Morrison's recent 
question, "How can we convert a racist house into a race-specific, 
non-racist home"?^''^ 
One way of visualizing that reconstructed building or house 
recalls the image of Jane Addams' Hull House and John Dewey's 
Laboratory School of the University of Chicago (1896-1904). As 
Maxine Greene reminds us, "Jane Addams moved from the language 
of Christian (and female) virtue to a language of social activism as 
213crusius, 33; Gadamer, 119; Aisenberg and Harrington, 78. 
^^^Karen Wintrier, "The Significance of Race" The Chronicle of Higher Education 40 (May 11, 
1994), AID. 
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she provided space and schooling to immigrant women, helped them 
form clubs and labor organizations, tried even to 'humanize' labor 
by seeking to instill greater understanding of the workers' world 
and more sensitivity to what it meant to be members of a 
collectivity. 
Likewise we see in the Dewey School another example of the 
reconstructed house of our exemplum. Katherine Camp Mayhew and 
Anna Camp Edwards tell us how the thirteen-year olds, in response to 
"many developing angles of interest," decided to organize a "Dewey 
Club for discussion and debate, [but] there was no spot which they 
could call their own, where their meetings could be free from 
interruption and under their own control." Acting on the problem of 
being "sadly put to it for quarters, [and] out of the actual, pressing, 
and felt need of the children, the idea of the club-house was born ~ an 
actual house planned, built, and furnished by themselves/'^is But our 
intention here is neither to agree with Wilma Miranda's interpretation 
of Dewey's thought as "a sophisticated theoretical feminism," nor to 
agree with Susan Laird who questions the transparency of the Dewey 
canon and focuses instead on its potential masking of the 
contributions made by The Dewey School women. What is to be 
emphasized here is the metaphor as microtext, that this clubhouse-
building project was coeducational, both male and female students 
^^^Maxine Greene, The Dialectic of Freedom (New York: Teachers College Press, 1978), 73. 
^^®Mayhew and Edwards, 228-229. 
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collaborating to remedy a situation that threatened the growth of 
their language community. We might sum all of this up by again turning 
to Maxine Greene's Dialectic of Freedom (a book that began as The 
John Dewey Lecture at Teacher's College, Columbia University). 
Referring to her own experience as the "quest" of "a woman striving 
to affirm the feminine as wife, mother, and friend, while reaching, 
always reaching, beyond the limits imposed by the obligations of a 
woman's life," it has also been the quest of "a person struggling to 
connect the undertaking of education , . . to the making and remaking of 
a public space, a space of dialogue and possibility .... The aim is to 
find (or create) an authentic public space, that is, one in which diverse 
human beings can appear before one another as, to quote Hannah 
Arendt, 'the best they know how to be.' Such a space requires the 
provision of opportunities for the articulation of multiple 
perspectives in multiple idioms, out of which something common can 
be brought into being."^' '^ 
Weinsheimer takes this concept of metaphoricity and Bildung one 
step far ther .  "Gadamer 's  thesis ,"  he  contends,  " is  that  Bi ldung,  not  
method, best explains the nature of hermeneutic understanding." In 
fact, as Weinsheimer reads Gadamer, "Bildung also displays the 
structure of metaphor and that there is therefore a real sense in which 
we can say understanding is  i tse l f  fundamental ly  metaphor ical  . . . .  In 
the structure of excursion and reunion defining Bildung we see at 
^Greene, xi. 
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once the circular structure of hermeneutic understanding and 
metaphor." Moments of Bildung occur when the interpreter "is altered 
not so much by acquiring a new piece of information as a new horizon. 
He [sic] learns to understand differently -- most important to 
understand himself differently -- and through that very alteration in 
self-understanding he becomes himself more fully ... a reciprocal 
transference like that which characterizes interactive metaphor." 
Weinsheimer concludes his essay by referring the seeming paradox of 
this dialectic to Gadamer's "fusion of horizons": "If we think of 
understanding as the establishment of a metaphorical relation, it 
fuses two horizons in such a way that they are both the same and 
different. Without mere contradiction, the hermeneutic as joins at 
one time both /s and is not, and 'in this as,' Gadamer writes, 'lies 
the whole riddle.'"2"'® 
But given the ontological ambiguity of language, the paralogical 
situation of Gadamer's as, how are we ever to make decisions 
grounded in some normative criteria? How are we ever to know what 
is distortive, miseducative, or discriminatory? The answer, according 
to Gadamer, is to be found in the concept of phronesis rather than the 
concept of techne. As Gallagher explains it, "prescriptives (canons, 
rules, and so forth), and even normative assumptions within the meta-
interpretation, should be developed, as far as possible, at the local 
level on the basis of the local hermeneutical situation, not on the 
basis of a universal prescriptive hermeneutics ... .A local inquiry (the 
^^®Weinsheimer, 187, 199-200, 201. 
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development of a meta-interpretation and prescribed interpretations) 
would be guided by the following kinds of questions: In any particular 
interpretational site, existing historically and in a specific place, 
what are the most immediate, the most local power relations at work? 
How do they produce and constrain the existing interpretations, and 
conversely, how are the existing interpretations used to support or 
transform such power relations?"^^^ In other words, because the 
ruling epistemology has been techne with its attendant universal 
prescriptions, codes, and methodologies, our not being able to see the 
forest for the trees has perpetuated an insularity that disallows a full 
hermeneutical openness to the unfamiliar and enforces the "silence" 
of  women.  I ronical ly ,  i t  is  the stunt ing of  th is  very  Bi ldung,  Deweyan 
growth, or "historically effected consciousness" that, in the end, will 
contribute to the full disclosure of our being-in-the-world. We may as 
well try to prevent a metaphor from happening. 
By way of conclusion, a passage from Georgia Warnke's book on 
Gadamer seems most appropriate. It is a passage that communicates 
some further credibility to what I have only hinted at in the above 
discussion, the plausibility of an educational experience based upon 
the complementarity of feminist social theory and philosophical 
hermeneutics: 
To the extent individuals and cultures integrate this understanding of others 
and of the differences between them within their own self-understanding, to 
the extent, in other words, that they learn from others and take a wider, 
^^®Gallagher, 333. Gallagher credits these insights to Paulo Freire's philosophy of education. 
Similarly, we find that in their chapter on "Connected Teaching" Belenky et al do the same. 
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more differentiated view, they can acquire sensitivity, subtlety and a 
capacity for discrimination. These virtues do not indicate that a gebildete 
culture has appropriated a certain set of beliefs that it finds more defensible 
than certain others. In becoming cultured we do not simply acquire better 
norms, values etc. We also acquire the ability to acquire them. In other 
words we learn tact, taste and judgment. Perhaps we cannot codify what we 
have learned as a method for adjudicating between beliefs; none the less, 
through the historical experience and conversation with others that are part 
of our self-formation or S//dung we can learn to think. And this practical 
reason thus substitutes for the dogmatism of the Enlightenment.^^® 
Now that we have circumnavigated the hermeneutical circle and 
have visited the topical regions of "understanding," "experience," and 
Bildung, we find ourselves in something like the situation that T.S. 
Eliot describes in "Little Gidding," where he tells us that "the end of 
our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And know the place 
for the first time."22i We have seen, for example, that the 
educational experience can be essentially hermeneutical, and as a 
hermeneutical experience it is ontologically in contradistinction to 
modern educational theory. That is, it goes against the grain of 
modern education's elevation of techne to the status of paradigm. But 
what is most distressing about this reversal of paradigmatic 
priorities is that this hegemonic "abuse of method" continues to 
reinforce the trait genderizations which have fueled the sexism 
machine for centuries. What we have seen, in fact, is that the 
educational experience is not the patriarchal mechanization of human 
judgment but the continuous reconstruction of the complementary 
22°Warnke, 174. 
^^^T.S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1971), 
1 4 5 .  
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reciprocation between philosopliical hermeneutics and Women's 
Ways. We have also seen that this hermeneutically-conceived 
educational experience is immanent in certain "pedagogies of 
understanding" which can be circumscribed by Gadamer's 
hermeneutical understanding, that Deweyan experience comports with 
hermeneutical experience, and that Bildung can be a way to connect 
feminist social theory to hermeneutics. Now, in good hermeneutical 
form, we are back to our beginning and the meeting of Frankenstein 
and Emile, but, having come full circle, our "meeting of this 
meeting" is as if for the first time. 
As if we would be enacting the process of metaphoricity itself, 
the foreconceptions that we now bring to the process of this 
"meeting" create a newness "over and above our wanting and doing." 
What we will be seeing in the next two chapters, which form 
essentially Part 2 of the dissertation, is a spiraling out of that 
newness in terms of the correspondence between theory and practice. 
That is, the next chapter, Chapter 5, as a "microtext" of the whole 
thesis, applies the "theory" of Part 1 to the metaphorical context of a 
"meeting" between Franl<enstein and Emile, but at the same time 
this metaphorical application is also the "theoretical" side of its 
follow up chapter on classroom practice. However, this second part of 
the thesis is more than simply an illustrative exercise. It addresses, 
as Gadamer says, "the problem of application, which is to be found in 
all understanding."222 it is the metaphorical (or theoretical) and the 
^^^Gadamer, 307. 
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practical application of the three chapters in Part 1. 
So in each of the foregoing three chapters, one might say that we 
were "testing" or "projecting" the viability of the hermeneutics/ 
education thesis, that is, anticipating a "completeness" or whole, by 
thinking through how well each part, each of the three elements ~ 
"understanding," "experience," and "Bildung" - can be applied to the 
whole and how well the whole can be thought of as greater than the 
sum of its parts. We might think of this as a "testing" of the 
"transferability" of each concept, or something like the process of 
making the right connections as one would attempt to do in navigating 
the Paris Metro system where correspondance literally denotes 
"direction to" and is what we would call a "transfer" from one line to 
another without having to buy another ticket. Essentially, we are 
attempting to answer the question, "To what extent can each element 
be applicative in a believably 'right' way?" Both theoretically and 
practically. And when this "applicative right way" rings true, as in 
the process of metaphoricity itself, understanding "unconceals" 
itself, and this is the same phenomenon that we experience in a well-
wrought metaphor. Something familiar fuses with something typically 
unfamiliar in such a way that a new "being," so to speak, comes into 
existence. This new "being" is the temporal event of ontological 
understanding, that will, in turn, project itself by questioning the 
interlocutor in yet a different way and in a different voice. What we 
hope to accomplish in Part 2, then, is a bringing to term of this 
1 4 1  
dialectic of question and answer, and in the hermeneutical logic of 
that dialectic, to find the question to which the meeting of 
Frankenstein and Emile is the answer. That question for Chapter 5 
will be something along the lines of, "What would it mean if the 
educational experience were fundamentally metaphorical"? And for 
Chapter 6, the question turns on something like, "What would it mean 
if the educational experience were essentially hermeneutical?" Where 
these two questions meet will be ontological understanding as the 
educational experience. 
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CHAPTERS 
FRANKENSTEINMEETS EMILE 
I am sick of hearing of the sublimity of Milton, the 
elegance of Pope, and the original, untaught genius of 
Shakespeare. 
-- Mary Wollstonecraft, 
Thoughts on the Education of Daughters 
But man, proud man. 
Dressed in a little brief authority, 
Most ignorant of what he's most assured. 
His glassy essence, like an angry ape, 
Plays such fantastic tricks before high Heaven 
As make the angels weep -- who, with our spleens. 
Would all themselves laugh mortal. 
-- Isabella in Shakespeare's Measure for Measure 
And Adam said, this is now bone of my bones, and flesh 
of my flesh; She shall be called Woman, because she 
was taken out of man. - Genesis 2:22 
Would metaphor be the continuous celebration of identification? 
~ Julia Kristeva, Tales of Love 
Tempting as it miglit be to read Mary Slielley's Frankenstein as a 
Bloomian (Harold) misreading of Rousseau's Emile, our purpose in 
this chapter is neither to map an "anxiety of influence" nor to play 
detective as one of those "carrion-eaters of scholarship" that Bloom 
identifies with "the source hunters.Nor are we attempting to 
^^®The "misreading" reference is to Harold Bloom's The Anxiety of Influence (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 80, where he spells out his theory of poetry as an "intra-poetic 
relationship" wherein strong poets make poetic history by "misreading one another, so as to 
clear imaginative space for themseives" (5). What might be even more tempting in this regard is 
to follow up on Jane Roland Martin's thesis that Rousseau's Emile is derivative of Plato's 
Republic. See her Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1985), especially Chapters 2 and 3. Her reading of Sophie's 
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crack any code in order to discover the "real" meaning Inherent In 
each work.224 what we will be attempting is a reading of these two 
texts as a metaphor for our thesis that the educational experience is 
the continuous reconstruction of the complementary reciprocation 
between the ontology of philosophical hermeneutics and the 
epistemology of Women's Ways of Knowing.It is, in effect, an 
exemplum for the previous three chapters. This is to say that the 
"meeting" or "fusion of horizons" of Emile and Frankenstein 
demonstrates 1) as a metaphor for Part 1, the hermeneutical 
interactivity of "understanding," "experience," and "Bildung"; 2) the 
fundamental metaphoricity immanent in the structure of Bildung and. 
"place" In Emile strengthens our later discussion In this chapter. Aside from theories of 
"misreadings," however, there are several treatments of the literary connections between 
Emile and Frankenstein. See Paul Cantor, Creature and Creator (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984); David Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Sympathy (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1988); James O'Rourke, "'Nothing More Unnatural': Mary 
Shelley's Revision of Rousseau," English Literary History 56 (Fall 1989): 543-569; and Alan 
Richardson, "From Emile to Frankenstein: The Education of Monsters," European Romantic 
Review 1:2 (Winter 1991): 147-157. Bloom uses the "carrion-eaters" phrase in A Map of 
Misreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 17-18. The context is a discussion of 
poetic origins: ". . . poets, as poets, and particularly the strongest poets, return to origins at the 
end, or whenever they sense the immanence of the end. Critics may be wary of origins, or 
consign them disdainfully to those carrion-eaters of scholarship, the source hunters, but the 
poet-in-a-poet is as desperately obsessed with poetic origins, generally despite himself, as the 
person-in-a-person at last becomes obsessed with personal origins." Note the connections here 
with our earlier discussion of monstrosity (Chapter 1), Frankenstein's monster's anguished 
query into its (in)human origins, and the point that Bloom makes elsewhere about the anxiety of 
influence: "Conceptually the central problem for the latecomer [poet] necessarily is repetition, 
for repetition dialectically raised to re-creation is the ephebe's road of excess, leading away 
from the horror of finding himself to be only a copy or a replica" (The Anxiety of Influence, 
80). 
^^'^The scholarship given over to explications of each work is voluminous, and since we are not 
primarily concerned with these works qua works, I will simply mention a "reservoir" for each. 
For Emile, see David Owen, Education and Freedom in Rousseau's Emile (Ph.D. diss.: University 
of Chicago, 1984). For Frankenstein, see George Levine and U.C. Knoepflmacher, The Endurance 
o/Frankenstein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and William Veeder, Mary 
Shelley and Frankenstein: The Fate of Androgeny (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
^^®Mary F. Belenky et al, Women's Ways of Knowing (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Hereafter 
referred to in the text as Women's Ways. 
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by extension, hermeneutical "understanding" and "experience"; and 3) 
the metaphorical possibility for a "two-sex society" where "theories 
of male and female education are mutually illuminating . . . [where] 
educational theory and philosophy . . . place males and females in one 
world -- a world in which the sexes live together independently."^26 
But this "meeting" will not be "arranged" so that it follows a critical 
or textual approach to the works themselves. What "method" there is 
follows from Richard Rorty's point that a text is not about something 
but should be used for something. Or in his words, "the distinction is 
between getting it right and making it useful." He expands this view 
by saying that, "Such criticism uses the author or text not as a 
specimen reiterating a type but as an occasion for changing a 
previously accepted taxonomy, or for putting a new twist on a 
previously told story."^27 Generally, the "new twist" that will be the 
task of this chapter to set in motion will have a lot to do with how 
we think about the educational experience and very little to do with 
what "Daniel Dennet calls 'a cure for the common code.'"228 
Figuratively, that "twist" might be better described as the 
^^®Martin, 183. See n. 223 for full citation. 
citations are from Steplian Collini, ed., Interpretation and Overinterpretation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 108. It might be helpful to include here the 
sentence that precedes the latter quote: "Unmethodical criticism of the sort which one 
occasionally wants to call 'inspired' is the result of an encounter with an author, character, plot, 
stanza, line or archaic torso which has made a difference to the critic's conception of who she is, 
what she is good for, what she wants to do with herself: an encounter which has rearranged her 
priorities and purposes." Again we come back to the thematic undercurrent of the thesis: 
"meeting." 
Cited by Rorty in Interpretation and Overinterpretation, 98. See n. 227 for full citation. 
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verbal counterpart to the "shift" that happens in the optical illusion 
of the "transparent" Necker cube that seenningly "moves" after we 
stare at it for a brief period of timeIn terms of the meeting of 
our two texts, that "shift" translates into a "crisscrossing" of voice 
and persona in which we hear a "female" voice in the male persona of 
Emile and a male voice in the "female" persona of Victor 
Frankenstein's monster,^30 and this androgen/ can be read as a 
metaphor for Jane Roland Martin's hope for a "two-sex society" where 
"theories of male and female education are mutually illuminating." 
Making sense of this oscillating male/female interdependence, then, 
realized in terms of the metaphorical purpose and direction that we 
described above, will be the purpose of this chapter. To this end, 
first, we will weave into the chapter the allegorical as well as the 
his essay "Metaphor and Learning" Hugh Petrie explains that "on some occasions we learn 
by actually changing the contexts of understanding. This latter phenomenon is graphically 
illustrated by the so-called ambiguous figures. [Take for example the figure that] can be seen as 
either a duci< or a rabbit. Piaget notes the distinction between these two kinds of learning by 
distinguishing between assimilation and accomodation. During assimilation, we learn by changing 
experience to fit our concepts and modes of understanding. During accomodation, we learn by 
changing our concepts and modes of understanding to fit our experience." See Andrew Ortony, 
ed., Metaphor and Thought {Camhridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 440. Petrie goes on 
to connect this kind of "shift" to what Thomas Kuhn describes as happening during scientific 
revolutions. 
230"Voice," as I will be using it, is the "voice of tradition" that "speaks" through each 
character. The emphasis here is on the historicality, linguisticality, and dialectic of tradition as 
Gadamer's "historically effected consciousness." I define "persona" as "appearance-complex" 
or the natural givenness of one's biological gender or race. This is a slight twist on the Jungian 
definition of "persona" as "function-complex," which denotes the projection of one's 
"psychological" appearance, i.e., personality. Again, as another "microtext" or part-for-the-
whole of our thesis, we can think of "voice" as the analogue of philosophical hermeneutics and 
"persona" as the analogue of Women's Ways. Notice that the inverse relationship or 
"crisscrossing" is evident even with this terminology. We would typically associate "voice" 
with Women's Ways and "persona" with the complexities of a hermeneutical ontology. But this 
is the very "complementary reciprocation" of our thesis: the "biologicality" is missing In 
philosophical hermeneutics, and the ontological basis of understanding as being is missing in 
Women's Ways. 
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historical and tliematic affinities of both texts; and secondly, we will 
compare the two works in terms of how that "voice over" of the two 
characters can be understood as a metaphor for the educational 
experience as we have been conceiving of it. In the course of this 
discussion, the point that we will try to establish is that the "voice-
over metaphor" ultimately describes what might be thought of as an 
"ideal type" of the educational experience that Jane Roland Martin 
proposes, but at the same time, at its most promising juncture, that 
ideal fails to achieve the vision that it embodies, thus, like Victor 
Frankenstein, it creates an anomaly that either can be understood in a 
"new" way or rejected outright based solely on its "otherness." And 
It is in this "experience of negation," i.e., the hermeneutical 
experience of this "dialectical metaphor," that we find the new twist 
for our theory of education.^si 
Given this twist, then, we can briefly formulate that theory by 
saying that the educational experience is, essentially, hermeneutical. 
The implication here is that since philosophical hermeneutics holds 
we saw in Chapter 3, the phrase "experience of negation" comes from Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. f^^arshall (New York: 
Crossroad, 1992), 354, where Gadamer tells us that the hermeneutical experience {Erfahrung) 
"is initially always experience of negation: something is not what we supposed it to be." 
(Hereafter, unless othenwise stated, all quotes from Gadamer will be from this text and will be 
abbreviated in notation as TM.) The phrase "dialectical metaphor" is from Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. Christopher Smith 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), 70-71. There Gadamer calls Plato's 
Republic "one grand dialectical myth." He goes on to say that "surely one must take ail the 
institutions and structures in this model city as dialectical metaphors. Of course reading 
dialectically means relating these Utopian demands in each instance to their opposite, in order to 
find, somewhere in between, what is really meant - that is, in order to recognize what the 
circumstances are, and how they could be made better." Gadamer's theory of metaphor, with its 
variations on our theme of "meeting" and in its ontological concerns for "emancipatory 
reflection," is compatible with our overall approach to the thesis. 
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that there is a fundamental metaphoricity for language, we can infer a 
fundamental metaphoricity for the educational experience. This 
metaphoricity, in turn, can be identified with the hermeneutical 
principle of "openness" implicit in the process of "the continuous 
reconstruction of experience," which is the assimilative/ 
accommodative process of learning itself.232 what we arrive at, then, 
is a hermeneutical understanding of "learning" as being one with the 
experience of irony that defines the experience of negation, hence the 
connection to metaphoricity and to Bildung. In other words, when 
something is not what we have presupposed it to be or expected it to 
be, we can either be open to "new" ways of understanding the 
unexpected event or anomaly as an interpretation, redescription, or 
metaphor of what we "originally" thought it to be and thus "learn" 
from the "new" application that has presented itself to our own self-
understanding (Emile),233 or we can "escape from freedom"234 by 
"learning" that the consequences of irony will be someone else's 
concern (Frankenstein).235 in contrast to the miseducative or 
^^^This is similar to Gallagher's thesis that "the hermeneutical process is better characterized 
as a process of learning rather than reading." (See Hermeneutics and Education, 330.) 
^^^Compare this to Dewey's "growth," "continuous reconstruction of experience," and 
educative/miseducative experiences, and Women's Ways' "constructed knowledge." What we 
are describing here as the process of being able "to learn from the new application that has 
presented itseir is phronesis or practical judgment; it is not a techne into which one can be 
trained. This has been the recurrent theme of the thesis itself. 
234we take up this discussion of Erich Fromm's "escape" in the next chapter. (See Chapter 6, n. 
2.) 
2®®cf., Heidegger's "forgetfulness of Being." Allan Megill talks briefly about this idea in his 
Prophets of Extremity, 127-128. I am reminded, too, of a comment made recently on NBC's 
"Nightly News" by the director of Blacksburg, Virginia's Networking Project. The comment, 
"For better or for worse, it's coming" was made in the context of a report on the "information 
superhighway." 
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invalidative nature of the latter experience, we can call the fornfier 
experience of "figuring out"236 a "validity trope" in that when it 
"works," i.e. when it is effected through what Gadamer calls 
"tradition" or "the horizon of the question" (or what we are calling 
"the continuous process of reconstructing experience" or 
metaphoricity), it emerges or applies itself to self-understanding as 
if through sonne kind of "recursive preceptivity," which implies 
neither idealism nor historicism; it is neither a process analogous to 
the perennially recurring "Great Ideas" of the traditional patriarchal 
core curriculum, nor is it the most banal misinterpretation of 
"progressive education" as so much "non-directive nonsense."^37 
These "tropes" or "corrective metaphors" as learning experiences are 
validated only in their application, which is always understanding 
i tse l f .238 
pqe 
"°The connection here is to Gadamer's concept of "understanding." See M. B. and L. Watson-
Franke's "Understanding in Anthropology: A Philosophical Reminder," Current Anthropology 
16, no. 2 (June 1975): 247-262, where they point out that, "In English the expression 'to figure 
out' seems best suited to bringing out this meaning of understanding [the mastery of skills as well 
as the conduct of intellectual operations]. One can 'figure out' the meaning of a text or the way to 
assemble a machine. The term itself tells us what is happening; we attempt to bring the figure 
(Figur, Gestalt) out of the context in which it has been hidden from us. We look for its form, 
and we could go so far as to say that we are looking for its formula. We reflect upon our activity, 
and the relationship we are thus building up between the phenomenon (the text, the machine) and 
ourselves finds expression in the questions we ask about this process. The fact that such 
reflection has come almost to a standstill in the modern process of production does not say so 
much about our understanding of machines as about our understanding of our working situation 
where mechanical operations have superceded the reflective, creative process" (258). This 
observation about anthropological practices, it seems to me, describes perfectly well the 
problem that we are facing in modern education, the problem with which this thesis is concerned. 
007 
The quote "nondirective nonsense" is from Richard Rorty, "Education, Socialization, and 
Individuation," Liberal Education 75:4 (Sept/Oct 1989), 7, where he is describing the 
"standard caricature of Dewey's views." The point that I am reinforcing is our basic agreement 
with Dewey's frustration with Either/Or thinking. 
^^®This explanation is, in fact, an example of that very process of application and understanding, 
i.e. a metaphor for philosophical hermeneutics itself. For example, as we recall from Chapter 2, 
1 4 9  
But it is Bildung , not metiiod, that best explains the nature of 
hermeneutical understanding, for it is Bildung that displays the 
structure of metaphor so that we can say "understanding" is itself 
fundamentally metaphorical. For example, the dialectical structure of 
"departure" from and "return" fo self that defines Bildung can also 
be viewed as the circular structure of hermeneutical understanding 
and metaphor. Moments of Bildung - or what Dewey called "growth" 
- occur when the interpreter (or student) is altered not so much by 
acquiring a new piece of information but by assimilating a "new" 
horizon (usually through the hermeneutic experience of negation and 
metaphor) and, accordingly, learns to understand differently. This new 
understanding, in turn, initiates a new self-understanding which, in 
our view, defines a reciprocal transference like that which 
characterizes interactive metaphor and Gadamer's "fusion of 
horizons." 
In our example of the dialectical metaphor as the 
Emile/Frankenstein "meeting," this "learning" becomes evident when 
we begin to move from the initial anomaly of monstrosity to the ideal 
type of the "two-sex society" understood as anomaly, to the "logic" 
of the negation itself. This latter phenomenon begins to happen when 
we begin to question where the ideal type "goes wrong" and, 
consequently, how an answer to this question can effect the 
what Gadamer calls the "historically effected consciousness" operates in much the same way as 
the process of what I refer to as "recursive preceptivity," and its attendant "validity tropes" 
can be construed as application, as in Gadamer's assertion that "Understanding ... is always 
application" (TM, 309). 
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appropriate change, corrective, or application to the educational 
experience. But before we turn to the meeting itself, we need to 
familiarize ourselves with what Harold Bloom calls the "hidden roads 
that go from poem to poem."239 
If we wanted to read allegory into the meeting and meaning of 
Emile and Frankenstein, we would have enough work to keep us busy 
for a long time. The specular or mirror-like affinity of the two works 
seems to presuppose an uncanny "Either/Or" forestructure that can be 
very appealing to an epistemology that recognizes binary opposition 
as an inherent logic of poetic language or tropology.^^o However, our 
hermeneutical position on Either/Or thinking is sympathetic with 
John Dewey's frustration with the human propensity to formulate "its 
beliefs in terms of Either-Or's, between which it recognizes no 
intermediate possibilities." This position also accords with that of 
Charlotte Bunch's "nonaligned feminism."^41 But maybe the simplest 
way to think about this hermeneutics of relating one metaphor to 
another without having to fall back on an Either/Or dichotomy is to 
Anxiety of Influence, 96. 
Among the Either/Or's construed in Emile/Frankenstein terms that come readily to mind are 
the following: progressive/traditional education, hermeneutics/rhetoric, 
understanding/explanation, authority/reason, being/knowledge, goodness/degeneracy, 
phronesis/techne, reproduction/production, nature/science, and connection/alienation. This 
kind of "decoding" is what Claude Levi-Strauss claims for his "mythemes" and their elementary 
logic as the smallest common denominator of thought, what Northrup Frye identifies with the 
logic of type/anti-type, and what Paul De Man equates with reading as "the construction and 
undoing of the mirrorlike, specular structure that is always involved in a reading" (see De Man's 
"Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric," in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, ed. Harold Bloom 
[New York: Columbia University Press, 1984], 135). 
See John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 17; and 
Charlotte Bunch, "Beyond Either/Or: Feminist Options," in Building Feminist Theory (New York: 
Longman, 1981), 44-56. 
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compare it to antiquity's custom of Joining two halves of a 
symbolon, a Greek teclinical term for a token of remembrance and 
from which our word "symbol" is derived. The symbolon was an 
object that one's host broke in two. The host kept half and gave the 
other half to the guest, who then would use it like a "pass," the two 
halves fitting together in a future act of recognition or proof of 
identity. And here we might remember that the words "guest" and 
"host" go back to the same etymological root, the Latin word hospes, 
someone with whom one has reciprocal duties of hospitality, i.e., host 
is guest and guest is host. Thus we arrive at our contemporary view of 
the symbol as appearing to be free-standingly ambiguous but having a 
connection with what it points to, its "other half" which is, 
consequently, also the nature of the complementary reciprocation 
alluded to in our thesis. Northrup Frye compares this phenomenon to 
"the stub of a theater ticket which is not the performance, but will 
take us to where the performance is."242 But if there is a career's 
worth of work for the critical theorist in explicating the allegories 
quote is from Northrup Frye, Words with Power (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1990), 109. However, the larger discussion of the symbol and its etymological 
connection with the symbolon is from Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, ed. 
Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 31-32; and the host/guest 
complementarity is explained by J. Hillis Miller, "The Critic as Host," in Deconstruction and 
Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1988), 221-222. I would add two more thoughts along these 
same lines; 1) Note that the word "teach" comes from the Old English word tacn ("to show" or 
"to demonstrate"), a root which also generated our word "token." We are also reminded here 
(see Chapter 1) that the word "monster" derives from a Latin root that is still extant in the 
French verb, montrer ("to show"). And 2) the psychically-cu/n-naturally betrothed 
preSophie-esque Emile is not the marriage but points the way to the marriage. Another 
etymological "twist" to the guest/host reciprocity underwrites the "transubstantiation" of 
body as host. The word "host" derives from the same root for the consecrated bread of the 
Eucharist (oste) which is from the same root for "sacrifice" or "victim" (hostia). For this 
etymology and its roundabout connection to the word "ghost," see Miller, 220. 
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between these two works, there also is an equal opportunity for the 
histor ian.  
Although of different nationalities, historically, Emile and 
Frankenstein were shaped out of the same cultural mold, the French 
Revolution, where, we might even go so far as to say, they first "met" 
(or where they first met "hermeneutically"). "Hermeneutically" 
because Rousseau died in 1778 and Mary Shelley was not born until 
1797, and their respective worlds were published fifty-six years apart 
{Emile in 1762 and Franl<enstein in 1818). So how is it that they 
could have met, even if it were hermeneutically? The answer lies in 
the "midwifery" of Mary Shelley's mother, Mary Wollstonecraft 
(1759-1797). In a sense she indirectly gave "birth" to Franl<enstein 
as an indirect response to Emile and Emile's direct influence on the 
French Revolution.^^3 in her A Vindication of the Rights of Womer^^^ 
Wollstonecraft attacks Rousseau and his characterization of Sophie in 
Emile for what Jane Roland Martin calls "trait genderization," or the 
"differential appraisal of traits according to sex."245 jhat Mary 
a discussion of the influence of Rousseau's works on the French Revolution (and in 
particular, Emile's influence) see Bernard Manin, "Rousseau," in A Critical Dictionary of the 
French Revolution (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989), 829-841. 
^^'^Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, Great Bool<s in Philosophy 
Series (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1989). The section that we will be concerned with is 
Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau's characterization of Sophie. This is found in Section I of 
her Chapter 5, "Animadversions on Some of the Writers Who Have Rendered Women Objects of 
Pity, Bordering on Contempt." In that chapter, Rousseau (and Emile) is one of five authors that 
she confronts. 
''^^The quote is from Reclaiming a Conversation, 31. The criticism that Wollstonecraft was 
leveling against Rousseau might best be summed up with her declaration that "I war with the 
sensibility that led him [Rousseau] to degrade woman by mailing her the slave of love" 
(Wollstonecraft, 100). 
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Shelley read her mother's works as well as Rousseau's Emile has 
been well-documented,^^6 and in our later discussion of "voice," we 
will take up this issue of Sophie and her relationship to 
Frankenstein's monster. But to follow this hermeneutical logic to 
term, we could point out that because Wollstonecraft was active 
politically and personally in the Revolution,^47 she, too, was directly 
influenced by Emile, so that later, once Mary Shelley had read her 
mother's work as well as Rousseau's Emile, the hermeneutical circle 
had been completed for the "birth" of Frankenstein. Whether or not 
we accept this convoluted sequence of events, the fact remains that 
the French Revolution enacted through Mary Wollstonecraft, with all 
of its implications for the modern world (and modern education), was, 
in fact, the "meeting" of Emile and Frankenstein. One might even say 
that this "meeting" or point of conception predetermined the 
Either/Or direction that modern education would follow -- either that 
of the "organicists" or that of the "technicists." 
Now, given that Emile and Frankenstein can be read separately 
SLS Bildungsromans and together as "specular companion pieces," how 
^^°See n. 223 and especially Richardson, 149-50 and O'Rourke, who describes a little-known 
essay on Rousseau that Mary Shelley wrote for an encyclopedia of French authors. Her focus in 
that essay, according to O'Rourke, was "parental neglect" (545). 
P47 
"^^'Wollstonecraft was married to William Godwin, the philosopher and novelist, who, in addition 
to his publishing achievements, "sat on a small committee that secured the publication of Paine's 
Rights of Man (cf., Wollstonecraft's Rights of Women). See in this regard, John Paxton, 
Companion to the French Revolution (New York: Facts on File), 91. Also, according to Muriel 
Spark, Wollstonecraft herself had been in Paris "to report on the Revolution" {l^ary Shelley 
[New York: New American Library, 1987], 6). One wonders what influence the publication of 
Olympe DeGouges' Declaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne (1791) had on the 
writing and publication of Wollstonecraft's Vindication (1792). References to the work of 
DeGouges are hard to come by. (See Paxton, 92.) 
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is it that we can read them as a metaphor for our thesis? As 
themat ic  specular  companion pieces,  the texts  of  Emile  and 
Frankenstein "meet" almost immediately, and we can gain the 
appropriate perspective on that meeting by taking a brief look at the 
title, subtitle, and epigraph of each text as a microtext for the 
whole.248 From them we can draw out our "voice over" of voice and 
persona and its implications for the educational experience. As we 
said earlier, this way of reading depends on opening up those "hidden 
roads that go between poems." And since our reading of the two as a 
"dialectical metaphor" for the educational experience requires a 
"crisscrossing" of voice and persona, we need all the interpoetic 
roads that we can find. Where those open roads now lead us is to the 
"female" voice in the male persona of Emile, and the male voice in the 
"female" persona of Frankenstein's monster, and this "voice over" 
ultimately leads us to the conclusion that where these two works 
truly "meet" is in their sexism, and it is in the realization of this 
that both works finally "undo" themselves in regard to education, and 
that through this undoing, we also learn, hermeneutically, not so much 
how this failure can be avoided in the future but that it must be 
avoided. 
Had he lived another forty years, Rousseau well might have had 
the Bloomian "metaleptic" tables turned on his own "(mis)reading" of 
OAQ 
citations from Emile and Franl<enstein will be from the following editions: Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979) and Mary Shelley, 
Frankenstein (New York: New American Library, 1985). 
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what would have been, in 1818, the newly-published Frankenstein , 
or the Modern Prometheus.^^^ Doubtless he wouldn't have gotten past 
the title page before feeling an uncanny deja vu of title, subtitle, and 
epigraph. Rousseau's title page reads as follows; 
Emile 
or 
On Education 
Sanabilibus aegrotamus malis; ipsaquenos 
in rectum genitos natura, si emendari 
velimus, iuvat. 
-- Seneca: de ira B II, c. 13 
(We are sick with evils that can be cured; and nature having 
brought us forth sound, itself helps us if we wish to be improved 
- "On Anger," Seneca [Bloom's Translation] ) 
And it follows the same schematic as Shelley's; 
Frankenstein 
or 
The Modern Prometheus 
"Did I request thee. Maker, from my clay 
To mold me Man, did I solicit thee 
From darkness to promote me?" 
- Milton, Paradise Lost X, 743-45 
249| use Bloom's jargon half-seriously. I do not presume to know the complexities of his theory 
of misprision, but his thinking on the rhetorical term metalepsis has some bearing on the overall 
theme of this thesis, i.e. "monsters, mothers, method, and metaphor." Bloom defines 
metalepsis as "a trope-reversing trope, a figure of a figure. In a metalepsis, a word is 
substituted metonymicaliy for a word in a previous trope, so that a metalepsis can be called, 
maddeningly but accurately, a metonymy of a metonymy. . . The metalepsis leaps over the heads 
of other tropes and becomes a representation set against time, sacrificing the present to an 
idealized past or hoped-for future" (See A Map of Misreading, ^ 02-03.) 
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For Rousseau's Emile it is the same schematic but with a difference. 
Notice first of ail that Rousseau's worl< focuses unambiguously 
on the student, Emile; whereas, for Shelley, the emphasis could fall on 
Victor Frankenstein as either the "student of the unhallow'd arts" or 
as the scientist and would-be teacher who abandons his "student." 
Emile is a "man"250 who speaks with the voice of a woman, and this 
is the voice of nature herse\t It is the "different voice" 
characterized by what Jane Roland Martin calls the three C's: "care, 
concern, and connection,"251 to which we could add two more C's --
communication and compassion -- which would then give us the voice 
of "connected knowing" as it is described in Women's Ways. It is the 
primal voice of the mother that Rousseau claims for the "first 
education" which is "the most important," for it is only after the 
child, who is at birth a "disciple of nature," "leaves the Author of 
things" that it "degenerates in the hands of man."252 jhjs is the voice 
of sympathy, amour de soi, family, and the Good into which, 
according to Rousseau, we are all born. Emile, in other words, is 
becoming Nature herself by his becoming a man. Victor Frankenstein's 
monster, in contrast, speaks with a male voice through a "female" 
persona. The male voice is the patriarchal voice of an educated 
nineteenth-century male, a voice, by the way, that the monster 
pen 
'''"Other than the direct male/female distinctions Rousseau makes for the purposes of forming 
the perfect union of Emile and Sophie, he is very straightforward about Emiie's manhood; "On 
leaving my hands, he will, I admit, be neither magistrate nor soldier not priest. He will, in the 
first place, be a man" (Bloom, 42). 
QC4 
Martin, Changing the Educational Landscape (New York: Routledge, 1994), 8. 
252Bloom, n. 37, 37. 61. 
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acquires only after it discovers the tliree texts wliich define that 
t radi t ion:  Mi l ton 's  Parac/ /se  Lost ,  a volume of  Plutarch L/Ves,  and 
Goethe's Sorrows of Young Werter. This "education," in tandem with 
what the monster calls the "godlike science" that is language, gives 
the creature the necessary "tradition" to gain enough of an historical 
consciousness of that tradition to realize that its morality is 
inherently self-contradictory, and like John the Savage in Huxley's 
Brave New World, this understanding becomes too much to bear. It is 
the realization that techne (or the abuse of method) cannot be an end 
in itself, regardless of whether it is Judaeo-Christian Reason, 
Classical edification, or German Romanticism. And when this 
realization comes for one of the oppressed of the world, one of the 
excluded, one of the controlled of the world, its physical expression 
is the release of that repression in the form rage. So what we begin to 
notice about the monster is that its male voice of nineteenth-century 
patriarchy is coming from a female persona, the image of the 
oppressed, subordinate woman that was so vividly self-evident to 
Mary Shelley and her mother.253 
arguments for Frankenstein's monster as woman are very ingenious and convincing. One 
can turn, for example, to Richardson's thesis that the novel is "pervasively concerned with . . . 
the dilemma of self-education and no less problematic "sexual education" which for women in the 
romantic period, is virtually the sole alternative to it" (149). And, as Richardson goes on to 
remind us, "the notion that women are morally, as well as physically, deformed in comparison to 
men surfaces throughout English writing on female conduct . . (151). And finally, "a further 
link between the male monster and woman as constructed by domestic ideology [is that] both are 
'forbidden to have their own desires'" (155). Other readings offer arguments for the 
autobiographical nature of the monster (Knoepflmacher); a feminist psychoanalytic reading of the 
monster as woman (Barbara Johnson); and a deconstructionist reading of the monster as Eve or 
the archetypal woman (Gubar and Gilbert). 
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We can take this student-teacher ratio a little further by trying 
to make a case for it being the other way around, regardless of what 
the title says. Could Jean-Jacques as teacher, for example, be thought 
of as the real focus of Emile? One could argue that he is as 
omnipresent as his student and, to an extent, even more so than Emile, 
given Jean-Jacques's omnipresc/ence. But this might simply be an 
issue of degree rather than of kind, for Jean-Jacques is more like a 
"negative capability," what Dewey would call the ability of someone 
to "provide the environment which shall organize the instincts." And 
in this sense, Jean-Jacques is not so much a "teacher" as he is 
"Natural Reason" (or, for that matter, God) personified, and this 
"Natural Reason" can be understood as being as much a part of Emile's 
"voice" as it is of Jean-Jacques' meditations on himself as 
teacher.254 
But what about Victor Frankenstein? Could he be understood as 
the student rather than the "teacher"? There is certainly a strong 
case to be made for the novel as a kind of Bildungsroman that details 
the twists and turns of Victor's educational process (a process, like 
254Dewey's quote is from Democracy and Education (New Yorl<, Macmillan, 1966), 115, where 
he says that "Rousseau was right, introducing a much-needed reform into education, in holding 
that the structure and activities of the organs furnish the conditions of all teaching of the use of 
the organs; but profoundly wrong in intimating that they supply not only the conditions but also 
the ends of their development" (114). The point that we are making here about Jean-Jacques as 
teacher is antithetical to a Victor Frankenstein as teacher, who, as Dewey would say, allows for 
the "spontaneous overflow of unlearned powers" (114). The "Force," one might say, is not with 
Victor Frankenstein. It might also be of interest to note that the pedagogical relationship between 
Jean-Jacques and Emile might be read as Rousseau's interpretation of Milton's Paradise Lost. In 
this scenario, Jean-Jacques can be identified with God or Divine Reason, Emile with Adam, and 
Sophie with Eve. (The connection between Eve and the monster in Franl<enstein has been 
described by Susan Gubar. See her essay, "Horror's Twin: Mary Shelley's Monstrous Eve.") 
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that of Celie in The Color Purple, that resembles a series of 
hermeneutical experiences of negation). We follow him, for instance, 
as he "discovers" the alchemists, Albertus Magnus and Paracelsus, 
only to eventually "transcend" them in favor of "natural philosophy" 
and chemistry, the study of which inspires him to "pioneer a new way, 
explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest 
mysteries of creation."^55 But this can also be just a "background 
check" for the benefit of the reader, for the real Bildungsroman, one 
could argue, begins when the monster tells Victor its own story of 
how it came to self-educated consciousness.256 And, as we learn 
from the telling of that story, it had been a process for the monster 
that is strikingly similar to the experiences of many of today's 
women as well as the alienated, homeless, and otherwise 
marginalized children, who are as disconnected from their teachers 
(and parents) as the monster had been from Victor. And as we are all 
aware, that uncaring, (dis)connected knowing, as it happens in today's 
society (and in the novel), culminates in rage and violence. So in the 
end, if we are to think of Victor as a student, he is a student who is 
unable to confront consequences in order to "grow" in his capacity for 
judgment and tact, and if we are to think of him as a teacher, he is a 
^^^Shelley, 47. 
^®®Chapters 11-16 can be read as the monster's educational autobiography and, as Richardson 
has pointed out, Shelley's parody of Emile. And here again we meet up with Paradise Lost We 
learn that it is one of the books that the monster reads as a text for its self-education. So given 
the symbolon-Wke character of Emile and Frankenstein, if we can think of Jean-Jacques and 
Emile as a God/Adam analogue, then Victor Frankenstein, in a "crossover" role, can be read as 
that biblical Prometheus, Lucifer. In the context of the novel, of course, Victor and the monster 
parody that God/Adam analogue. 
1 6 0  
teacher who is incapable of the self-conscious reflection that is 
necessary for differentiating negative prejudice from the 
consequences of that prejudice. 
This distinction becomes even clearer when we weigh in the 
subtitles of each work. For Frankenstein, the Modern Prometheus 
mythos contrasts sharply with the ethos suggested by Rousseau's 
On Education. The reason for this contrast is in the richness of the 
Prometheus persona. The "Prometheus" of the Modern Prometheus 
continues the Ancient Greek story of the fire-stealing, man-making, 
forethinking, mythic revolutionary with whom the young nineteenth-
century Shelleyean Romantics identified. But even with these multiple 
personalities, (one begins to wonder if he is not just another 
incarnation of Hermes), Prometheus cannot shake his primary 
identification with forethought and hubris,257 both of which are 
central to Rousseau's argument. And so we meet Victor Frankenstein, 
the antipode of Rousseau's vision, as a Promethean-like victim of 
what Rousseau would call Frankenstein's own amour-propre, as well 
as his prevoyance, or foresight. We can "hear" these "flaws" in 
Victor's description of his God-like purpose. He says, "A new species 
would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent 
natures would owe their being to me."^®® In contrast, what holds the 
the etymology of "Prometheus": pro before + mathein, to learn. Implicit here are 
the connections with the essential role that forestructure plays in hermeneutics and, by contrast, 
the bad reputation that "foresight" has for Rousseau ("Foresightl Foresight, which takes us 
ceaselessly beyond ourselves and often places us where we shall never arrive. This is the true 
source of all our miseries" (82).) As for hubris, the Church turned it into the first of the Seven 
Deadly Sins, i.e., Pride. 
258shelley. 52. 
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center together for Emile is his sentiment de I'existence, that 
feeling of relatedness in and for ail things. His is not the separation 
of subject and object that defines the scientistic existence of a 
"Modern Prometheus": rather, Emile feels a pathos of presence from a 
loving Auteur who knows that the Good is the love of the natural 
order of things. And unlike Victor Frankenstein, who is constantly 
looking over his shoulder, always paranoid that something is 
following him, Emile feels his God's love of that natural order within 
himself and all around him. For Frankenstein, on the other hand, the 
center cannot hold, and in the end, he becomes the degenerative 
agency Rousseau identifies in the first sentence of Emile : 
"Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; 
everything degenerates in the hands of man."^^® Frankenstein is also 
characterized by Rousseau's observation that, "In the present state of 
things a man abandoned to himself in the midst of other men from 
birth would be the most disfigured of all,"260 which is a fair 
description of both Victor and his Promethean offspring. However, 
when we turn to Rousseau's subtitle, On Education, we find that his 
concern is with the concept of education itself, not with a "bigger-
than-life" mythos that carries with it the implications of Ancient 
Greek tragedy.261 His concern is with sympathy, not with tragedy as 
^^^Rousseau, 37. 
260|bid. 
^®1what needs to surface at this point is Gadamer's inclusion of the Aeschylean formula of 
"learning through suffering" that is so important in his explanation of the hermeneutical 
experience {Erfahrung). He says, "This plirase does not mean only that we become wise through 
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an educational principle, and what is most conspicuously missing in 
the Victor/Monster educational experience, namely, sympathy, 
becomes in the Jean-Jacques/Emile experience a credential for 
humankind(ness).262 
Lastly, the epigraph of each text tells us a lot about these two 
educational experiences. In both works we are dealing with a "new" 
Adam, and in spite of the Judaeo-Christian and Ancient Greek 
traditions surrounding Frankenstein's subtitle and epigraph, both of 
these Adams have been demythologized. For Rousseau, that 
demythification comes out of the Stoic Naturalism of someone like 
Seneca, and for Shelley, it is the result of the New Science 
Naturalism of Bacon. Undoubtedly much can be made of these two 
traditions as being representative of the philosophical and cultural 
contexts from which each text found its wellspring, but here the point 
to be made has more to do with the "voice" of each epigraph. 
Notice first that Adam is the speaking voice in the 
Frankenstein quote. In what the Freudians might call a "defense 
strategy," Adam scornfully presses his Maker to give a full accounting 
suffering and that our knowledge of things must first be corrected through deception and 
undeception. . . . Aeschylus means more than this. He refers to the reason why this is so. What a 
man [sic] has to learn through suffering is not this or that particular thing, but insight into the 
limitations of humanity, into the absoluteness of the barrier that separates man [sic] from the 
divine. It is ultimately a religious insight--the kind of insight that gave birth to Greek tragedy" 
(TM, 356-57).The link with the Prometheus epigraph is the obvious one of authorship, i.e., 
Aeschylus' play Prometheus Bound, but there is also the connection between the hermeneutical 
"experience of negation" and the "religious insight" into hubris. 
262we cannot seem to escape from that black-and-white, Boris Karloffian image of an abandoned, 
abused, homeless, pathetic figure, who, because he is "un-sympathized with" stands in a 
macabre wood, howling "like a wild beast" (Shelley, 130). 
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of why he, Adam, even exists. Like an angry child or adolescent, Adam 
is not about to take the "heat" or the responsibility for his actions. 
Instead, he projects the sense of his own inadequacies onto the only 
logical alternative, his Father, who, because Adam is the first human 
being, just happens to be God Himself. And it is this dissatisfaction 
with self and its consequent blasphemous and, ultimately, violent 
expression that sounds the theme of Shelley's novel: alienation. But 
when we turn to Rousseau's epigraph, what we hear is not a 
characterization but the discursive voice of Seneca himself, who is 
prescribing the remedies of nature, saying something to the effect 
that, "Nature helps those who help themselves." The shift from the 
Garden of Eden to organic gardening has occurred, and for Rousseau it 
Is this evolutionary naturalism that conflicts so unmistakably with, 
basically, its perverted incarnation, Frankensteinian unnaturalism and 
its irrevocable offspring, man as "angry ape." That that offspring 
goes against Rousseau's grain and rages at itself and its Maker 
conflicts with Seneca's view, for in the Frankensteinian worldview, 
these are evils that cannot be cured because this technologized 
Adam, as Rousseau puts it, "loves deformity, monsters."2®^ However, 
for Rousseau it is this very rage that can be cured^^^ jf^ \\[^q the 
organic gardener, the teacher tends to the "contournei" of the 
263Rousseau, 37. 
'^"^Bloom's footnote to the epigraph summarizes the significance of this "rage" and its 
attendant, potential cures: "The worl< from which this quotation is drawn, "On Anger," is 
significant for Rousseau's intention. Anger is the passion which must be overcome, and his 
analysis of human psychology gives it a central place. It has pervasive and protean effects. His 
correction of education consists essentially in extirpating the roots of anger" {Emile, 481). 
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student's "mode," "like a tree in his garden."265  or, as Rousseau puts 
it in an aphoristic continuation of that gardening metaphor,266 
"Plants are shaped by cultivation, and men [sic] by education." 
What Victor Frankenstein did not take into account is this very 
extirpation of the roots of anger. One might say that by the very 
unnatural act of creating man according to the Frankensteinian Laws 
of Nature, he actually omitted Rousseau's version of Natural Law, and 
in so doing, inadvertently created the archetypal violent rage that 
evolved into the persecuted, howling monster. Thus, from Rousseau's 
point of view, Victor's failure as an "unnatural" teacher can be 
attributed to his excluding the first two of the three kinds of 
education upon which we are all dependent: "nature, men [sic], and 
things." Rousseau tells us that, "The internal development of our 
faculties and organs is the education of nature. The use that we make 
of this development is the education of men. And what we acquire 
from our own experience about the objects which affect us is the 
education of things."267 Victor's creature was deprived of his 
natural growth and development is obvious enough.268 xhat the 
265pQUsseau, 37. 
2®6|bi£i, 38. 
2®7|bid. 
^®®The point can be made semi-playfuiiy by tliinl<ing about tfie teacher education course called 
"Human Growth and Development." For the monster, of course, the "Human" part of that course 
description wouid have been non-applicable. We can also turn to a passage in Emile that must 
have had a strong impression on Mary Shelley's reading of Rousseau and the subsequent 
development of her own ideas about monstrous progeny: "Let us suppose that a child had at his 
[sic] birth the stature and the strength of a grown man, that he emerged, so to speal<, fully 
armed from his mother's womb as did Pallas from the brain of Jupiter. This man-child would be a 
perfect imbecile, an automaton, an immobile and almost insensible statue. . . . He wouid have only 
a single idea, that is, of the '1' to which he wouid relate ail of his sensations; and this idea or, 
rather, this sentiment would be the only thing that he would have beyond what an ordinary baby 
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creature was deprived of "men" is also evident in the absolute 
excoriation and abandonment to which it was subjected. What was 
left was an education by "things," which turned out to be cruelly 
insufficient. The irony here is that, according to Rousseau, of the 
three kinds of education, the only one over which we can assume any 
degree of control is that of "men." But tragically for the monster, it 
proves to be the one that Victor as scientist, teacher, and new 
Promethean, was incapable of mastering for himself. 
But in the end what can we conclude about this meeting of 
Frankenstein and Emile ? What is it that makes this "cross-
genderized" reading of the two works a metaphor for education and 
for our thesis? What does it teach us? What do we learn from it? As 
we pointed out earlier, we can take this meeting as a dialectical 
metaphor for Jane Roland Martin's "two-sex society." However, what 
we learn from the metaphor is not the discursive facts for what such 
an ideal would be like but rather what such an ideal type would not 
be like. In other words, the metaphor does not tell us how such an 
educational ideal can come about but why it cannot, and this is the 
in-between where the two works truly meet. For at the very point 
where each work verges on fulfilling the Utopian promise of its 
educational ideal, that ideal breaks down because of the sexism 
immanent in each work. For Emile this becomes evident in light of 
Jane Roland Martin's argument that Rousseau created Emile in the 
has" (Rousseau, 61). 
1 6 6  
likeness of Plato's philosopher-king, with all of the attendant 
responsibilities that come with such a protectorate, the first and 
foremost being full citizenship. But Rousseau denies the privilege of 
citizenship and gender equity to Sophie. As Martin points out, 
Rousseau certainly recognized the problem of Plato's Republic being 
led by male and female guardians alike as the problem of what to do 
with the responsibilities of family and children. Plato's solution is to 
"farm" the children out to the appropriate surrogates. But for 
Rousseau, this cannot be, for the family unit recapitulates the unity 
of the Republic. The Republic, in other words, cannot maintain its 
natural order without the natural order of the family to shore it up. 
Rousseau solves this problem by giving those domestic (or what 
Martin calls "reproductive") duties exclusively to Sophie, who will, in 
turn, then be the perfect complement to citizen Emile.^^s So at the 
climactic point when Emile is to become a complete human being,270 
that is, when he is finally "ready" for his marriage to Sophie, we 
learn of the genderized place of Sophie in the educational scheme of 
things. We could say that at this point we witness the complementary 
reciprocation between Emile and Sophie, but it is a mutuality that can 
only exist in Emile's world. 
^®®Jane Roland Martin, "Sophie and Emile: A Case Study of Sex Bias in the History of 
Educational Thought" Harvard Educational Review 51, no. 3 (August 1981). A later variation of 
this argument appears in her "Transforming the Liberal Curriculum: Rewriting the Story of 
Sophie and Emile" Working Paper no. 56 (Wellesley: Wellesley College Center for Research on 
Women, 1985). 
^^^This is dramatically as well as chronologically climactic. We learn about Sophie in the last 
Book, Book v. 
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Similarly, this breakdown occurs in Frankenstein with a 
"marriage" analogue. When Victor denies the monster's request for a 
mate, for someone who would be an equal, he destroys the most 
uplifting hope of the monster's "life." And with this denial, the future 
of any sort of complementary union, any "fusion of horizons," is 
denied as well. To have honored the monster's request so that it could 
finally be "sympathized with" is the point at which the recognition of 
woman as human being would have been affirmed as well, but Victor 
and the patriarchal tradition that he represents cannot bring himself 
to make that most human of all admissions and chooses instead to 
destroy what little hope the monster had managed to have in a 
tradition that made it an object of scorn and humiliation. 
But if, as we have claimed, this is a metaphor for the 
metaphoricity of the educational experience, what applicative 
relevance does it have for the classroom? As we try to demonstrate 
in the next chapter, this hermeneutical approach to the educational 
experience can be translated into the "language of learning" by way of 
talking about anomalies, metaphors by which those anomalies can be 
interpreted, activities through which a student can work to "test" the 
validity of those metaphors or tropes, and finally to make the 
necessary corrections to the application itself. Cumulatively, this is 
the process we have been referring to as the hermeneutical 
experience of negation.And what we have tried to demonstrate 
with our reading of Frankenstein and Emiie as a metaphor for that 
P71 
" 'A variation on tills "sequence" Is described by Petrle in "Metaphor and Learning." 
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metaphoricity, i.e., our thesis, is that the educational experience 
begins with an anomaly (Frankenstein's monster) revealed through 
"creative negativity" which is that kind of experience that results in 
the opposite of what was intended (Victor's intention to create a new 
species of "beautiful people" gone awry). And this "opposite" is 
usually inexplicable given the experiencer's (student's or teacher's) 
preconceptual framework. What is then required in order to make 
sense of things is a metaphorical relation {Emile) that might build on 
what is familiar in that personal forestructure and thus generate an 
interpretation of the anomaly (an androgenous or "two-sex" society 
characterized by our "voice over"). The testing or projecting of the 
validity of that interpretation ("validity trope") is the continuous 
reconstruction of the complementary reciprocation between the 
ontology of philosophical hermeneutics and the epistemology of 
Women's Ways of Knowing. What this activity turns up for us in the 
meeting of Frankenstein and Emiie is that where they truly meet is 
in their sexism (Sophie's "place" in society and Victor's refusal to 
make a mate for his creature), and the educational "corrective" that 
follows suit is the transumptive or metaphorical self-understanding 
that has been effected by a recognition of the "tyrrany of the hidden 
prejudice," so that what we "learn" is that education cannot be 
education for liberty without this "new" (in)fusion of horizons which 
is the historically effected consciousness. That this approach to the 
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educational experience finds its "home away from home" in the 
multicultural nonsexist classroom is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
APPLICATION 
"As I read, however, I applied much personally to my own 
feelings and condition. I found myself similar yet at the 
same time strangely unlike to the beings concerning whom I 
read and to whose conversation I was a listener." 
-- The "Monster" to Victor Frankenstein in Frankenstein 
Once it is demonstrated that man and woman are not and 
ought not to be constituted in the same way in either 
character or temperament, it follows that they ought not to 
have the same education. 
-- Rousseau, Emile V 
No 'advanced educator' can allow himself [sic] to be so 
absorbed in the question of what a child ought to be as to 
exclude the discovery of what he [sic] is. 
-- Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics 
In practice, what would it mean if the educational experience 
were, in fact, essentially hermeneutical? Or, more to the point, how 
would our thesis be translated from dissertational discourse into the 
everyday classroom "language of learning"? What would it mean if we 
practiced the preaching of our thesis that the educational experience 
is the continuous reconstruction of the complementary reciprocation 
between the ontology of philosophical hermeneutics and the 
epistemology of Women's Ways? 
At first, what we are proposing might appear to be yet another 
case of ivory towerism, just another example of philosophical 
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discourse that has no applicability in the classroom, or if it does (so 
the defensive denial might go), "Only the brightest students would be 
able to profit, so the idea is elitist."^^^ But the task of application is 
not really as formidable as it seems to be, for we have had, in Chapter 
2, some introduction to what such a practice might be like as well as 
what such a practice would not be like, namely, the behavioral 
objectives model of instruction. In Chapter 2 we also briefly surveyed 
several models of what we termed "explicit" and "tacit" 
hermeneutical approaches to the classroom experience, and we also 
saw that the "connected teaching" of Women's Ways with its ties to 
Paulo Freire's problem-posing approaches to teaching and opposition 
to the "banking-concept" of teaching can also be understood as 
compatible with philosophical hermeneutics. We saw, too, that 
certain "pedagogies of understanding" and "constructivist" practices 
are also compatible with our thesis. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, we 
saw that John Dewey's theory of experience and education — the 
similarities between his integrative concept of "the past of the living 
present" and the concept of the hermeneutical circle - offers us 
another direction for getting us off the drawing board and into the 
day-to-day problems of the "real" classroom. 
So although the basic, practical, pedagogical views of this thesis 
are not necessarily predominant views, they are themselves familiar 
^^^This example is from a list of "denials" that were discussed in the context of "A Humanities 
Approach to Education," an NEH-sponsored seminar for Montgomery County (MD) Public School 
System teachers during the spring of 1985 and 1986. The seminar was led by Dr. George 
Usdansky, whose ideas have been assimilated into the above discussion. 
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to thoughtful students in the field. However, even for many of those 
thoughtful practitioners, these views have become semi-hackneyed 
and, accordingly, have slipped into the pejorative, dead metaphor 
office of educational jargon. The challenge, then, specifically for this 
chapter and generally for the thesis as a whole, is not simply to 
recycle or to repackage existing (or at least perceived to be existing) 
classroom practices under a new and "catchier" label; it is to create 
for the student and for the teacher the "edifying" open space and 
social hope necessary to counteract the "fear of freedom" and the 
defensive denials that go along with it.^^^ It is, in words that we 
have used previously, the challenge of pulling the plug on the 
"tyrannical machine" that is running our teacher preparation 
programs and, by extension, the majority of classrooms in today's 
public schools. It is the kind of tyranny that is self-perpetuating so 
that a postsecondary student teacher who does receive an "edifying" 
understanding of the educational experience will, during his or her 
273| ugg "edifying" here in relation to education in the sense that Richard Rorty uses the term in 
relation to philosophy. (Note too the connection between edifying/edifice and the buMmg/Bildung 
homophone described in Chapter 4.) In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979) he builds his case for an "edifying philosophy" as "the 
attempt to prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into a research program" (372). 
"The point of edifying philosophy," he says, "is to keep the conversation going rather than to 
find objective trutii. . . . The danger which edifying discourse tries to avert is that some given 
vocabulary, some way in which people might come to thini< of themselves, will deceive them into 
thinking that from now on all discourse could be, or should be, normal discourse" (377). And 
finally, "to see wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation, is to see human 
beings as generators of new descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be able to describe 
accurately" (378). The reference to the "fear of freedom" is intended to echo what Erich Fromm 
called our attempt to "escape from freedom," to escape from fears about our human condition. In 
terms of our thesis, this would be the fear of not having understanding as applied theory or 
techne, because techne is perceived to be a clear authority, and any breach of that authority 
would lead to the "calamitous" condition of "subjectivity," uncertainty, and personal judgment 
and responsibility (phronesis). 
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practice teaching requirennent, more than likely get "processed" into 
the machine that the teacher preparation program spent so much time 
theoretically deconstructing. And it goes without saying that that 
same machine is having the same effect on the school students 
themselves, thus making the machine truly tyrannical. 
In the course of our thesis, this is what we have tried to portray 
as "monstrosity," techne, sexism, and as the "abuse of method" with 
all of the negative prejudices contingent upon that closed-
mindedness. Confronting these denials, these fears of freedom and the 
obstacles they create, is the critical challenge facing the schools and 
the schools of education today. How do we get students in the schools, 
students in the academy, and teachers in the same to recognize these 
denials for what they are -- self-deceptions about "true" motives? 
How do you tell an experienced teacher that the resistance she is 
offering to "that old Progressive stuff" has everything to do with 
stereotype and an unfounded motive to escape from freedom and 
nothing to do with the nature of learning and the educational 
experience? How do you tell this to student teachers? The task of this 
thesis is to suggest that a "fusing" of philosophical hermeneutics and 
Women's Ways provides an ontological way of thinking about the 
educational experience, and what this means in terms of classroom 
practice is that the responsibility of the teacher is nothing less than 
getting students to understand who they are by acknowledging who 
they have been and who they will be, and that this Being that can be 
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understood is language, not some "monster" created ex nihilo by a 
mistaken belief in techne as the way to truth. A description of how 
we might go about doing this in the classroom is what follows. 
The annotated lesson plans that make up the rest of this chapter 
are actual classroom practices that I experimented with during the 
1994 Spring Semester at Simpson College in Indianola, Iowa. The unit 
was taught in a course called "Human Relations in Teaching,"^74 and 
the students were juniors and seniors in the Teacher Preparation 
Program, majoring in a variety of content areas in both the secondary 
and the elementary education tracks. My rationale for choosing this 
course was that it is a state-mandated course in Multicultural Non-
Sexist Education (MCNSE) for teacher certification, so it provided me 
with students from different cultural backgrounds (as best as is 
possible at Simpson with its ninety-six percent plus student 
population drawn from Iowa), and from different content areas. And 
because these students would be a mix of both the elementary and the 
secondary education tracks, it was the closest thing to an 
interdisciplinary course in the teacher education program. The reason 
for choosing an "interdisciplinary" course is that it gave me the 
opportunity at the outset to distance myself and my students from a 
taxonomic approach to the educational experience, for as we have 
tried to make clear throughout the thesis, any such 
compartmentalization of knowledge would be counterintuitive for a 
ideas were generated during a 1993 summer seminar taught by Dr. Theresa McCormicl< 
at Iowa State University. 
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hermeneutical approach to the teaching/learning situation. But 
perhaps the most important reason for choosing this course was that 
it has, as one of its components, the issue of sexism in education. 
This, then, I recognized as an appropriate forum for trying out the 
Women's Ways part of my thesis. It gave me the opportunity to begin 
with the least curricular resistance so that my planning and teaching 
could be concentrated on coming up with ways to effect the 
"continuous reconstruction of the complementary reciprocation 
between philosophical hermeneutics and Women's Ways." And one of 
the real challenges with which I was faced in this regard was the 
challenge that we are confronting in this chapter -- being able to 
convince the students of the difficulty in and the importance of 
applying the "infusion" process to their own respective content areas 
and educational environments as teachers themselves .^^s  
But before turning to the lesson plans, we need to become 
familiar with some of the background assumptions about the 
hermeneutical nature of the educational experience as we are 
proposing it. These can be thought of as three "theses" or 
"pedagogical moves" presupposed in the planning of the course 
^^^1 do not distinguish between what the schools are referring to as the "infusion" of MCNSE 
material into the regular classroom and what goes on in the classroom that I am proposing as an 
application of our thesis that the educational experience is hermeneutical. In fact, it seems like 
the schools have their jargon wrong. Instead of "in-fusion," which suggests some kind of 
authoritative inoculation, we might be better served by noting that the "fusion" part, at least, 
accords with our thesis and Gadamer's "fusion of horizons." Aside from the misnomer, the only 
other difference is that many of the "infused" classrooms have already been "processed" by the 
"tyrranical machine." The hermeneutical approach that I am proposing eludes methodological 
abuse. 
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i tse l f ,276  and each "thesis" has its own "applications" or 
assignments for the course in general. Focusing on the three 
characteristics that both the educational and the hernneneutical 
experiences have in comnnon, these "theses," which were introduced 
in Chapter 1, are "historicality," "linguisticality," and "dialectic." 
The lesson plans which follow them make up one unit in the Human 
Relations course. 
1. The education experience as hermeneutical is historical. This does 
not mean "historical" in the prevailing historicist interpretation of a 
cyclical cause-and-effect relationship. Nor does it mean "historical" 
in the sense that it has had a "long history." What we need to keep in 
mind here is Gadamer's notions of the "historically effected 
consciousness," openness, and the historicality of our (the students' 
and the teachers') prejudgments. Application: As a first day 
assignment, students are asked to write a two-page autobiography to 
be submitted the next class meeting. At that time I collect them and, 
in return, give the students my own two-page autobiography. This 
seemingly platitudinous dialogic exchange accomplishes four very 
important goals, all of which are circumscribed by Gadamer's notion 
of a "fusion of horizons": 1) to discover any special needs that my 
students might have; 2) to reveal the student preconceptions that I 
will be dealing with during the semester and to reveal to them my 
P7fi 
""These "moves" are "teaching strategies" that can be applied to any course. They might be 
thought of as the first building blocks for an across-the-curriculum application of our thesis. The 
"theses" that follow have been adapted from Richard Palmer's Hermeneutics (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969), 242-253. 
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own preconceptual framework; and 3) to get students to make 
reflective decisions about what may or may not be "historically" 
significant enough to include in a two-page story of one's Bildung. 
(This assignment is revisited at the end of the course in conjunction 
with a culminating assignment described next.) 
2. The educational experience as hermeneutical is linguistic. The key 
idea here is Gadamer's thesis that "Being that can be understood is 
language." Language, in other words, is not merely an instrument to to 
be called up whenever a "need" arises but is, in fact, the medium 
through which Being "unconceals" itself. Application: All of the 
writing and discussion assignments during the semester are designed 
to provide the students with the opportunity to reflect on how they 
use language and what that language can tell them about themselves 
in a social context. For example, one of the culminating activities is 
the writing of an "intellectual autobiography" or mini-
Bildungsroman which is a revisiting, a "reading" or interpretation of 
the semester's writing assignments. They give "themselves" a 
hermeneutical reading with the added twist that I return to them 
their "first-day autobiographies" and ask them to read and to 
contextualize that assignment as a baseline experience for the 
semester. They are also asked to reflect on the experiences of 
negation as they show up in the patterns of their semester's 
development. This activity takes several class meetings of peer 
discussion and large group review. Several students read/report on 
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their work to the entire class, which is followed by further 
discussion about the nature of learning. 
3. The educational experience as hermeneutical is d/a/ecf/ca/. This 
"thesis" embodies the other two and is the inspirational source for 
most of the ideas that are included in this section's applications and 
lesson plans. The key point to remember here is that hermeneutical 
understanding can only be achieved when students begin to conceive of 
experience "not as consciousness perceiving objects, but as 
understanding encountering a negativity which broadens and 
illuminates self-understanding."277 jhis is not to suggest that 
students must be taught Heidegger or Gadamerian hermeneutics in 
order to begin "truly" to understand. However, it does imply that 
teachers, of all people, should have a/ least this ontological insight 
into experience, understanding, Bildung and the educational 
experience so that their students might have a chance to see why 
experience is not the simple "accessing" of compartmentalized, 
neatly organized, and cleanly efficient virtual experience that they 
get from the electronic media.^^® Instead, they need to become 
277pa|fner, 242. Later he coins the term "creative negativity" for the hermeneutical 
experience of Erfahrung, the apperception of which seems to me to be at the heart of the 
educational project and is an important pedagogical move in my approach to the thesis. We might 
also bear in mind here Palmer's succinct definition of hermeneutical understanding: 
"Understanding is most open when it is conceived of as something capable of being seized by being 
rather than as a self-sufficient grasping consciousness" (244). 
P7R 
'''"Because I am focusing mainly on the preparation of teachers, the immediate issue is not one 
of canon and curriculum. What's at stal<e in the teacher prep forum has its own political as well 
as philosophical entanglements. My thinl<ing on the political side of things has to do with 
established power behind the state-required courses for teacher licensure. Why, for example, 
must so much attention be paid to educational psychology (at least two courses) when its 
contribution to gender equity and human connectedness have been negligible? It seems that this 
area of the preparation regimen "fused" with the basic philosophical foundations, methods, and 
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conscious of experience as a life-world nnade up of uncertainties, 
annbiguities, conflicts, and humiliation. 
To understand this means to understand that we do not "use" 
history, language, and world as we would an instrument or a tool, but 
that we participate in this "Being that can be understood," and that 
only through participation will "truth," "connected knowing," and 
Deweyan social hope reveal itself. But this "truth" is not an objective 
fact: it cannot be plotted out on some behavioral grid and then 
"captured" and "possessed" by tracking it down with the "correct" 
rational strategy. This "truth" simply "happens" by reminding us of 
human finitude and of the infinity of possibilities that constitute that 
irony of negation. Thus the more "experiences" students can have of 
"ontological experience," the better prepared they will be to accept 
"truth" for what it is and not for what it ought to be, and to 
participate in and to fuse horizons with not only the familiar life-
world but the multicultural strangeness of Being as well. And this is 
accomplished dialectically. Application: The activity that comes 
closest to embodying all of these characteristics is a practice 
teaching session in which each student becomes intimately involved 
in the hermeneutical nature of the educational exper ience .^^s  
human relations requirements could very adequately provide students with the "linguistic turn" 
that would allow them to begin to think of the educational experience as an ontological event of 
being or, if they so choose, to continue to think of it as the fossilized epistemology that it is. At 
least there would be the conditions necessary for Gadamer's "fusion of horizons" to happen 
"over and above their wanting and doing." 
^^^This is an activity that I use in Foundations of Education, Secondary Methods, as well as 
Human Relations. I think that it should be used across the curriculum in both the pre-college and 
the postsecondary classroom. The point that I find myself returning to is one that I tried to make 
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The "short version" of this assignment is that it is basically a 
role playing activity, whereby each student teaches the class as if it 
were a "real" pre-college class in a specific content area (the 
student teacher's content area), at a specific grade level, and in a 
specific location or cultural context. Each session lasts at least forty 
minutes, with an additional ten minutes added on for an 
"introduction" that describes the first five sections of the plan (see 
below) and opens the floor to peer review and questioning of the 
propriety of those aspects. Each student is required to teach two 
sessions during the semester and is required to meet with me at least 
one class meeting prior to the assigned teaching date, the preliminary 
meeting when we review a first draft of the lesson plan. 
The "long version" can be summed up by describing the "lesson 
plan" that I require of each session. Unlike the traditional lesson plan 
format, this plan is generated hermeneutically. It is organized around 
what I call the "key idea" -- not the instructional objective -- and 
around a "local hermeneutics"280 .. not an impersonal "l-Them" 
relationship between the teacher and the students. It has seven parts: 
1) Context or Environment, 2) Key Idea, 3) Question(s) to Which This 
in the previous chapter: if we think of the educational experience as fundamentally metaphorical, 
then "learning is teaching" becomes what we have called a "validity trope," which plays itself 
out in the proverbial "teacher wisdom" that "you don't really know something until you teach 
it." 
^®°This is based upon what Shaun Gallagher calls a "local hermeneutics." He maintains (along 
with Freire) that "A hermeneutical situation is always a localized one." And that "Local 
hermeneutics attempts, in its descriptive and explanatory parts, to give an account of how and 
why a particular interpretation is actually taking place in specific circumstances and, in its 
prescriptive part, to prescribe how it ought to take place." See Hermeneutics and Education 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 331-332. 
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Lesson is an Answer, 4) Curriculum, 5) Student Preconceptions 6) 
Procedure, 7) Evaluation, 8) Bibliography.^81 Remember, this is 
required of each student in the Human Relations class, and because of 
the course mandate (practice at infusing MCNSE into content areas 
across the curriculum), it becomes a natural environment for the 
cultivation of our hermeneutical approach to education. 
1. Context or environment. The student teacher must "project" his or 
her initial idea onto a specific grade-level and content area (e.g., 10th 
Grade English), in a specific geographical and cultural locale (e.g., "a 
small Iowa town comparable to Indianola with a population of 12,000, 
with one high school where ninety-nine percent of the students are 
white Euro-Americans," etc.), at an approximate time in the academic 
year (e.g. "half-way through the first marking period"). Students are 
required to research this data for the most current and complete 
information available on a given school district, its curriculum, its 
student population, and the general cultural milieu of the given town 
or city.282 
Embedded in this plan are four areas of "topical Invention": "Environment," "Curriculum," 
"Student," and "Teacher." I have appropriated this matrix from the work that Professors David 
Owen and Sonja Darlington had done collaboratively with a Social Foundations of Education class 
at Iowa state University and have described in their unpublished papers, "Topical Invention in 
Curriculum: Pluralism in Social Foundations." 
282Most of the students rely on the "forestructure" of their own school experience and begin to 
construct meaning out of that material. And this too gives the course instructor (me) a ground 
upon which to engage students in "the logic of question and answer." For instance, when a 
student is asl<ed, "What would be taught at this point in the marking period and why is it taught 
then?" the student's response is usually something like, "That's the way we did it when I was a 
student at the school." The "opening" here for the instructor is one that allows him or her to 
"negate" that experience by comparing it to other curricular scopes and sequences, the detailing 
of which can lead the student to "constructed knowing" and hermeneutical understanding. That is, 
the student can be led to recognize that curriculum is a function of culture, time, and 
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2. Key idea. This might also be thought of as a "focus," "thesis 
statement," or, as I explain it to my students "the most important 
point that you feel needs to be taught about this particular topic." It 
is written as a complete sentence, not as an infinitive phrase that 
passes itself off as an "instructional objective."^®^ We usually begin 
with a key term as the subject and then develop individual predication 
based upon the "application" that that term has for the student's 
self-understanding.284 For example, in that 10th-Grade English class, 
the key term might be "honor" and its key idea might be, "As it is 
portrayed in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, the concept of public honor 
excludes women." 
3. The Question(s) to which this lesson (or key idea) is an answer. As 
we have seen, this dialectical "logic of the question and answer" is a 
fundamental part of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. In 
practice, this approach does two things: First, it helps the student to 
clarify his or her thinking about the key idea. For instance, if we 
return to the above example of a key idea, a student struggling with 
predication can begin to think differently about the key term, "honor" 
(which the student has selected but "doesn't know what to say about 
communicative discourse, i.e., historicaiity, iinguisticality, and dialectic. 
have found this -- the most critical task in the planning stage -- to be the most difficult and 
frustrating for the students. It is the same conflict that the writing teacher runs into when trying 
to get the student to locus the argument" or to "come up with clear thesis statement." Notice 
here how similar rhetoric, hermeneutics, and the educational experience can really be. In my 
view, this goes back to the ontological Iinguisticality of philosophical hermeneutics. 
O O A  
^°^We are again reminded here of Women's Ways "constructed knowledge" and Gadamer's 
insight that "the central problem of hermeneutics" is the "problem of application, which is to 
be found in all understanding" (Truth and h/lethod, 307). 
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it"), if he or she is asked about what question might have given rise 
to the interest in "honor" in the first place. The student's first 
response is predictable: "What is honor?" But here the conversation 
can take its first turn towards "constructed knowing." With carefully 
modulated and thoughtful querying on the supervising teacher's part, 
this Socratic questioning can turn into a true dialectical and 
hermeneutical experience, which, as we have been arguing, is the 
educational experience itself. Secondly, the question can open up the 
student's thinking beyond the single lesson plan to thoughtful 
consideration about the larger unit that embodies this particular idea. 
By means of the same dialectic used for clarifying the key idea, this 
further widening of the student's horizons can provide a deeper 
understanding of the nature of curriculum and tradition. 
4. Curriculum. Once the student has decided on the lesson plan, a 
plausible unit within which the lesson would appear, and when that 
particular lesson might be taught during the year, he or she must 
compare that information with what the actual curriculum guide (or 
comparable substitute) calls for. This must be a guide from the school 
district identified by the student as the location for his or her 
teaching assignment (#1). What the student usually finds out is that 
a) the curriculum guide is sketchy at best, if it exists at all, or b) the 
curriculum guide describes things differently than what the student 
conceived them to be. Either way, this "encounter" becomes a 
hermeneutical experience of negation which encourages the student to 
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rethink his or her preconceptions of what teaching is "really like" and 
to begin to question his or her understanding of where knowledge 
actually comes from. 
5. Student preconceptions. Having determined what will be taught, 
where it will be taught, and when it will be taught, the student 
teacher now must consider what preconceptions his or her students 
might bring with them to class (prior knowledge of the subject and 
prejudgments related to the content as well as to the immediate life-
world). The student teacher, for example, would need to check the 
curriculum guide to see what the students had studied the previous 
year and are currently studying in their other courses, especially in 
history. He or she must also make some reasonable decisions about 
what cultural prejudgments these students are bringing to the subject 
and to the class as a community. (This is a reflexive act in that it 
tells the student teacher something about his or her own 
prejudgments.) For instance, in our Shakespeare example, the student 
teacher might report that this is the second Shakespeare play that the 
students have read and that they are currently studying the historical 
Caesar in their required World History class, etc. It might also be 
apparent to the student teacher that since the community is small and 
culturally closed, the students might have certain traditional, 
patriarchal notions of a woman's role, etc. Given these investigations, 
the student teacher is required to offer suggestions (during his or her 
introduction to the lesson) as to how these prejudgments might be 
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turned to an advantage. 
6. Procedure. This is a detailed description of how the lesson will 
actually be taught. It requires the usual explanation of logistics, 
timeframe, and materials needed, but what sets it apart from the 
traditional lesson plan is that the activity must involve the students 
in some form of "creative negativity" and must prepare specific 
questions that anticipate the dialectic which will result from that 
experience of negation. One possibility for doing this in our Caesar 
example -- given our key idea about "honor" and the exclusion of 
women -- would be to provide for the students some examples of 
"honorable women" who have persevered through history, but 
simultaneously to underline the irony in Antony's famous speech about 
"honorable men." Questions, then, might relate to what "honor" means 
to each student, and why or why not that definition could include 
women. 
7. Evaluation. The traditional approaches to testing are discouraged 
in favor of the hermeneutical approaches to rhetoric and wri t ing .285  
For example, the student teacher is required to develop a writing 
activity that addresses the hermeneutical problem of application. How 
does this portrayal of honor, for example, bridge history and speak to 
us today? 
8. Bibliography. Each lesson plan must be thoroughly documented. 
^®®See especially the work of Crusius, Kinneavy, and Berthoff. For full citations see Works 
Consulted. 
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The remainder of this chapter is my own application of this 
process, which is also an application of our thesis. My purpose in 
developing this particular three-lesson unit on trait genderization and 
communication focuses on the hope that by having some exposure to 
the so-called "cultural differences" that exist between men and 
women, and by coming to some realization about the pervasive 
institutionalization of power structures that continues to dominate 
those cultural differences, my students will be able to have that 
hermeneutical experience of negation by recognizing the biases that 
have prejudiced society against women for what they are, "regimes of 
power," and that their own preconceptions about gender might be 
nothing more than groundless stereotypes. 
My reasoning towards the formulation of a key idea followed the 
proposition that research into the ways that individuals perceive the 
world and themselves — the ways that men and women come to know 
things ~ suggests that cognition might follow a sequence of stages 
which leads to intellectual and moral development but that those 
cultural stages are, in turn, affected by long-term power structures 
that have been established by the ruling majority. Because of 
inequities inherent in socialized structures of power, students do not 
have equal opportunities to develop according to stages of normal 
intellectual and moral growth. And because women have been the 
victims of social inequities, the apparent cultural differences in their 
intellectual development and in their ability to communicate with 
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men are oftentimes misinterpreted as being representative of an 
essential inferiority to men. 
The first lesson plan might best be entitled the "Cognitive 
Perspective," and its key Idea formulated as, "Developmental theory 
has established men's experience and competence as a baseline 
against which both men's and women's development is then judged, 
often to the detriment of misreading women."286 jhe required 
texts are: 1) Mary Belenky, et al. Women's Ways of Knowing 
(especially the Introduction, Chapter 1 and Chapter 10); 2) BIythe 
Clinchy, "On Critical Thinking and Connected Knowing" Liberal 
Education (Nov/Dec 1989) (Class Handout); 3) D. N. Gollnick and P. C. 
Chinn, Multicultural Education in a Pluralist Society (especially 
Chapter 4); 4) J. Kurfiss, "Developmental Theories, or What Happens to 
Students in College?" Teaching Professor (April 1990): 3-4 (Class 
Handout); and 5) William Perry, Forms of Intellectual and Ethical 
Development (Figures 1 and 2 as a class handout). Among the 
students' preconceptions and prior knowledge will be: 1) a 
familiarity with the Clinchy, Kurfiss, and Perry handouts, and they 
will have read Chapter 4 in Gollnick and Chinn; 2) Except for the above 
articles, students will not have prior familiarity with the Perry or 
the Belenky et al. studies; however, most will be slightly familiar 
with Piaget and will have taken the required Educational Psychology 
course; 3) Many male students will have stereotypical male opinions 
^®®Belenky, et al., 7. 
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about women and cross-gender communication; 4) Some males (and 
females) will be resistant to "feminist attempts to force political 
correctness on them." 
The procedure opens with a brief summary of the study which 
forms the basis for Women's Ways. An overhead transparency "Fact 
Sheet" guides this background data presentation. Next, the students 
are engaged in a discussion about the "stages" themselves, and the 
Kurfiss/Perry handouts guide this segment of the introduction which 
runs approximately 30 minutes. For the next 15 minutes the students 
begin to work collaboratively in four groups. Each group is assigned 
one of the four "perspectives" identified in Women's Ways and 
summarized by Kurfiss. Their assignment is to define "Art" (this 
could be any thought-provoking key term or concept), as it would be 
defined by someone from that particular perspective, and each group 
must provide justification for their definition. Because this is 
typically a class which meets three times each week for fifty 
minutes each session, this first meeting ends here with the students 
organized into their four groups and informed of the activity. 
The class reconvenes and for the first 30 minutes is involved in 
the assignment. Reporting and discussing the "definitions" take up the 
next 20 minutes. After the activity has been completed, the students 
are given a writing assignment. They are asked to write a two-page 
paper (due next class meeting) on the following topic: "Discuss your 
own learning experiences at Simpson College in terms of 'connected 
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knowing' and 'separate knowing.* From your own male/female point of 
view, what effect did those experiences have on your understanding of 
gender difference and inherent classroom biases against women?" 
(This assignment accounts for the issues raised in the Clinchy 
handout.) Finally the students are asked to write a "one-minute 
paper."287 
The second lesson plan we can call "The Sociolinguistic 
Perspective," and its key idea can be stated as follows: "A cross-
cultural approach to gender differences in conversational style 
differs from the work on gender and language which claims that 
conversations between men and women break down because men seek 
to dominate women. . . . The effect of dominance is not always the 
result of an intention to dominate."288 jhe required texts are; 1) 
Gollnick & Chinn's Multicultural Education in a Pluralist Society, 
Chapter 15; 2) Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand] 3) Peggy 
Taylor, "'Can We Talk?' An Interview with Deborah Tannen," New Age 
Journal (Nov/Dec 1990): 31-33 (Class Handout); and 4) "What's Your 
Gender Communications Quotient?" an unpublished "quiz" similar to a 
cultural literacy approach to gender and communication. At this point, 
poy 
Described in Richard Light, "The Harvard Assessment Seminars," (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1991). At the end of each class I ask my students to write out, anonymously, 
on a half-sheet of paper (that I salvage from the recycling bins), answers to the following 
questions: "What Is the one big thing I learned during this class?" and "What is the one big 
question that still remains?" The one-minute paper provides a quick means of assessment as to 
where my lesson's emphases fell, and it also provides a helpful and interesting means for 
beginning the next class meeting. By mentioning the things learned and by asking the questions 
that still remained, we as a class can review the previous lesson, a variety of opinions, and also 
take up issues that remained problematic. 
pQQ 
^°°Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understand (New York: Morrow, 1990), 18. 
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the students' preconceptions and prior knowledge will be that 
1) they have read key chapters from You Just Don't Understand, 
Chapter 4 in Gollnick and Chinn, and the interview with Deborah 
Tannen; 2) Students will know the difference between "connected 
knowing" and "separate knowing": 3) Students will be familiar with 
the implications of cultural feminism; and 4) Many students will still 
believe that women by nature "talk all the time." 
The procedure begins after the first 10 minutes of review 
based on selected one-minute paper comments from the Women's 
Ways class. The students then "take" the "What's Your Gender 
Communications Quotient?" quiz, and after talking over the 
implications of the "answers" to the quiz, the class turns its 
attention to the "Fact Sheet" overhead transparency which 
summarizes the sociolinguistic model used by Deborah Tannen. Like 
the first lesson, time usually runs out at this point, so following the 
"Fact Sheet" introduction, the remaining time is allotted for 
instructions and organizing for the main activity. The next class 
meeting is given over to the primary activity, and the class gets into 
the 4 groups assigned the previous meeting. These groups are 
different from the previous groups and are made up of approximately 
5-6 students per group with an equal distribution of male and female 
students. Before the groups are formed, I ask 2 male students and 2 
female students (without the others knowing) to "be" sociolinguists 
modeled after the methodology used by Deborah Tannen. Each student-
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sociolinguist becomes something like participant-observer and is 
assigned to a group where he or she will observe the conversational 
styles of the males and females in each group. The groups are then 
instructed to engage in a discussion about a specific topic given to 
them, a topic that will be intentionally controversial (e.g., "The 
decision to change the name of the Simpson mascot from 'Redmen' to 
'Storm' was motivated only by concern over being politically 
correct"). The groups "go at it" for about 30 minutes. After the 
discussion period ends, the "sociolinguists" report to the class their 
observations and attempt to align those observations with specific 
findings by Tannen (rapport/report talk, independence/intimacy, one-
upsmanship, cooperation, etc). The class as a whole is encouraged to 
take part in this "debriefing" exercise. The final five minutes will be 
set aside for the assignment of a two-page paper: "How do the key 
concepts of understanding and connectedness compare with one 
another in the sociolinguistic model and in the cognitive model?" And 
also for a one-page paper that will serve as an introduction to Tavris 
book: "Based on what we have read and talked about up to this point, 
do you believe that essential differences exist in the natures of men 
and women? Why and/or why not?" Lastly, the students write their 
one-minute papers. 
The third lesson plan is called "The Power Perspective" and 
takes as its key Idea(s) the following: 1) "The philosophy of cultural 
feminism has functioned to keep women focused on their allegedly 
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Stable and innate personality qualities, instead of on what it would 
take to have a society based on the qualities we value in both sexes"; 
and 2) "To free oneself from the [white male club] and to change it, 
one must question its assumptions and carve out a new self-
understanding -- both individually and as a member of a g r o u p . " 2 8 9  
The required texts are: 1) Caryn M. Musil, ed. "The Courage to 
Question." Executive Summary of the AAC Report on Women's Studies 
and Student Learning, 1992 (Class Handout); 2) Carol Tavris, The 
Mismeasure of Woman (Introduction, Chapters 2, and Chapter 8); and 
3) Robert Terry, "The White Male Club" (Class Handout), The students 
will have the following preconceptions and prior Icnowledge: 1) 
Students will have read Terry's article and the readings from Tavris' 
book; 2) Some male and female students will take offense at the idea 
of the "White Male Club"; 3) Most of the students will have come to an 
understanding of "cultural feminism"; 4) Students will have read the 
AAC Report Summary and will understand the scope of Women's 
Studies at the postsecondary level and that what we have been doing 
is not some fragmented version of "political correctness." 
The procedure begins as it did with the previous lesson: The 
students will begin with a review of one-minute paper questions and 
comments, and then they will take turns reading their one-page 
papers on the question of the essential natures of men and women. 
^®®1) Carol Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 332; 
and 2) Robert Terry, "The White Male Club," Civil Rights Digest (1974): 20. 
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This reading with the accompanying discussion takes most of the 
time, but before the end of class, the students are introduced to the 
"Tavris/Terry Model," again, by way of an overhead transparency. At 
the beginning of the next class, the students are divided again into 
four different groups. Each group is assigned the following two 
questions for their discussion: 1) "What evidence from your own 
personal experience can you cite to support Terry's claim for the 
existence of a "White Male Club?" and 2) "What examples from your 
own educational experience (elementary, secondary, and post-
secondary) can you cite in support of Tavris' claim that men have been 
traditionally 'the measure of all things' and that women have been 
judged according to that norm?" This discussion takes the full class 
time, so at the following meeting, each group reports to the class and 
comparisons/contrasts, application, and contextualization cues help 
them in developing a meaningful dialogue. Because this activity takes 
most of the class time, the last ten minutes is set aside for the 
writing of the one-minute paper and to the assignment of a two-page 
paper: "Based on your reading of Women's Ways and You Just Don't 
Understand, do you agree or disagree with Carol Tavris' critique of 
those works as examples of a 'flawed' cultural feminism? Draw on 
your own experience and from your thoughts about the essential 
nature of men and women." 
In conclusion, the success of this unit depends on the 
applicability of two assumptions about the interrelationship of 
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hermeneutics, multicultural education, teaching, and "constructed 
knowledge." First, as James Banks explains it, "The challenge that 
teachers face is how to make effective instructional use of the 
personal and cultural knowledge of students while at the same time 
helping them to reach beyond their own cultural boundaries."290 In the 
jargon of philosophical hermeneutics, this amounts to an affirmation 
of Gadamer's insight that "it is not so much our judgments as it is our 
prejudices that constitute our being" and that "the nature of the 
hermeneutical experience is not that something is outside and desires 
admission. Rather, we are possessed by something and precisely by 
means of it we are opened up for the new, the different, the true."^®'' 
For Gadamer, prejudgments are what Harold Bloom calls the "hidden 
roads between poems" that get us into the hermeneutical circle, but, 
as we have seen, the circle is not a closed circuit. Rather, it is more 
like a spiral wherein occurs the "fusion of horizons," the dialectical 
interplay of which widens the spiral of that circle toward an infinity 
of new experiences. Banks, having made this point about what he calls 
"cultural knowledge," then reinforces his argument (and the rationale 
for my unit) by directing our attention to the role that 
"transformative knowledge" also plays in multicultural education. He 
says, "Transformative academic knowledge challenges some of the 
key assumptions that mainstream scholars make about the nature of 
^^'^James Banks, "The Canon Debate, Knowledge Construction, and Multicultural Education," 
Educational Researcher ^993): 8. 
Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem," in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, ed. David Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 9. 
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k n o w l e d g e ."292 And here, for "transformative knowledge," we could 
substitute "constructed knowledge" without missing a beat. 
The second assumption is one made by Charles Payne in his 
article "Multicultural Education: A Natural Way to Teach." Basically 
making the same point that Banks makes in regard to process, Payne 
centralizes his concern on the strengths of a culture or cultures: "It 
would appear that natural skills and abilities which have been 
acquired because of a certain lifestyle or culture would be more 
useful in teaching when viewed as cultural strengths and not 
weaknesses."293 Again, Women's Ways' "connected teaching," 
Gadamer's "preconceptions," and Gallagher's version of a "local 
hermeneutics" all seem to converge with this underlying assumption 
about the role of multicultural education in modern educational theory 
and practice. It was this striking compatibility that confirmed my 
decision to begin with this particular course as the most compatible 
with our thesis. 
292Banks, 9. 
2®3charles R. Payne, "Multicultural Education: A Natural Way to Teach" Contemporary 
Education 54, no. 2 (Winter 1983): 98-104. 
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CHAPTER? 
CONCLUSION 
The book will not appeal to teachers who prefer to work 
with manuals and guides and a rigid syllabus. There are no 
special "study questions" because tlie whole book Is a 
study question. 
-- Ann Berthoff, Forming, Thinking, Writing 
Thus all useful education begins with and circles back to 
historical understanding. Since time gives knowledge a 
narrative structure, self-knowledge means storytelling. 
And when the self knowledge is collective, the storytelling 
is shared. Education is systematic storytelling. 
- Benjamin Barber, An Aristocracy of Everyone 
Ann Berthoffs characterization of her book as "one big study 
question" is a practical way to describe this dissertation and its 
i n v e s t m e n t  i n  w h a t  G a d a m e r  c a l l s  t h e  " h o r i z o n  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n . I f  
we think of the dissertation in this way, that is, as an answer to a 
question, the question that lies behind it is "How does one go about 
'making' a human being?"^^^ However, as Gadamer goes on to point 
^^^Gadamer, Truth and Method, 370. Gadamer says that "a person who wants to understand 
must question what lies behind what is said. He [sic] must understand it as an answer to a 
question." He goes on to say that "If we go back behind what is said, then we inevitably ask 
questions beyond what is said. We understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the 
horizon of the question -- a horizon that, as such, necessarily includes other possible answers." 
In Chapter 6, I describe how this "logic of the question" can be applied to the preparation of 
lesson plans, especially in teacher education courses. 
pQC 
^"''As far as the "meeting" of Emiie and Franltenstein goes, implicit in this "making" are the 
divergent paths taken by the educational "organicists" (Emileians, if you will) and the 
"technicists" (Frankensteinians). The choice, figuratively speaking, is between "cultivating" or 
reproduction, on the one hand, and "building" or production, on the other. Dewey calls the 
former "growth" and Skinner names the latter "technology." The "question horizon" itself 
begs the question of monstrosity, e.g., "How does one go about making an 'anomalous' human 
being?" Implicit in the discussion of monstrosity in Chapter 1 is that this "making" does not so 
much involve a Frankenstelnian laboratory as it does an "exemplar mediated prejudice," i.e., 
the way that people "see" other people (women and people of color, for example) as being 
"subhuman." 
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out, because the meaning of a work is relative to the question to 
which it is an answer, its meaning necessarily exceeds what is said 
in it. This means that although our "horizon of the question" might be 
discursively straightforward enough, the answer to which the 
dissertation attempts to give meaning "exceeds" what is said in it. 
Thus we arrive at the dissertation not only as an elaboration of the 
thesis that the educational experience is hermeneutical.^s^ but as an 
attempt to answer other key questions to which this situation has 
given rise. Among those other questions are the following: "What sort 
of educational experience is contingent upon a philosophy of education 
that is essentially hermeneutical?" "What is it about Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics [or in Gallagher's terms a "moderate 
hermeneutics"] that precludes the other hermeneutical theories as the 
basis for a theory of education, and how, exactly, will it address the 
problem with which this hermeneutical approach to education is 
concerned?" And given that the educational experience is 
hermeneutical, "In what ways can hermeneutics be complemented so 
as to account for gender issues, and how can the critique of gender be 
complemented by hermeneutics, reciprocally, so that one does not 
supercede the other?" And finally, "How plausible is this philosophy 
of education as a counterweight to the monomethodologism of modern 
educational practice?" The variation on this theme that formulates 
pQC 
we have seen, this is a thesis given its fullest expression by Shaun Gallagher in his 
Hermeneutics and Education (1992). 
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the dissertation's thesis is that the educational experience is, in 
fact, a continuous reconstruction of the complementary reciprocation 
between the ontology of philosophical hermeneutics and the 
epistemology of Women's Ways of Knowing. 
The reason for taking this particular approach is that it offers a 
plausible corrective to what we have identified as the most serious 
problem faced by modern educational theory and practice, which is 
essentially that it has become based upon a social engineering model 
informed by the idea that method, especially scientific method and 
techne, is the road to truth. As we explained this problem in Chapter 
4, it is essentially that education has naively surrendered to the 
social engineering model of the social sciences, which, in turn, so as 
not to forfeit its rightful place on the high road to truth, appropriated 
it from the Enlightenment model of the natural sciences. This mutated 
conception of education has collapsed practical judgment or what 
Aristotle calls phronesis into technical know-how or techne. We 
have explained that practical judgment belongs to the realm of "tact," 
of the "extrascientific experiences" that Gadamer associates with 
the four "guiding concepts of humanism": "Bildung," "taste," "sensus 
communis," and "judgment." And that this is also where Gadamer 
connects with Women's Ways, for these are the key concepts that 
best illustrate the impropriety of method, not only in the human 
PQ7 
"'The philosophical hermeneutics referred to is the philosophy of ontological understanding 
developed by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer and described in his Truth and 
Method (1960), and the epistemology is that described by Mary Belenky et al in their study of 
the cognitive development of women, Women's Ways of Knowing (1986). 
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sciences but also in the course of everyday human experience and 
interaction, as well as in the activity of what Women's Ways calls 
"constructed knowing" (and "connected teaching"). As we have shown, 
this impropriety of method comes about because method is supposedly 
derived from a "universal" principle, and the application of that 
method would be invariant regardless of the situation, which is to 
say, "tactless" and therefore inappropriate. To make this point more 
clearly, we cited the example of an individual who is taught a second 
language from a series of outdated audiotapes and who has had no 
other contact with that language. The result would be mere parroting, 
i.e., an "uncultivated" use of the language. The language user would 
have no "sixth sense" of how to use the language at the right time in 
the right place. In other words, the parroting would be applied techne 
without concern for the practical judgment of phronesis. It would not 
require any sense of taste, common sense, or practical judgment for 
its application, which is to say that "tact," because it is not a 
techne, cannot be taught. And as we saw in Chapter 2, if we take this 
example as a "microtext" for the whole of our modern technological 
culture, and specifically for modern educational practices, this is the 
situation that we must come to terms with, for as we are all aware, 
"method" in this context can be synonymous with an abusive and 
methodical, negative prejudice. 
Recognizing this as the problem (or the question) for which this 
dissertation offers a possible solution (is an answer to) is the first 
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Step. That first step, then, requires an early formulation of the 
solution itself, which is fairly obvious: People need to know how to 
use techne at the right time in the right place, they need to develop 
phronesis. In the jargon of our thesis, the way to do this is in a kind 
of reflexive complementarity between what Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics calls "tact" and what Women's Ways' conceives of as 
"constructed knowledge." Understood in this way, we arrive at our 
aim for education: the inculcation of "tact" through Bildung by 
recognizing that the educational experience is the continuous 
reconstruction of the complementary reciprocation between the 
ontology of philosophical hermeneutics and the epistemology of 
Women's Ways of Knowing.^^^ 
The more complete solution to this problem, we have argued, 
relies on three areas of compatibility that exist between traditional 
educational theory, Gadamer's hermeneutics, and the thesis as we are 
proposing it. These are the key concepts of "understanding," 
"experience," and Bildung. This compatibility, as it has been outlined 
primarily in Chapters 2-4, is defined by the ontological understanding 
of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, the pragmatic experience of 
John Dewey's theory of education, and Bildung as the "constructed 
knowledge" of Women's Ways of Knowing. 
For Gadamer understanding is not simply empathy. It is 
this regard, Gadamer hints at the dissertation's implicit theme of monstrosity: "When a 
naive faith in scientific method denies the existence of effective history, there can be an actual 
deformation of knowledge. We are familiar w/ith this from the history of science, where it 
appears as the irrefutable proof of something that is obviously false' {Truth and Method, 301). 
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characterized by historicity, linguisticality, and dialectic. Indeed, 
understanding always involves more than merely reconstructing the 
past "world" to which the work belongs. Hermeneutical understanding 
always retains the consciousness that the interlocutor too belongs to 
that world, and correlatively, that the work too belongs to his or her 
world. Because understanding constitutes the movement of Being 
itself, we can never presume to think that a "correct" meaning or 
intention is discoverable by some innate faculty that allows us to 
identify with another person or with another time period. The most 
we can hope to achieve is that we remain open to the other person's or 
text's meaning by situating that other meaning in relation to the 
whole of our own meanings or ourselves in relation to it. In fact, the 
task of hermeneutical understanding is to question a text and to be 
prepared for it to have something to tell us in return. Thus a 
hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, 
sensitive to the text's "otherness," which involves the foregrounding 
of one's own preconceptions and prejudices so that the text can 
present itself in all its "otherness" and thus assert its own truth 
against those preconceptions. It is what Gadamer calls the "tyranny 
of hidden prejudices" that makes us deaf to what speaks to us in 
tradition. 
For our purposes, the historicity of understanding might be best 
summed up with Gadamer's emphasis that understanding is primarily 
a process of participation as a constant mediation of past and 
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present, what Women's Ways calls "connected knowing." It is this 
mediation of present and past that Gadamer calls a "fusion of 
horizons" and by which he further defines understanding. And 
contemporaneous with this "fusion of horizons" is the linguistical 
dimension of Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding. And Gadamer is 
unequivocal about this when he asserts that "Being that can be 
understood is language"^^^ or that "understanding and interpretation 
are ultimately the same thing." And this linguisticality, in turn, bears 
directly on the historicity and the dialectical nature of understanding. 
In other words, what is true of understanding is just as true of 
language. Neither can be grasped simply as a fact or as an object that 
can be empirically investigated by means of what is in Women's 
Ways' terminology, "separate knowing." But the educational 
implications of Gadamer's hermeneutical understanding go beyond its 
compatibility with Women's Ways. This hermeneutical 
"understanding" we have maintained has strong affinities with what 
we have referred to as contemporary "tacit hermeneutical 
pedagogies." Representative of these are "the pedagogies of 
understanding" (Perkins, Cohen, Egan), "the pedagogy of care" 
(Noddings), "connected teaching" (Belenky et al), "dialogic teaching" 
(Reinsmith), "constructivism" (Brooks and Brooks), educational 
theories and practices that are explicitly and/or implicitly derived 
from Gadamer's hermeneutics, and "the pedagogy of the oppressed" 
Truth and Method, 474, 388. 
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(Freire). Finally, the multicultural implications of Gadamer's 
hermeneutical understanding are implicit in its inescapable capacity 
for a "fusion of horizons." 
"Experience," as the second of the three affinities, was advanced 
in Chapter 3 with the assumption that Gadamer's hermeneutical 
"experience of negation" and its concomitant "fusion of horizons" 
are, indeed, compatible with John Dewey's insistence that a 
philosophy of education must rely on a theory of experience, and that 
"philosophy is the theory of education in its most general phases." 
But if Dewey's philosophy of education, according to our argument, 
were based upon the hermeneutical experience, it was not to be 
thought of as a prescription or procedure for a new educational 
methodology. Rather, in Gadamer's terms, it would be the art of 
employing methods where they belong, not where they don't belong. 
This hermeneutical approach to Dewey established the following 
theses: 1) Dewey's "social movement circle" can be viewed as a 
variant of the hermeneutical circle and that that structure is the 
structure of experience. 2) Dewey's observation that since the 
objectives of learning are in the future and its immediate materials 
are in present experience, they can be carried into effect only in the 
degree that "present experience is stretched, as it were, backward," 
expanding into the future only as it is also enlarged to take in the 
past,30° describes hermeneutical historicity, linguisticality, and 
®®®Dewey, Experience and Education, 77. 
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dialectic. 3) This "hermeneutical experience" also describes a 
Deweyan version of Gadamer's "fusion of horizons" and its direct 
relationship to understanding. 4) Dewey's prescription for the 
situation as dependent upon the two inseparable principles of 
"interaction" and "continuity" -- what he calls the "longitudinal and 
lateral aspects of experience" ~ is another way of getting at 
Gadamerian dialectic and historicity. And 5) Dewey's use of the word 
"reconstruction" in his lifelong insistence on education as the 
"continuous reconstruction of experience" is not synonymous with 
repeatability, as in the positivist's sense of a capacity to repeat an 
experiment for verifiability. Rather, as Richard Rorty has argued, it 
can be best understood to mean redescription, what Gadamer 
characterizes as "an ongoing reacquisition that proceeds into 
infinity." One major implication of this argument is that if Gadamer's 
hermeneutics can supplement Dewey's theory of experience and thus 
underwrite the compatibility of a continental philosophical 
hermeneutics with a philosophy of education in a liberal democracy, 
then other aspects of Dewey's Americanized Hegelianism could very 
well be reexamined in the light of what Richard Bernstein calls the 
New Constellation and the "grand Either/Or" that is its universe.^'^^ 
In his "Introduction" to The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of 
Modernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), Bernstein explains why he chose 
this metaphor. The explanation is in the context of his primary concern with probing "the grand 
Either/Or: either there is a rational grounding of the norms of critique or the conviction that 
there is such a rational grounding is itself a self-deceptive illusion": "The reason why I find this 
metaphor so fertile is because I want to show that our "modern/postmodern" situation or 
predicament is one that defies and resists any and all attempts of reduction to 'a common 
denominator, essential core, or generative first principle.' 'Constellation' is deliberately 
intended to displace Hegel's master metaphor of Aufhebung. For, as I will argue, although we 
cannot (and should not) give up the promise and demand for reconciliation -- a reconciliation 
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Such a reading of Dewey's theory of education in terms of his own 
persistent preoccupation with Either/Or's would reveal -- as Richard 
Rorty has shown - not so much a radical "postmodernism" but a 
hermeneutics of education that makes philosophical sense out of 
those Deweyan concepts like "experience," "growth," "science," and 
"method" that have been misunderstood and misapplied in the 
educational context for generations. 
Bildung, the third and final node of complementarity between 
the educational experience and philosophical hermeneutics, is the 
German word in Gadamer's hermeneutics that is roughly synonymous 
with the process of educative acculturation. As a third key concept in 
our argument for an alternative to a "technology of teaching," we 
discussed it in Chapter 4 in terms of Women's Ways' "constructed 
knowledge" as the "meeting" of hermeneutical understanding and 
experience, i.e., the two previous chapters. What we proposed in that 
chapter is that our emphasis is not on the postmodern as such, nor is 
it on a postmodern critical feminism, but we were careful not to 
dismiss these deconstructive efforts out of hand. Rather, we 
attempted to build on the terrain cleared off by the critical theorists 
so that our approach would be more pragmatically directed in the 
achieved by what Hegel calls 'determinate negation,' I do not think we can any longer 
responsibly claim that there is or can be a final reconciliation -- an Aufhebung in which all 
difference, otherness, opposition and contradiction are reconciled. There are always unexpected 
contingent ruptures that dis-rupt the project of reconciliation. The changing elements of the new 
constellation resist such reduction. What is 'new' about this constellation is the growing 
awareness of the depth of radical instabilities. We have to learn to think and act in the "in-
between" interstices of forced reconciliations and radical dispersion" (8-9). 
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sense that Women's Ways can be understood as complementing 
philosophical hermeneutics (and vice versa) in much the same way 
that we argued in Chapter 3 for philosophical hermeneutics as 
supplementing Dewey's theory of experience. To put this another way, 
with our discussion of Bildung, we have attempted to bring the 
critical theorists and the pragmatists into the same conversation, and 
as a variation on how Women's Ways conceptualizes "connected 
teaching," this complementarity can provide an overflowing source 
for practical applications in the classroom. (In Chapter 6 we have 
demonstrated how one area of that potentiality -- multicultural 
nonsexist education -- can be developed into a "unit plan.") What must 
be kept in mind here, though, is that this is not a one-sided operation. 
Philosophical hermeneutics, for example, will not be telling Women's 
Ways (or vice versa) what to do in order to effect change within the 
dominant power structure. What emerged in the course of this 
argument was a kind of reciprocating complementarity or a "fusion of 
horizons" by which philosophical hermeneutics meets certain needs of 
Women's Ways, and Women's Ways reciprocates. The subsequent 
widening of horizons was what we have referred to as Bildung. In the 
educational context, the implications of this fusing become evident 
with Women's Ways' advocacy of "connected teaching" and the 
necessary roles that understanding and experience, for example, play 
in the development of that pedagogical and epistemological mode, 
especially in the multicultural nonsexist classroom. 
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The point of our proposed reciprocation is that philosophical 
hermeneutics, complemented by Women's Ways, can account for the 
gender inequities that are the direct concerns of feminist thought 
and, by implication, the direct concerns of educational theory, and 
that this can be effected without slipping into a feminist 
essentialism. And, as we have tried to further demonstrate in Chapter 
5, we have taken this one step farther by assimilating metaphoricity 
into the concept of Bildung, thus demonstrating the potential for a 
feminist rhetoric immanent in this particular fusion of horizons. In 
brief, we agree with Gadamer that Bildung, not method, best explains 
the nature of hermeneutic understanding. We then take the position 
that Bildung also displays the structure of metaphor and that there 
is therefore a real sense in which we can say understanding is itself 
fundamentally metaphorical. For example, the dialectical structure of 
"departure" from and "return" to self that defines Bildung can also 
be viewed as the circular structure of hermeneutic understanding and 
metaphor. Moments of Bildung -- or what Dewey called "growth" -
occur when the interpreter (or student) is altered not so much by 
acquiring a new piece of information but by assimilating a "new" 
horizon (usually through the hermeneutic experience of negation) and, 
accordingly, learns to understand differently. This new understanding, 
in turn, initiates a new self-understanding which, in our view, defines 
a reciprocal transference like that which characterizes interactive 
metaphor and Gadamer's "fusion of horizons." The chapter concludes 
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by leading into what can be construed as Part 2 of the thesis, which is 
a metaphorical treatment (Chapter 5) of the three previous chapters, 
and a practical treatment of the same (Chapter 6). 
In Chapter 5 we turned to literary texts, Frankenstein and 
Emile, as a way to further the inquiry into the contingencies of 
education, hermeneutics, trait-genderization, language, and metaphor. 
Actually, one might think of the theme of "meeting," which Chapter 5 
makes explicit, as a further reaffirmation of Gadamer's thesis of 
Truth and Method, where he says that "the thing which hermeneutics 
teaches us is to see through the dogmatism of asserting an opposition 
and separation between the ongoing, natural 'tradition' and the 
reflective appropriation of it."^®^ /\s an exemplum or metaphor for 
the complementary reciprocation of philosophical hermeneutics and 
Women's Ways, the "meeting" of Frankenstein and Emile is an 
answer to the question, "What would it mean if the educational 
experience were fundamentally metaphoristic?" And what our answer 
tries to suggest for education is that the interactive process of 
learning something new while admitting we must always start with 
what and how we already know is, in fact, the process of 
metaphoricity and the structure immanent in Bildung. If this 
understanding of the educational experience were recognized as the 
ontological basis for learning, what implications would this have for 
the behavioral objectives model approach to education that is the 
^^^Truth and Method, 28. 
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foundational basis for most of the pre-college and postsecondary 
educational systems in today's society? Wouldn't it require a 
significant rethinking of the infrastructure of teacher preparation 
programs? 
What we have tried to demonstrate with our reading of these two 
texts as a metaphor for that metaphoricity, i.e., our thesis, is that the 
educational experience begins with an anomaly (Frankenstein's 
monster) revealed through a hermeneutical "experience of negation," 
which is that kind of experience that results in the opposite of what 
was intended, being this opposite usually is inexplicable, given the 
experiencer's preconceptual framework. What is then required in order 
to make sense of things is a metaphorical relation {Emile) that might 
build on what is familiar in that personal forestructure and thus 
generate an interpretation of the anomaly. The testing of the validity 
of that interpretation is the continuous reconstruction of the 
complementary reciprocation between the ontology of philosophical 
hermeneutics and the epistemology of Women's Ways of Knowing. 
What this activity turns up for us in the meeting of Franl<enstein and 
Emile is that where they truly meet is in their sexism (Sophie's 
"place" in society and Victor's refusal to make a mate for his 
creature), and the educational corrective that follows suit is a 
transumptive or metaphorical understanding of the "tyrrany of the 
hidden prejudice," so that what we "learn" is that education cannot 
be education for liberty without this "new" fusion of horizons which 
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has been effected historically, linguistically, and dialectically. 
The chapter is, in effect, an exemplum for the previous three 
chapters and points the way to further implications having to do with 
understanding, experience, and Bildung as educational principles. 
This is to say that the "meeting" or "fusion of horizons" of Emile 
and Frankenstein is illustrative of: 1) the fundamental metaphoricity 
immanent in our thesis and, by extension, in the educational 
experience; 2) the possibility for a "two-sex society" where 
educational theory and philosophy place males and females in one 
world -- a world in which the sexes live together independently; 3) 
the hermeneutical interactivity of understanding, experience, and 
Bildung: and 4) the linguistic, historical, and dialectical 
characteristics peculiar to philosophical hermeneutics. But this 
"meeting" was not "arranged" so that it follows a critical or textual 
approach to the works themselves. What "method" there is follows 
from Richard Rorty's point that a text is not about something but 
should be used for something. Or in his words, "the distinction is 
between getting it right and making it useful." He expands this view 
by saying that "Such criticism uses the author or text not as a 
specimen reiterating a type but as an occasion for changing a 
previously accepted taxonomy, or for putting a new twist on a 
previously told story.Generally, the "new twist" that Chapter 5 
sets in motion has a lot to do with how we think about the educational 
citations are from Steplian Coliini, ed., Interpretation and Overinterpretation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 108. 
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experience and very little to do with what something "really" means. 
The larger implications for the classroom teacher are taken up in 
the final chapter, Chapter 6, where specific lesson plans are 
described for a unit that was developed for a "Human Relations in 
Teaching" course at Simpson College in Indianola, Iowa, a course that 
is required for state teaching licensure. The emphasis here is on the 
promise that the thesis holds for teacher preparation courses in 
multicultural, nonsexist education, but the implications for the 
"canon debate" and the "culture wars" are unavoidable. In Chapter 2, 
we were introduced to what such a practice might be like as well as 
to what such a practice would not be like, namely, the behavioral 
objectives model of instruction. In Chapter 2 we also briefly surveyed 
several models of what we termed "explicit" and "tacit" 
hermeneutical approaches to the classroom experience, and we also 
saw that the "connected teaching" of Women's Ways with its ties to 
Paulo Freire's problem-posing approaches to teaching and his 
opposition to the "banking-concept" of teaching can also be 
understood as compatible with philosophical hermeneutics. We saw, 
too, that certain "pedagogies of understanding" and "constructivist" 
practices are also compatible with our thesis. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 3, we saw that John Dewey's theory of experience and 
education — the similarities between his integrative concept of "the 
past of the living present" and the concept of the hermeneutical 
circle ~ offers us another touchstone. 
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So although the basic, practical, pedagogical views of this thesis 
are not necessarily predominant views, they are themselves familiar 
to thoughtful students in the field. However, even for many of those 
thoughtful practitioners, these views have become semi-hackneyed 
and, accordingly, have slipped into the pejorative, dead metaphor 
office of educational jargon. The challenge, then, specifically for 
Chapter 6 and generally for the thesis as a whole is not simply to 
recycle or to repackage existing (or at least perceived to be existing) 
classroom practices under a new and "catchier" label; it is to create 
for the student and for the teacher the "edifying" open space and 
social hope necessary to counteract the "fear of freedom" and the 
defensive denials that go along with it. It is, in words that we have 
used previously, the challenge of pulling the plug on the "tyrannical 
machine" that is running our teacher preparation programs and, by 
extension, the majority of classrooms in today's public schools. It is 
the kind of tyranny that is self-perpetuating so that a postsecondary 
student teacher who does receive an "edifying" understanding of the 
educational experience will, during his or her practice teaching 
requirement, more than likely get "processed" into the machine that 
the teacher preparation program spent so much time theoretically 
deconstructing. And it goes without saying that that same machine is 
having the same effect on the school students themselves, thus 
making the machine truly tyrannical. 
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In the course of our thesis, this is what we have tried to portray 
as "monstrosity," techne, sexism, and as the "abuse of method" with 
all of the negative prejudices contingent upon that closed-
mindedness. Confronting these denials, these fears of freedom and the 
obstacles they create is the critical challenge facing the schools and 
the schools of education today. How do we get students in the schools, 
students in the academy, and teachers in the same to recognize these 
denials for what they are -- self-deceptions about "true" motives? 
How do you tell an experienced teacher that the resistance she is 
offering to "that old Progressive stuff" has everything to do with 
stereotypy and an unfounded motive to escape from freedom and 
nothing to do with the nature of learning and the educational 
experience? How do you tell this to student teachers? The task of this 
thesis is to suggest that a "fusing" of philosophical hermeneutics and 
Women's Ways provides an ontological way of thinking about the 
educational experience, and what this means in terms of classroom 
practice is that the responsibility of the teacher is nothing less than 
getting students to understand who they are by acknowledging who 
they have been and who they will be, and that this Being that can be 
understood is language, not some "monster" created ex nihilo by a 
mistaken belief in techne as the way to truth. 
Where the thesis will contribute the most is in the teacher 
preparation programs at colleges and universities. By offering an 
214  
ontological alternative to a mentality that is circumscribed by the 
behavioral objectives model of education, the thesis may undermine 
the self-perpetuation of the "tyrannical machine" that "runs" modern 
education. For at least the past twenty years, supporting evidence, 
both theoretical and practical, has been growing to substantiate the 
claim in favor of the compatibility of Gadamer's hermeneutics and 
education, and for at least the past ten years the evidence has been 
growing in support of a complementary reciprocation between 
feminism and hermeneutics. The dissertation provides one of the most 
up-to-date sources for both the theoretical and the practical work in 
the hermeneutics-as-education movement. 
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